WIND

§239. In these cases Barclay, the great champion of absolute monarchy, is forced to allow, that a king may be resisted, and ceases to be a king. That is, in short, not to multiply cases, in whatsoever he has no authority, there he is no king, and may be resisted: for wheresoever the authority ceases, the king ceases too, and becomes like other men who have no authority. And these two cases he instances in, differ little from those above mentioned, to be destructive to governments, only that he has omitted the principle from which his doctrine flows: and that is, the breach of trust, in not preserving the form of government agreed on, and in not intending the end of government itself, which is the public good and preservation of property. When a king has dethroned himself, and put himself in a state of war with his people, what shall hinder them from prosecuting him who is no king, as they would any other man, who has put himself into a state of war with them, Barclay, and those of his opinion, would do well to tell us. This farther I desire may be taken notice of out of Barclay, that he says, the mischief that is designed them, the people may prevent before it be clone: whereby he allows resistance when tyranny is but in design. Such designs as these (says he) when any king harbours in his thoughts and seriously promotes, he immediately gives up all care and thought of the common-wealth; so that, according to him, the neglect of the public good is to be taken as an evidence of such design, or at least for a sufficient cause of resistance. And the reason of all, he gives in these words, because he betrayed or forced his people, whose liberty he ought carefully to have preserved. What he adds, into the power and dominion of a foreign nation, signifies nothing, the fault and forfeiture lying in the loss of their liberty, which he ought to have preserved, and not in any distinction of the persons to whose dominion they were subjected. The people’s right is equally invaded, and their liberty lost, whether they are made slaves to any of their own, or a foreign nation; and in this lies the injury, and against this only have they the right of defence. And there are instances to be found in all countries, which shew, that it is not the change of nations in the persons of their governors, but the change of government, that gives the offence. Bilson, a bishop of our church, and a great stickler for the power and prerogative of princes, does, if I mistake not, in his treatise of Christian subjection, acknowledge, that princes may forfeit their power, and their title to the obedience of their subjects; and if there needed authority in a case where reason is so plain, I could send my reader to Bracton, Fortescue, and the author of the Mirrour, and others, writers that cannot be suspected to be ignorant of our government, or enemies to it.
§239. 在这些情况中，绝对君主制的重要斗士巴克利也不得不承认，国王可以遭到抵抗，而不再成其为国王。换句话说，简而言之，无需大量举例，在任何没有授权的事情上，他就不是国王，就可以遭到抵抗：因为在授权终止的情况下，国王也就终止了，他变成了像其他没有权力的人一样。在巴克利所列举的两种情况中，与前面提到的破坏政府的情况并没有多大的区别，只是他忘记了他的学说所依据的原则：这个原则就是，违背信任，不去保护人们所同意的政府形式，不去追求政府本身的目的，即公共利益和财产的保护。当一个国王自我罢免，置身于对其臣民的战争状态之中，又有什么办法阻止他们对不是国王的他进行指控呢，如同他们指控任何其他的对他们宣战的人，巴克利，以及那些赞同他的观点的人，最好好好给我们解释一下。对巴克利的话，我希望进一步注意，他说，意图加于人们的伤害，他们可以在其实现之前予以阻止：据此当暴政还在计划当中他也允许进行抵抗。（他说）当任何国王怀有这样的意图并真的促其实现，他便立即放弃了所有对国家的关心；所以，根据他的说法，忽略公共利益可以被视为这样的意图的证据，或至少是抵抗的一个充分理由。而全部的理由，他是这样说的，因为他背叛或者强迫他的臣民——他本来应当细心的保护他们的自由的。至于他添加的“置身于外国的权力和统治之下”则没有什么意义，国王的过错和权力的丧失在于他本来应当加以保护的臣民的自由的丧失，而不在于他们受谁统治的不同。无论他们做他们自己人的奴隶，还是做外国的奴隶，人们的权利都是同样的受到侵犯，他们的自由都是同样的丧失；他们所受的伤害在这里，并且他们也只有反抗这种伤害的自卫权利。在所有国家都能找到这样的例子说明，引起侵犯的并不是统治者们的国籍的改变，而是政府的改变。比尔森（Thomas Bilson，1547 – 1616），我们教会的一个主教，一个君主权力和特殊权力的重要的拥护者，如果我没有弄错的话，在他的《论基督徒的服从》中承认，君主们可以丧失他们的权力和拥有其臣民的服从的资格；如果在理由如此明白的情况下还需要学术权威的话，我建议我的读者到布莱克顿，福特斯丘，《明镜》的作者，以及其他的写作者那里去，这些人都不能被怀疑对我们的政府无知或是我们政府的敌人。

WIND

But I thought Hooker alone might be enough to satisfy those men, who relying on him for their ecclesiastical polity, are by a strange fate carried to deny those principles upon which he builds it. Whether they are herein made the tools of cunninger workmen, to pull down their own fabric, they were best look. This I am sure, their civil policy is so new, so dangerous, and so destructive to both rulers and people, that as former ages never could bear the broaching of it; so it may be hoped, those to come, redeemed from the impositions of these Egyptian under-task-masters, will abhor the memory of such servile flatterers, who, whilst it seemed to serve their turn, resolved all government into absolute tyranny, and would have all men born to, what their mean souls fitted them for, slavery.
但是我想也许胡克一人就足以满足那些认为其基督教政制依赖于他的人，他们在一种奇怪的命运的驱使下，竟然否定那些胡克的学说所据以建立的原则。他们是否在此变成了诡诈之人的工具，把他们自己的建造物都拆毁了，他们最好细查一下。我可以肯定的是，他们的世俗策略是如此的新颖，如此的危险，对统治者和全体公民都是如此具有破坏性，以致，在以前的时代从未容许提起讨论；也许可以期待，将来的统治者，从这些“埃及的地下工头”的强迫下被拯救出来之后，会对这些奴性的奉承者感到厌恶，他们看似在服务其职，其实是将政府引向绝对暴政，意欲使所有人生来就受奴役，虽然他们卑贱的灵魂使他们自己适于被奴役。

WIND

§240. Here, it is like, the common question will be made, who shall be judge, whether the prince or legislative act contrary to their trust? This, perhaps, ill-affected and factious men may spread amongst the people, when the prince only makes use of his due prerogative. To this I reply, The people shall be judge; for who shall be judge whether his trustee or deputy acts well, and according to the trust reposed in him, but he who deputes him, and must, by having deputed him, have still a power to discard him, when he fails in his trust? If this be reasonable in particular cases of private men, why should it be otherwise in that of the greatest moment, where the welfare of millions is concerned, and also where the evil, if not prevented, is greater, and the redress very difficult, dear, and dangerous?
§240. 这里，可能又会提出这个通常的问题，即谁来担当审判者裁定君主或立法权力行事违背了他们的信任？当君主仅仅行使其正当的特殊权力时，心怀恶意好纷争的人可能会在人们中间散布流言。对此我的回答是，全体公民应当担当审判者；因为谁来裁定他的受托人或代理人做得好不好，是不是依其信任行事，除了委托人之外还会是谁呢？并且因为委托与受托人，当受托人辜负信任时，委托人不应该拥有终止委托的权力吗？如果这在私人的特别情况下是合理的，为什么在关乎数百万人的福利的时候，在罪恶更大——如果不阻止的话，矫正非常困难，代价高并且危险的时候这样最紧要的关头反而不合理了呢？

§241. But farther, this question, (Who shall be judge?) cannot mean, that there is no judge at all: for where there is no judicature on earth, to decide controversies amongst men, God in heaven is judge. He alone, it is true, is judge of the right. But every man is judge for himself, as in all other cases, so in this, whether another hath put himself into a state of war with him, and whether he should appeal to the Supreme Judge, as Jephthah did.
§241. 进一步而言，这个问题，（谁来担当审判者？）并不意味着，根本就不存在审判者：因为即使在这世上没有司法权力来裁定人们之间的争议，天国的上帝便是审判者。确实，只有祂才是权利的审判者。但是，如同所有其它的情况一样，每个人都可自行判定，在这种情况下，他人是否置身于对他的战争状态之中，他是否应当像耶弗他那样诉诸于最高的审判者。

WIND

§242. If a controversy arise betwixt a prince and some of the people, in a matter where the law is silent, or doubtful, and the thing be of great consequence, I should think the proper umpire, in such a case, should be the body of the people: for in cases where the prince hath a trust reposed in him, and is dispensed from the common ordinary rules of the law, there, if any men find themselves aggrieved, and think the prince acts contrary to, or beyond that trust, who so proper to judge as the body of the people, (who, at first, lodged that trust in him) how far they meant it should extend? But if the prince, or whoever they be in the administration, decline that way of determination, the appeal then lies no where but to heaven; force between either persons, who have no known superior on earth, or which permits no appeal to a judge on earth, being properly a state of war, wherein the appeal lies only to heaven; and in that state the injured party must judge for himself, when he will think fit to make use of that appeal, and put himself upon it.
§242. 如果在法律沉默或有疑问并且事关重要的事情上君主和某些人之间产生争议，我认为在这样的情况中，恰当的仲裁者应当是全体公民：因为在君主获得信任并不受法律通常的规则所约束的情况下，如果任何人发现他们自己受到了侵害，并认为君主违背或超出信任的范围行事，谁会比全体公民（他们当初将信任交托与他）更适合去裁定多大的程度才算越界呢？但是如果君主或任何管理人员，拒绝这种裁定的方式，那么就只能诉诸于天国了；任何一方使用强制力，若他在世上没有上级，或者不允许诉诸世间的审判者，便是战争状态，在战争状态中只能诉诸于天国；在那种情况下，受害方必须自行判断，何时适于申诉并投入战争。

§243. To conclude, the power that every individual gave the society, when he entered into it, can never revert to the individuals again, as long as the society lasts, but will always remain in the community; because without this there can be no community, no common-wealth, which is contrary to the original agreement: so also when the society hath placed the legislative in any assembly of men, to continue in them and their successors, with direction and authority for providing such successors, the legislative can never revert to the people whilst that government lasts; because having provided a legislative with power to continue for ever, they have given up their political power to the legislative, and cannot resume it. But if they have set limits to the duration of their legislative, and made this supreme power in any person, or assembly, only temporary; or else, when by the miscarriages of those in authority, it is forfeited; upon the forfeiture, or at the determination of the time set, it reverts to the society, and the people have a right to act as supreme, and continue the legislative in themselves; or erect a new form, or under the old form place it in new hands, as they think good.
§243. 结论就是，每个人在进入社会的时候交给社会的权力，只要社会持续下去，便不能再度回归到个人的手中，而一直由共同体保留；因为没有这一条就没有共同体，没有国家，这是与初始的协议相违背的：同样的，当社会已经将立法权力交给任何议会，由他们和他们的继承者维持，继承者的产生由立法权力进行规定，那么，只要政府持续下去，立法权力便不能再度回归到公民手中；因为既已规定了立法权力的权力，他们便将他们的政治权力交给了立法权力，不能再度使用。但是如果他们设定了立法权力的期限，使任何个人或议会只是暂时性的拥有这种最高权力；或者，由于那些掌权者的误政行为，而使立法权力丧失；在立法权力丧失或者任期终止的时候，这种权力便再度回归社会，公民有权利行使最高权力即立法权力；或者建立一种新的政府形式，或者在旧的形式下将立法权力交到他们认为合适的新人的手中。

WIND

杰斐森受洛克影响颇深，在整理完这篇论文翻译之后，我将重新翻译一下他草拟的《独立宣言》。有人评价杰斐森说，他的独立宣言是向政治压迫宣战的宣言，他的宗教自由法是向宗教压迫宣战的宣言。

李苗

翻译大师WIND兄，高行健的帖子下面有一段需要翻译，去看一下。