[转帖] NYT:The Myth of Japan’s Failure(纽时日本经济衰退的谎言)

By EAMONN FINGLETON

Published: January 6, 2012


DESPITE some small signs of optimism about the United States economy, unemployment is still high, and the country seems stalled.

Time and again, Americans are told to look to Japan as a warning of what the country might become if the right path is not followed, although there is intense disagreement about what that path might be. Here, for instance, is how the CNN analyst David Gergen has described Japan: “It’s now a very demoralized country and it has really been set back.” But that presentation of Japan is a myth. By many measures, the Japanese economy has done very well during the so-called lost decades, which started with a stock market crash in January 1990. By some of the most important measures, it has done a lot better than the United States. Japan has succeeded in delivering an increasingly affluent lifestyle to its people despite the financial crash. In the fullness of time, it is likely that this era will be viewed as an outstanding success story. How can the reality and the image be so different? And can the United States learn from Japan’s experience? It is true that Japanese housing prices have never returned to the ludicrous highs they briefly touched in the wild final stage of the boom. Neither has the Tokyo stock market. But the strength of Japan’s economy and its people is evident in many ways. There are a number of facts and figures that don’t quite square with Japan’s image as the laughingstock of the business pages: 。 Japan’s average life expectancy at birth grew by 4.2 years — to 83 years from 78.8 years — between 1989 and 2009. This means the Japanese now typically live 4.8 years longer than Americans. The progress, moreover, was achieved in spite of, rather than because of, diet. The Japanese people are eating more Western food than ever. The key driver has been better health care. 。 Japan has made remarkable strides in Internet infrastructure. Although as late as the mid-1990s it was ridiculed as lagging, it has now turned the tables. In a recent survey by Akamai Technologies, of the 50 cities in the world with the fastest Internet service, 38 were in Japan, compared to only 3 in the United States. 。 Measured from the end of 1989, the yen has risen 87 percent against the U.S. dollar and 94 percent against the British pound. It has even risen against that traditional icon of monetary rectitude, the Swiss franc. 。 The unemployment rate is 4.2 percent, about half of that in the United States. 。 According to skyscraperpage.com, a Web site that tracks major buildings around the world, 81 high-rise buildings taller than 500 feet have been constructed in Tokyo since the “lost decades” began. That compares with 64 in New York, 48 in Chicago, and 7 in Los Angeles. 。 Japan’s current account surplus — the widest measure of its trade — totaled $196 billion in 2010, up more than threefold since 1989. By comparison, America’s current account deficit ballooned to $471 billion from $99 billion in that time. Although in the 1990s the conventional wisdom was that as a result of China’s rise Japan would be a major loser and the United States a major winner, it has not turned out that way. Japan has increased its exports to China more than 14-fold since 1989 and Chinese-Japanese bilateral trade remains in broad balance. As longtime Japan watchers like Ivan P. Hall and Clyde V. Prestowitz Jr. point out, the fallacy of the “lost decades” story is apparent to American visitors the moment they set foot in the country. Typically starting their journeys at such potent symbols of American infrastructural decay as Kennedy or Dulles airports, they land at Japanese airports that have been extensively expanded and modernized in recent years. William J. Holstein, a prominent Japan watcher since the early 1980s, recently visited the country for the first time in some years. “There’s a dramatic gap between what one reads in the United States and what one sees on the ground in Japan,” he said. “The Japanese are dressed better than Americans. They have the latest cars, including Porsches, Audis, Mercedes-Benzes and all the finest models. I have never seen so many spoiled pets. And the physical infrastructure of the country keeps improving and evolving.”

Why, then, is Japan seen as a loser? On the official gross domestic product numbers, the United States has ostensibly outperformed Japan for many years. But even taking America’s official numbers at face value, the difference has been far narrower than people realize. Adjusted to a per-capita basis (which is the proper way to do this) and measured since 1989, America’s G.D.P. grew by an average of just 1.4 percent a year. Japan’s figure meanwhile was even more anemic — just 1 percent — implying that it underperformed the United States by 0.4 percent a year.
A look at the underlying accounting, however, suggests that, far from underperforming, Japan may have outperformed. For a start, in a little noticed change, United States statisticians in the 1980s embarked on an increasingly aggressive use of the so-called hedonic method of adjusting for inflation, an approach that in the view of many experts artificially boosts a nation’s apparent growth rate.

On the calculations of John Williams of Shadowstats.com, a Web site that tracks flaws in United States economic data, America’s growth in recent decades has been overstated by as much as 2 percentage points a year. If he is even close to the truth, this factor alone may put the United States behind Japan in per-capita performance. If the Japanese have really been hurting, the most obvious place this would show would be in slow adoption of expensive new high-tech items. Yet the Japanese are consistently among the world’s earliest adopters. If anything, it is Americans who have been lagging. In cellphones, for instance, Japan leapfrogged the United States in the space of a few years in the late 1990s and it has stayed ahead ever since, with consumers moving exceptionally rapidly to ever more advanced devices. Much of the story is qualitative rather than quantitative. An example is Japan’s eating-out culture. Tokyo, according to the Michelin Guide, boasts 16 of the world’s top-ranked restaurants, versus a mere 10 for the runner-up, Paris. Similarly Japan as a whole beats France in the Michelin ratings. But how do you express this in G.D.P. terms? Similar problems arise in measuring improvements in the Japanese health care system. And how does one accurately convey the vast improvement in the general environment in Japan in the last two decades? Luckily there is a yardstick that finesses many of these problems: electricity output, which is mainly a measure of consumer affluence and industrial activity. In the 1990s, while Japan was being widely portrayed as an outright “basket case,” its rate of increase in per-capita electricity output was twice that of America, and it continued to outperform into the new century. Part of what is going on here is Western psychology. Anyone who has followed the story long-term cannot help but notice that many Westerners actively seek to belittle Japan. Thus every policy success is automatically discounted. It is a mind-set that is much in evidence even among Tokyo-based Western diplomats and scholars. Take, for instance, how Western observers have viewed Japan’s demographics. The population is getting older because of a low birthrate, a characteristic Japan shares with many of the world’s richest nations. Yet this is presented not only as a critical problem but as a policy failure. It never seems to occur to Western commentators that the Japanese both individually and collectively have chosen their demographic fate — and have good reasons for doing so. The story begins in the terrible winter of 1945-6, when, newly bereft of their empire, the Japanese nearly starved to death. With overseas expansion no longer an option, Japanese leaders determined as a top priority to cut the birthrate. Thereafter a culture of small families set in that has continued to the present day. Japan’s motivation is clear: food security. With only about one-third as much arable land per capita as China, Japan has long been the world’s largest net food importer. While the birth control policy is the primary cause of Japan’s aging demographics, the phenomenon also reflects improved health care and an increase of more than 20 years in life expectancy since 1950.

Psychology aside, a major factor in the West’s comprehension problem is that virtually everyone in Tokyo benefits from the doom and gloom story. For foreign sales representatives, for instance, it has been the perfect get-out-of-jail card when they don’t reach their quotas. For Japanese foundations it is the perfect excuse in politely waving away solicitations from American universities and other needy nonprofits. Ditto for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in tempering expectations of foreign aid recipients. Even American investment bankers have reasons to emphasize bad news. Most notably they profit from the so-called yen-carry trade, an arcane but powerful investment strategy in which the well informed benefit from periodic bouts of weakness in the Japanese yen.

Economic ideology has also played an unfortunate role. Many economists, particularly right-wing think-tank types, are such staunch advocates of laissez-faire that they reflexively scorn Japan’s very different economic system, with its socialist medicine and ubiquitous government regulation. During the stock market bubble of the late 1980s, this mind-set abated but it came back after the crash.

Japanese trade negotiators noticed an almost magical sweetening in the mood in foreign capitals after the stock market crashed in 1990. Although previously there had been much envy of Japan abroad (and serious talk of protectionist measures), in the new circumstances American and European trade negotiators switched to feeling sorry for the “fallen giant.” Nothing if not fast learners, Japanese trade negotiators have been appealing for sympathy ever since. The strategy seems to have been particularly effective in Washington. Believing that you shouldn’t kick a man when he is down, chivalrous American officials have largely given up pressing for the opening of Japan’s markets. Yet the great United States trade complaints of the late 1980s — concerning rice, financial services, cars and car components — were never remedied. The “fallen giant” story has also even been useful to other East Asian nations, particularly in their trade diplomacy with the United States. A striking instance of how the story has influenced American perceptions appears in “The Next 100 Years,” by the consultant George Friedman. In a chapter headed “China 2020: Paper Tiger,” Mr. Friedman argues that, just as Japan “failed” in the 1990s, China will soon have its comeuppance. Talk of this sort powerfully fosters complacency and confusion in Washington in the face of a United States-China trade relationship that is already arguably the most destructive in world history and certainly the most unbalanced. Clearly the question of what has really happened to Japan is of first-order geopolitical importance. In a stunning refutation of American conventional wisdom, Japan has not missed a beat in building an ever more sophisticated industrial base. That this is not more obvious is a tribute in part to the fact that Japanese manufacturers have graduated to making so-called producers’ goods. These typically consist of advanced components or materials, or precision production equipment. They may be invisible to the consumer, yet without them the modern world literally would not exist. This sort of manufacturing, which is both highly capital-intensive and highly know-how-intensive, was virtually monopolized by the United States in the 1950s and 1960s and constituted the essence of American economic leadership. Japan’s achievement is all the more impressive for the fact that its major competitors — Germany, South Korea, Taiwan and, of course, China — have hardly been standing still. The world has gone through a rapid industrial revolution in the last two decades thanks to the “targeting” of manufacturing by many East Asian nations. Yet Japan’s trade surpluses have risen. Japan should be held up as a model, not an admonition. If a nation can summon the will to pull together, it can turn even the most unpromising circumstances to advantage. Here Japan’s constant upgrading of its infrastructure is surely an inspiration. It is a strategy that often requires cooperation across a wide political front, but such cooperation has not been beyond the American political system in the past. The Hoover Dam, that iconic project of the Depression, required negotiations among seven states but somehow it was built — and it provided jobs for 16,000 people in the process. Nothing is stopping similar progress now — nothing, except political bickering.
为“雪藏”国力,日本编造“经济衰退20年"大谎言

昨晚看了商务部研究员唐淳风在凤凰卫视“世纪大讲堂”里发表“日本文化与钓鱼岛争端”演讲视频,虽然感到唐先生对日本的民主政治带有一定的有色眼镜,但也确有可圈可点的一针见血之处。其中,最醍醐灌顶的,是道出日本经济的一个大真相:所谓“日本经济衰退20年”,完全没有那回事,自始至终都是日本自制的一个烟雾弹。日本的海外资产,已经超越本土1.5倍,日本每年GDP都在持续增长,实际上,日本已具备世界第一经济强国的实力,岂有“衰退”之理?
  
  显然,这与一些清醒的学者判断不谋而合。十年前,日本就放出“经济衰退”之说,甚至把“衰落”的原因归咎于邻国中国的“崛起”。他们一边哭穷一边热炒中国“崛起”,把“世界第二经济实体”的高帽送给中国,一些中国人沾沾自喜,但也有清醒的旁观者没被日本装“穷”的假象遮蔽双眼。
  
  早在八年前,香港《每周财经动向》就报道了“日本哭穷”的原委。报道所阐述的情况正是世人急需认清的真相:在世人眼中,过去的十年里,日本经济一蹶不振,增长持续低迷,国内问题百病丛生,日本人一直在哭穷,在叫苦,似乎世人反倒应该给予他们更多的悲悯与同情。然而,权威人士的调查表面:这一切全是日本的“阴谋”!
  
  权威人士是通过调查所得的数据来说明真相的:2005年,日本人均GDP逼近4万美元,高居世界前列。日本海外净资产年增长神速,“海外日本”悄然打造成功……
  
  尤其在最近的十年里,日本哭穷的背后,是令世界震惊的天文数字般的技术开发的投入。虽然他们将“中国制造”爆炒得惊天动地,但这着实是“揣着明白装糊涂”,大概他们心里比谁都清楚:中国与日本的制造能力,根本不在一个重量级上。
  
  专注真实的国力,把高帽送给他国。结果是,高叫“衰落”危机的他们总是不曾衰落,而送出去的高帽说不定蒙住了他国浑然不觉的脑壳,真是一石二鸟、得了便宜又卖了乖的“忍者”。
  
  我不知道日本“装穷”的“阴谋”是否已经全部得逞。不过,依我看来,这个“阴谋”于日本的国家利益而言,并无什么不妥。雪藏真实的国力,将“飞速发展”的高帽送与比邻大国。岂不正是“韬光养晦”的真谛?如此战略难道不正是麻痹对手的高明国策?
  
  研究日本历史文化,我们会发现,“装穷”也是日本文化的写照之一。日本是一个“务实主义”至上的国家,从不在乎虚名,真正谙习“韬光养晦”。在没有“露狰狞”前,很善于“装孙子”。日元该贬则贬,该升则升,总的把握一个“不吃亏”原则。“明修栈道、暗度陈仓”符合他们虚势待发的强国大计。“攻其不备出其不意”的“偷袭战”也是日本军人的强项之一。
  
  历史上的日本一贯如此,经济战的今天,日本将“厚积薄发”的战略演绎得淋漓尽致。冷战开始到后冷战时代,日本长期充当着美国“总后”的角色,如果没有日本出钱,那么美国的世界警察进程也将因为“经费不足”而举步维艰。
  
  从目前日本的真实国力来推断,当今世界,除了美国之外,日本真是“何患之有”!而他们为了发展的长远大计,不惜大力施放烟雾弹,虽然其烟其雾未必能瞒得过那些独立思考人士的慧眼,但也毕竟给一些感觉良好比邻之国的盲目乐观者注上了一大号麻醉剂。
  
  装穷的人不一定没有贮备,摆阔的人不一定真的富足。当我们同情“日本经济衰退20年”,日本人却在偷笑“韬光养晦”大功告成。
  
  “韬光养晦”的日本蓄势待发。中国乃至世界千万不要小看它。当你改变不了对手狡猾,那么则要提醒自己不要愚蠢。一个欠发达国家,对于发达国家送过来的高帽,如果一不讨厌,二不警惕,在实力与虚名之间,更偏爱后者,那么到了真正对垒时,则必然会得到大跌眼镜的结果。
中国流行谎言之一: 十年货币升值后,日本经济衰退了

@福州依伯@的微博  

是最为误导国民的谎言。


只是因为日本没有所谓的GDP大幅成长。但是,实际上,日本国民的生活水准从来就没有下降,为什么?


因为在泡沫经济之后,日元升值,日资大举进入世界,比如在中国有大约2千万人为日资相关企业工作。在europa 美国,东南亚,印度,都有大批日资企业,这些GDP记在当地国家(包括中国)头上,但日本同样分享到好处。
日资企业在海外生产总值,跟日本本土的产值几乎相等。

中日人均GDP比是1/10倍,收入比确是1/30.