WIND

§128. For in the state of nature, to omit the liberty he has of innocent delights, a man has two powers.
The first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself, and others within the permission of the law of nature: by which law, common to them all, he and all the rest of mankind are one community, make up one society, distinct from all other creatures. And were it not for the corruption and viciousness of degenerate men, there would be no need of any other; no necessity that men should separate from this great and natural community, and by positive agreements combine into smaller and divided associations.
The other power a man has in the state of nature, is the power to punish the crimes committed against that law. Both these he gives up, when he joins in a private, if I may so call it, or particular politic society, and incorporates into any common-wealth, separate from the rest of mankind.
§128. 因为在自然状态中，略去他所拥有的天真快乐的自由，一个人拥有两种权力。
第一种，在自然法所许可的范围之内，可以为保护自己和他人做他认为恰当的一切：基于这种全人类共有的法律，他和所有其他的人类作为一个整体，组成一个社会，与所有其他的生物区别开来。若不是堕落的人类的败坏和邪恶，本无须其它；人们也没有必要与此庞大和自然的整体分离，并通过肯定性的协议联合成较小的分立的社团。
自然状态中的人所拥有的另一种权力是惩罚违反自然法的罪行。当他加入一个私有的（如果我可以这样称谓的话）或特别的政治社会，并组成任何一个国家，与其与人类相分离的时候，他便放弃了这两种权力。

§129. The first power, viz. of doing whatsoever he thought for the preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind, he gives up to be regulated by laws made by the society, so far forth as the preservation of himself, and the rest of that society shall require; which laws of the society in many things confine the liberty he had by the law of nature.
§129. 第一种权力，即为保护自身和他人做他认为合适的一切事情的权力，他交由社会所制定的法律来调整，只要是保护他自身和此社会其他人所要求的；这样的社会的法律在许多事情上限制着他基于自然法所享有的自由。

WIND

§130. Secondly, The power of punishing he wholly gives up, and engages his natural force, (which he might before employ in the execution of the law of nature, by his own single authority, as he thought fit) to assist the executive power of the society, as the law thereof shall require: for being now in a new state, wherein he is to enjoy many conveniencies, from the labour, assistance, and society of others in the same community, as well as protection from its whole strength; he is to part also with as much of his natural liberty, in providing for himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety of the society shall require; which is not only necessary, but just, since the other members of the society do the like.
§130. 第二，惩罚的权力他完全交出，并在那个社会的法律要求的情况下使用他自然的力量（之前他根据他自己的权力，在他认为合适的时候可以使用它来执行自然法）来协助社会的执行权力：因为现在既已处于新的状态中，他便可以从同一共同体内的其他人的劳动，帮助和交往中获得许多便利，同时也能得到整体力量的保护；他也应当与他的诸多自然自由相分离，当社会的利益，繁荣和安全要求他这样做的时候；这不仅是必要的，而且也是正当的，因为社会其他成员也是这样。

WIND

§131. But though men, when they enter into society, give up the equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature, into the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the legislative, as the good of the society shall require; yet it being only with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself, his liberty and property; (for no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse) the power of the society, or legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed to extend farther, than the common good; but is obliged to secure every one's property, by providing against those three defects above mentioned, that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy. And so whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any common-wealth, is bound to govern by established standing laws, promulgated and known to the people, and not by extemporary decrees; by indifferent and upright judges, who are to decide controversies by those laws; and to employ the force of the community at home, only in the execution of such laws, or abroad to prevent or redress foreign injuries, and secure the community from inroads and invasion. And all this to be directed to no other end, but the peace, safety, and public good of the people.
§131. 但是虽然，当人们进入社会，放弃他们在自然状态中所拥有的平等，自由和执行权力，交到社会的手中，由其中的立法权力在社会的利益所要求的范围内加以处理；然而，由于每个人的意图仅仅是更好的保护他的人身，自由和财产；（因为没有理性的被造物能够被假定为意图将自己的境况变得更糟）所以，社会的这种权力或他们所建立的立法权力便不能认为可超越公共利益的界限；通过预防上面提到的致使自然状态非常不安全和不舒适的三种缺陷，必须保障每个人的财产。因此，无论是谁拥有任何国家的立法权力或最高权力，必须通过既定的恒定的法律去统治，向公民公布并众所周知，不能通过心血来潮的法令；通过中立和正直的法官，他们依据那些法律来裁决争议；并且使用共同体的力量对内只能执行这样的法律，对外阻止或矫正外部伤害，以保障共同体免受入侵。所有这些没有别的目的，只是为了公民的和平，安全和公共利益。

WIND

Chapter X.
Of the Forms of a Common-wealth.
第十章 论共同体(国家)的形式

§132. THE majority having, as has been shewed, upon men's first uniting into society, the whole power of the community naturally in them, may employ all that power in making laws for the community from time to time, and executing those laws by officers of their own appointing; and then the form of the government is a perfect democracy: or else may put the power of making laws into the hands of a few select men, and their heirs or successors; and then it is an oligarchy: or else into the hands of one man, and then it is a monarchy: if to him and his heirs, it is an hereditary monarchy: if to him only for life, but upon his death the power only of nominating a successor to return to them; an elective monarchy. And so accordingly of these the community may make compounded and mixed forms of government, as they think good. And if the legislative power be at first given by the majority to one or more persons only for their lives, or any limited time, and then the supreme power to revert to them again; when it is so reverted, the community may dispose of it again anew into what hands they please, and so constitute a new form of government: for the form of government depending upon the placing the supreme power, which is the legislative, it being impossible to conceive that an inferior power should prescribe to a superior, or any but the supreme make laws, according as the power of making laws is placed, such is the form of the common-wealth.
§132. 正前所述，在人们最初结合成社会的时候，共同体的全部权力自然的属于多数，他们可以使用这种权力不时来为共同体制定法律，并指定官员来执行这些法律；这样的政府形式就是完全的民主制（democracy，源于希腊语，意为rule of the people）：或者，将制定法律的权力交给少数挑选出来的人，以及他们的继承人；这就是贵族制（oligarchy：源于希腊语，意为a few rulers）：或者将制定法律的权力交给一个人，这就是君主制（monarchy，源于希腊语，意为one/singular ruler）：如果交给他和他的继承人，这是继承君主制：如果仅仅只交给他，在他死后指定继承人的权力仍然交回给多数；这是选举君主制。依据这些基本的形式，共同体可以建立他们认为好的混合的政府形式。如果立法权力最初由多数交给了一个或少数几个人，终身制或一定限期，那么到期之后这种权力仍回归多数；回归之后，共同体将重新决定交给他们想交给的人，从而开始一种新的政府形式：因为政府形式依赖于最高权力即立法权力置于何处，不可能设想一种较低的权力去规定一种较高的权力，或者最高权力之外的任何权力来制定法律，依据制定法律的权力的归属，便可确定国家的形式。

WIND

§133. By common-wealth, I must be understood all along to mean, not a democracy, or any form of government, but any independent community, which the Latines signified by the word civitas, to which the word which best answers in our language, is common-wealth, and most properly expresses such a society of men, which community or city in English does not; for there may be subordinate communities in a government; and city amongst us has a quite different notion from common-wealth: and therefore, to avoid ambiguity, I crave leave to use the word common-wealth in that sense, in which I find it used by king James the first; and I take it to be its genuine signification; which if any body dislike, I consent with him to change it for a better.
§133. common-wealth一词，我前后一贯的意思应该被理解为——不是指民主制或任何政府形式，而是指任何独立的共同体，拉丁人用civitas（古罗马的名词，指罗马公民所生活的社会）来指这种共同体，在我们的语言中与之最相当的是common-wealth，而最恰当的表达这样一个人类社会的，英语中的community或者city都不合适；因为一个政府之下会有若干community；而我们语言中的city概念则已与common-wealth相去甚远：所以，为了避免混淆，我请求用common-wealth来指这种概念，我发现詹姆士一世国王首先使用过这词；我认为它表达了它的真实含义；如果有人不喜欢这个词，我同意他用更好的词来更换。

WIND

commonwealth现在仍然在洛克这一意义上普遍使用，比如：
澳大利亚称为“Commonwealth of Australia”；
英联邦称为“Commonwealth of Nations”;
美国有好几个州也如此称呼，比如马萨诸塞称为“Commonwealth of Massachusetts”。

WIND

Chapter XI.
Of the Extent of the Legislative Power.
第十一章 论立法权力的边界

§134. THE great end of men's entering into society, being the enjoyment of their properties in peace and safety, and the great instrument and means of that being the laws established in that society; the first and fundamental positive law of all commonwealths is the establishing of the legislative power; as the first and fundamental natural law, which is to govern even the legislative itself, is the preservation of the society, and (as far as will consist with the public good) of every person in it. This legislative is not only the supreme power of the common-wealth, but sacred and unalterable in the hands where the community have once placed it; nor can any edict of any body else, in what form soever conceived, or by what power soever backed, have the force and obligation of a law, which has not its sanction from that legislative which the public has chosen and appointed: for without this the law could not have that, which is absolutely necessary to its being a law, * the consent of the society, over whom no body can have a power to make laws, but by their own consent, and by authority received from them; and therefore all the obedience, which by the most solemn ties any one can be obliged to pay, ultimately terminates in this supreme power, and is directed by those laws which it enacts: nor can any oaths to any foreign power whatsoever, or any domestic subordinate power, discharge any member of the society from his obedience to the legislative, acting pursuant to their trust; nor oblige him to any obedience contrary to the laws so enacted, or farther than they do allow; it being ridiculous to imagine one can be tied ultimately to obey any power in the society, which is not the supreme.
§134. 既然人们进入社会的主要目的是和平安全的享用他们的财产，而达致这个目的的主要工具和方式是那个社会中所建立的法律；所以所有国家的首要和基础的肯定性法律是建立立法权力；如同首要和基础的自然法——它甚至统治着立法权力——是保护社会和社会中的每个人（与公共利益相一致的限度内）。这种立法权力不仅是共同体的最高权力，而且共同体一旦授权便变得神圣和不可变更；若没有公众选举和指定的立法权力的许可，任何其它实体的法令，无论以什么形式，或无论以何种权力作支撑，都不具法律的强制力和服从的责任：因为没有这样的许可，这样的法律就不能取得社会的同意，而取得社会同意是成为法律所绝对必须的，超越社会同意之上将没有任何实体拥有权力去制定法律，只能经由他们自己的同意，并由他们授权；所以，任何人有责任付之以最郑重的服从，最终都将由这种最高权力来决定，并受它所制定的法律的指导：对任何外国的权力或任何国家之内的从属性权力的誓言，都不能解除社会中的任何成员对这种根据多数的信任而运行的立法权力的服从；也不能强制一个人服从与这样制定的法律相违背或超过它们许可的法律；如果强制一个人服从的最终不是最高权力的权力，这样的事情是很荒谬的。

WIND

§135. Though the legislative, whether placed in one or more, whether it be always in being, or only by intervals, though it be the supreme power in every common-wealth; yet,
First, It is not, nor can possibly be absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people: for it being but the joint power of every member of the society given up to that person, or assembly, which is legislator; it can be no more than those persons had in a state of nature before they entered into society, and gave up to the community: for no body can transfer to another more power than he has in himself; and no body has an absolute arbitrary power over himself, or over any other, to destroy his own life, or take away the life or property of another. A man, as has been proved, cannot subject himself to the arbitrary power of another; and having in the state of nature no arbitrary power over the life, liberty, or possession of another, but only so much as the law of nature gave him for the preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind; this is all he cloth, or can give up to the common-wealth, and by it to the legislative power, so that the legislative can have no more than this. Their power, in the utmost bounds of it, is limited to the public good of the society. It is a power, that hath no other end but preservation, and therefore can never* have a right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the subjects. The obligations of the law of nature cease not in society, but only in many cases are drawn closer, and have by human laws known penalties annexed to them, to enforce their observation. Thus the law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men, legislators as well as others. The rules that they make for other men's actions, must, as well as their own, be conformable to the law of nature, i.e. to the will of God, of which that is a declaration, and the fundamental law of nature being the preservation of mankind, no human sanction can be good, or valid against it.
§135. 虽然立法权力，不管是交给一个还是多个机构，也不管是持续还是间断存在，虽然在每个国家中它都是最高权力；然而，
第一，它不是，也不可能对人们的生命和财产拥有绝对的肆意处置权：因为这交给被称为立法者的个人或议会的权力仅仅是社会中每个人的权力的交集；它不能超过那些人在未进入社会之前所拥有的自然状态之中的权力，进入社会之后他们将它交给了共同体：因为没有人能够授与其他人多于他所拥有的权力；而且没有人对他自己和别人拥有绝对肆意的权力，来毁灭他自己的生命，或夺去另一个人的生命和财产。一个人，如已经证明的，不能服从于另一个人肆意的权力；并且在自然状态中也没有对他人生命，自由和财产的肆意权力，依自然法仅仅拥有保护自身和其余人类的权力；这就是他拥有或者可以交给国家的所有权力，由此授与立法权力，因而立法权力就不能超过这种限度。他们的权力，在最大的边界之内，限于社会公共利益。这是一种没有其它目的的权力，仅仅在于保护因而没有权利去破坏，奴役或蓄意使臣民陷于贫穷。自然法所规定的责任并不在社会中终止，而是在许多情况下离人类更近，通过人类的法律（human law，人类所制定的法律）所附加的惩罚来强制他们遵守。这样自然法就成为了所有的人——立法者和其他的人——的一种永恒的规则。他们为他人行为所制定的规则，如同为他们自己的行为所制定的规则，都必须与自然法相一致，即必须与上帝的意志相一致，自然法就是上帝意志的宣告，既然自然的基本法是为了人类的保护，那么违背它的人类法律都不是好的或有效的。

WIND

§136. Secondly,* The legislative, or supreme authority, cannot assume to itself a power to rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees, but is bound to dispense justice, and decide the rights of the subject by promulgated standing laws, and known authorized judges: for the law of nature being unwritten, and so no where to be found but in the minds of men, they who through passion or interest shall miscite, or misapply it, cannot so easily be convinced of their mistake where there is no established judge: and so it serves not, as it ought, to determine the rights, and fence the properties of those that live under it, especially where every one is judge, interpreter, and executioner of it too, and that in his own case: and he that has right on his side, having ordinarily but his own single strength, hath not force enough to defend himself from injuries, or to punish delinquents. To avoid these inconveniences, which disorder men's propperties in the state of nature, men unite into societies, that they may have the united strength of the whole society to secure and defend their properties, and may have standing rules to bound it, by which every one may know what is his. To this end it is that men give up all their natural power to the society which they enter into, and the community put the legislative power into such hands as they think fit, with this trust, that they shall be governed by declared laws, or else their peace, quiet, and property will still be at the same uncertainty, as it was in the state of nature.
§136. 第二，立法权力或最高权力，不能自认为是通过心血来潮的肆意的法令来统治的权力，而只能限于提供正义，通过所颁布的恒定的法律和众所周知的被授权的法官来裁定臣民之间的权利：因为自然法并非成文，所以只能在人们的思想中找到它们，在没有设立法官的地方，由于冲动或利益会错误的引证或应用自然法，就不那么容易明白他们的错误：从而自然法就不是服务于——它本来应该如此——裁定权利，保护生活于其下的那些人的财产，特别是在他自己的事情中，每个人都是审判者，解释者和执行者的场合：有权利的一方，通常只有依靠他自己的力量，没有足够的力量来保护他自己免于伤害，或者去惩罚犯罪者。为避免这些自然状态中搅乱人们的财产的麻烦，人们联合成社会，这样他们就可以拥有整个社会的联合力量来保障和捍卫他们的财产，并可以拥有恒定的规则来约束这一点，通过这些规则每个人都可以知道什么是他的。为着这个目的，人们才放弃他们所有的自然权力并交给他们所加入的社会，然后共同体将立法权力连同这种信任授与他们认为合适的人选，为着这个目的，他们才受公布的法律统治，否则，他们的和平，安宁和财产仍将处于不确定之中，如同处于自然状态之中。

李苗

光荣革命之后的英国政治制度如此先进，美洲殖民地为什么还要独立呢，儿子为什么还要扁老子呢？

WIND

光荣革命之后的英国政治制度如此先进，美洲殖民地为什么还要独立呢，儿子为什么还要扁老子呢？
李苗 发表于 2011-7-24 18:51

首先我想说的是，你这个比喻是很混帐的，这个帖子的前面洛克费了那么大的功夫说明亲子关系与政治关系的不同，你还在用这种比喻说明问题。
第二，我是这样来看待这个问题的，没有条理，简述如下——
1，就当时英语世界的思想来说，洛克的思想，孟德斯鸠的思想，布莱克斯通的广泛影响，等等，在北美的知识分子中影响是不小的；
2，就英国来说，之前北美各殖民地以英王的名义与法国和其它欧洲列强的军队进行战争，战争胜利后，增加税收本身似乎也并不是毫无道理的。但是另一方面，根据当时已有的这些政治理论，英国本岛的政治制度与北美还是有所区别的，这些事实已经罗列在独立宣言中，你自己可以去看看，作为一面之词难免有夸大的成分，但是对北美自治的三权的不当干预或多或少应该是事实。
3，就北美当时独立的极力主张者来说，正如HBO迷你剧所表现的，亚当斯在大陆议会中说，这是一个神赐的良机。这些鼓动确实有点危险，因为宣布独立之后，随之而来的全面战争是不可避免的，要知道英军当时是在北美战胜了欧洲列强，已经无敌了，因而大量的战争死亡也是可以预见的。
4，不过在我看来，总的来说，北美的新政府还是离暴政很远的，这里有一篇林达的文章，多年前读过，可以作为我的结论的证据，即英国人的法律观念在北美还是占了上风。
林奇堡：私刑的发源地
http://www.ifanshu.com/book/1488/74836.html

WIND

§137. Absolute arbitrary power, or governing without settled standing laws, can neither of them consist with the ends of society and government, which men would not quit the freedom of the state of nature for, and tie themselves up under, were it not to preserve their lives, liberties and fortunes, and by stated rules of right and property to secure their peace and quiet. It cannot be supposed that they should intend, had they a power so to do, to give to any one, or more, an absolute arbitrary power over their persons and estates, and put a force into the magistrate's hand to execute his unlimited will arbitrarily upon them. This were to put themselves into a worse condition than the state of nature, wherein they had a liberty to defend their right against the injuries of others, and were upon equal terms of force to maintain it, whether invaded by a single man, or many in combination. Whereas by supposing they have given up themselves to the absolute arbitrary power and will of a legislator, they have disarmed themselves, and armed him, to make a prey of them when he pleases; he being in a much worse condition, who is exposed to the arbitrary power of one man, who has the command of 100,000, than he that is exposed to the arbitrary power of 100,000 single men; no body being secure, that his will, who has such a command, is better than that of other men, though his force be 100,000 times stronger. And therefore, whatever form the common-wealth is under, the ruling power ought to govern by declared and received laws, and not by extemporary dictates and undetermined resolutions: for then mankind will be in a far worse condition than in the state of nature, if they shall have armed one, or a few men with the joint power of a multitude, to force them to obey at pleasure the exorbitant and unlimited decrees of their sudden thoughts, or unrestrained, and till that moment unknown wills, without having any measures set down which may guide and justify their actions: for all the power the government has, being only for the good of the society, as it ought not to be arbitrary and at pleasure, so it ought to be exercised by established and promulgated laws; that both the people may know their duty, and be safe and secure within the limits of the law; and the rulers too kept within their bounds, and not be tempted, by the power they have in their hands, to employ it to such purposes, and by such measures, as they would not have known, and own not willingly.
§137. 绝对肆意的权力，或没有确定不变的法律的统治，都是与社会和政府的目的不一致的，社会和政府的目的若不是为了保护他们的生命，自由和财产，并通过确定的权利及财产规则来保障他们的和平和安宁，人们就不会放弃他们的自然状态的自由然后将自己置于社会之中和政府之下。不能设想，如果人们有权力这样做的话，他们会打算交给任何一个或多个机构一种对他们自己的人身和财产拥有绝对肆意的权力，并授与管理者一种强制力以对他们执行他肆意的无限制的意志。这将置他们自己于一种比自然状态更糟的境况之中，自然状态之中的人尚有捍卫他们权利的自由，以免于他人的伤害，并以平等的力量条件去维护这种自由，不论被一个人还是一群人侵犯。然而一旦假定为他们已经将自己交给了这样一个立法者的绝对肆意的权力和意志，就意味着他们就自己解除了自己的武装，并武装立法者，只要他高兴就可以猎食他们；一个人置身于能指挥100,000个人的一个肆意权力之下，其境况远比他置身于100,000个单独的肆意权力之下更糟；谁也不能保证那拥有指挥权的意志会比其它的意志更好，虽然他的力量强大了100,000倍。所以，无论国家处于什么形式之下，统治的权力都应当由公布并被承认的法律而不是由心血来潮的指令和不确定的决议来统治：因为人类一旦将众人的联合权力武装一个或少数人，来强制人们服从他们突发奇想的过度和无限制的法令，或者服从于没有确定的措施来引导和规正他们行为的不可预知的无约束的意志，他们将跌入远比自然状态更糟的境况之中：因为政府所拥有的所有权力，既然仅仅为了社会的利益，就不应当是肆意和一时兴起的，它应当依建立和公布的法律来行使；不仅公民可以知道他们的责任，知道在法律的约束之中能够得到安全和保障；而且统治者也可以被限制在他们的界限之内，而不会被他们手中的权力所诱惑，从而使用这种权力去为人们并不知道和并不情愿的目的服务，并作为这样的手段。

元一

一如既往地顶~~

WIND

一如既往地顶~~
元一 发表于 2011-7-24 23:50

谢谢当的元首.

WIND

§138. Thirdly, The supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property without his own consent: for the preservation of property being the end of government, and that for which men enter into society, it necessarily supposes and requires, that the people should have property, without which they must be supposed to lose that, by entering into society, which was the end for which they entered into it; too gross an absurdity for any man to own. Men therefore in society having property, they have such a right to the goods, which by the law of the community are their's, that no body hath a right to take their substance or any part of it from them, without their own consent: without this they have no property at all; for I have truly no property in that, which another can by right take from me, when he pleases, against my consent. Hence it is a mistake to think, that the supreme or legislative power of any commonwealth, can do what it will, and dispose of the estates of the subject arbitrarily, or take any part of them at pleasure. This is not much to be feared in governments where the legislative consists, wholly or in part, in assemblies which are variable, whose members, upon the dissolution of the assembly, are subjects under the common laws of their country, equally with the rest. But in governments, where the legislative is in one lasting assembly always in being, or in one man, as in absolute monarchies, there is danger still, that they will think themselves to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community; and so will be apt to increase their own riches and power, by taking what they think fit from the people: for a man's property is not at all secure, tho' there be good and equitable laws to set the bounds of it between him and his fellow subjects, if he who commands those subjects have power to take from any private man, what part he pleases of his property, and use and dispose of it as he thinks good.
§138. 第三，若没有他自己的同意，最高权力不能取走任何人的任何财产：因为保护财产是政府的目的，也是人们进入社会的目的，这就必然的假定并要求人们应该拥有财产，若没有财产就只能假定人们进入社会就丧失了它，放弃财产是人们进入社会的目的；这太荒谬了，任何人都不会承认。所以，既然社会中的人们拥有财产，他们对于根据共同体的法律属于他们的财产就有这样一种权利，即若没有他们自己的同意，没有人拥有权利可以从他们手中拿走全部或任何其中的部分：若没有这种权利他们就根本没有财产权；因为我实际上对物品并没有所有权，别人只要高兴，就可违背我的意愿，有权利从我这里拿走那些物品。由此可知，如果认为任何国家的最高权力或立法权力能够做它想做的，从而肆意处置臣民的财产或随意取走其中的任何部分，这都是错误的。如果政府立法权力——全部或部分——由变动的议会组成，在议会解体之后，其成员也是他们国家共同法律的臣民，与其余的人平等，那么这种权力就没那么可怕。但是在政府中，立法权力属于一个持续的议会一直存在，或属于一个人，就如在绝对君主的手中，那就仍然存在一种危险，这些人将会认为他们自己拥有与共同体截然不同的利益；从而趋向于通过夺取他们想夺取的一切来增加他们自己的财富和权力：因为如果指挥那些臣民的人有权力只要他认为不错就可夺取，使用和处置任何私人的财产，那么尽管存在公正的良法来确定他和他的臣民之间的财产边界，一个人的财产实际上是完全没有保障的。

WIND

§139. But government, into whatsoever hands it is put, being, as I have before shewed, entrusted with this condition, and for this end, that men might have and secure their properties; the prince, or senate, however it may have power to make laws, for the regulating of property between the subjects one amongst another, yet can never have a power to take to themselves the whole, or any part of the subjects property, without their own consent: for this would be in effect to leave them no property at all. And to let us see, that even absolute power, where it is necessary, is not arbitrary by being absolute, but is still limited by that reason, and confined to those ends, which required it in some cases to be absolute, we need look no farther than the common practice of martial discipline: for the preservation of the army, and in it of the whole common-wealth, requires an absolute obedience to the command of every superior officer, and it is justly death to disobey or dispute the most dangerous or unreasonable of them; but yet we see, that neither the sergeant, that could command a soldier to march up to the mouth of a cannon, or stand in a breach, where he is almost sure to perish, can command that soldier to give him one penny of his money; nor the general, that can condemn him to death for deserting his post, or for not obeying the most desperate orders, can yet, with all his absolute power of life and death, dispose of one farthing of that soldier's estate, or seize one jot of his goods; whom yet he can command any thing, and hang for the least disobedience; because such a blind obedience is necessary to that end, for which the commander has his power, viz. the preservation of the rest; but the disposing of his goods has nothing to do with it.
§139. 但是，无论政府交到谁的手中，如我前面已经说明的，是以此条件为信任前提并为着这个目的的，即人们可以拥有并保障他们的财产；君主，或元老院（senate，源于拉丁语，意为old man），虽然它拥有制定法律的权力来调整臣民彼此之间的财产，然而若没有臣民自己的同意，绝没有权力将他们财产的全部或其中任何的部分取为己有：因为这实际上是置他们于无财产权的境况之中。让我们来看看，即使在绝对权力有必要的地方，也不会因为绝对而变得肆意，而仍然受那个原因和目的的限制，在某些情况下要求权力是绝对的，我们只要看看军队管制的通常实践：为保护军队——这是与整个共同体一致的——要求对上级军官绝对的服从，这些命令即使非常危险或没有理由，不服从或争辩也可以处死；然而我们看到，一个士官，他可以命令一个士兵冲向炮口，或坚守被攻破的缺口，在这种情况下几乎必死，但是他也不能命令士兵交给他一个便士；一个将军，可以因士兵擅离岗位或没有遵守铤而走险的命令而处死，然而他也不能用他对生死的绝对权力而处置或夺走那个士兵一丁点儿的财产；虽然他能够对士兵下任何命令，稍不服从即可吊死；因为对那个目的而言，这样的盲目服从是必要的，为着那个目的，即保护其余的人，指挥者拥有这种权力；但是处置士兵的财产与此无关。

WIND

§140. It is true, governments cannot be supported without great charge, and it is fit every one who enjoys his share of the protection, should pay out of his estate his proportion for the maintenance of it. But still it must be with his own consent, i.e. the consent of the majority, giving it either by themselves, or their representatives chosen by them: for if any one shall claim a power to lay and levy taxes on the people, by his own authority, and without such consent of the people, he thereby invades the fundamental law of property, and subverts the end of government: for what property have I in that, which another may by right take, when he pleases, to himself?
§140. 确实，若没有巨大的花费政府便不能支持，每个享受它保护的人，支付一定比例的财产来维持它，这是恰当的。但是，这仍然必须经他本人的同意，换言之，可以是他们自己也可以是他们选举的代表所给与的多数的同意：因为如果任何人，无需这样的公民同意，而只凭他自己的权力就声称可以对公民征税，那么他就侵犯了基本的财产权法律，并颠覆了政府的目的：因为在那样的政府之下我还有什么样的财产权呢？另一个人只要高兴就有权利将我的财产据为己有。

WIND

§141. Fourthly, The legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands: for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it cannot pass it over to others. The people alone can appoint the form of the common-wealth, which is by constituting the legislative, and appointing in whose hands that shall be. And when the people have said, We will submit to rules, and be governed by laws made by such men, and in such forms, no body else can say other men shall make laws for them; nor can the people be bound by any laws, but such as are enacted by those whom they have chosen, and authorized to make laws for them. The power of the legislative, being derived from the people by a positive voluntary grant and institution, can be no other than what that positive grant conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not to make legislators, the legislative can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws, and place it in other hands.
§141. 第四，立法机力不能将制定法律的权力转交给任何其他人：因为这仅仅是一种被公民委托的权力，拥有它的人便不能将它转给其他人。只有公民才能通过创建立法权力并指定立法权力交给谁，从而确定国家的形式。当公民已经声明：我们将服从规则，愿受那些人以那样的方式制定的法律的统治，那么其余的人将不能说其他人也可以为他们制定法律；除了那些他们选举并授权为他们制定法律的人所制定的，人们不受任何法律限制。立法的权力，既然源于公民通过肯定性的自愿的授权与创立，那就不能超出肯定性的授权所表达的内容，只能制定法律，而不能再去指定立法者，立法权力没有权力将他们制定法律的权力转交给他人。

WIND

§142. These are the bounds which the trust, that is put in them by the society, and the law of God and nature, have set to the legislative power of every common-wealth, in all forms of government.
First, They are to govern by promulgated established laws, not to be varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favourite at court, and the country man at plough.
Secondly, These laws also ought to be designed for no other end ultimately, but the good of the people.
Thirdly, They must not raise taxes on the property of the people, without the consent of the people, given by themselves, or their deputies. And this properly concerns only such governments where the legislative is always in being, or at least where the people have not reserved any part of the legislative to deputies, to be from time to time chosen by themselves.
Fourthly, The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to any body else, or place it any where, but where the people have.
§142. 这些就是在所有的政府形式中，由社会交托给立法权力的信任，以及上帝和自然的法律为每个国家的立法权力所设定的边界。
首先，他们应当由公布的已确定的法律统治，不得在特定的情形中改变，不论富有和贫穷，也不论是王室中的宠儿和种田的乡村人，只有一种规则。
第二，这些法律应当最终没有别的目的，只能是公民的利益。
第三，未经公民自己或他们的代表的同意，他们不得对公民的财产征税。恰当的说，这一点只指这样的政府，在这里立法权力一直存在，或至少这里的公民未将任何部分的立法权力预留给不时由他们选举出来的代表们。(这句话有点头晕。？)
第四，立法权力不应该也不能够将制定法律的权力转交给其它任何实体，或放在不是公民所放置的地方。

WIND

Chapter XII.
Of the Legislative, Executive, and Federative Power of the Common-wealth.
第十二章 论国家的立法,执行和外交权力

§143. THE legislative power is that, which has a right to direct how the force of the common-wealth shall be employed for preserving the community and the members of it. But because those laws which are constantly to be executed, and whose force is always to continue, may be made in a little time; therefore there is no need, that the legislative should be always in being, not having always business to do. And because it may be too great a temptation to human frailty, apt to grasp at power, for the same persons, who have the power of making laws, to have also in their hands the power to execute them, whereby they may exempt themselves from obedience to the laws they make, and suit the law, both in its making, and execution, to their own private advantage, and thereby come to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community, contrary to the end of society and government: therefore in well ordered commonwealths, where the good of the whole is so considered, as it ought, the legislative power is put into the hands of divers persons, who duly assembled, have by themselves, or jointly with others, a power to make laws, which when they have done, being separated again, they are themselves subject to the laws they have made; which is a new and near tie upon them, to take care, that they make them for the public good.
§143. 立法权力是指有权利引导如何使用国家的强制力来保护共同体及它的成员。但是因为制定那些法律——法律需要不断得到执行，其强制力需要持续存在——需要的只是少量的时间；所以，立法权力就没有必要一直存在，并不总是有事情要做。又因为人类的缺陷，对于那些制定法律的人有一种巨大的诱惑，他们倾向于也去攫取执行法律的权力，于是，他们便可免于服从他们自己所制定的法律，并使法律的制定和执行有利于他们自己的私人利益，从而使他们拥有与共同体其余的人完全截然不同的利益，因而与社会和政府的目的相背离：所以在秩序良好的国家中，那里的整体利益是这样考虑的——如它所应当的那样——立法权力交到不同的人手中，在他们适当的集会之后，便自行或与其它的机构一起拥有了制定法律的权力，法律一旦制定，议会再度解散，他们自己也必须服从他们所制定的法律；这些法律对他们自己也是一种新的和切身的约束，从而使他们注意，应当为公共利益去制定法律。

WIND

§144. But because the laws, that are at once, and in a short time made, have a constant and lasting force, and need a perpetual execution, or an attendance thereunto; therefore it is necessary there should be a power always in being, which should see to the execution of the laws that are made, and remain in force. And thus the legislative and executive power come often to be separated.
§144. 但是，因为立即并短期内可以制定出来的法律具有不断和持续的强制力，需要得到永久的执行或照看；所以，有必要设置一种持续存在的权力，负责察看已制定的并仍具强制力的法律的执行。这样，立法和执行权力通常就分离了。

WIND

洛克将主要的三权称为立法权力,执行权力和外交权力.与之相对应,孟德斯鸠称之为立法权力,司法权力和执行权力.美国宪法采用孟德斯鸠的称谓.孟德斯鸠与洛克在三权的内涵上没有太大的差别.

WIND

§145. There is another power in every common-wealth, which one may call natural, because it is that which answers to the power every man naturally had before he entered into society: for though in a common-wealth the members of it are distinct persons still in reference to one another, and as such as governed by the laws of the society; yet in reference to the rest of mankind, they make one body, which is, as every member of it before was, still in the state of nature with the rest of mankind. Hence it is, that the controversies that happen between any man of the society with those that are out of it, are managed by the public; and an injury done to a member of their body, engages the whole in the reparation of it. So that under this consideration, the whole community is one body in the state of nature, in respect of all other states or persons out of its community.
§145. 每个国家还有另一种权力，可以称之为自然的权力，因为它与每个人在进入社会之前自然拥有的权力相当：因为虽然在国家之中，一个人与另一个人是明显不同的，并如上所述受社会法律的统治；然而参照其余的人类，他们组成了一个整体，这个整体，如同进入社会之前的人，仍然与其余的人类处于自然状态之中。由此，这个社会之中的人与之外的人发生的争议，则由公共权力去解决；对共同体的成员所造成的伤害，则由整体去要求补偿。所以，从这方面考虑，在与共同体之外的所有国家或个人的关系中，整个共同体是处于自然状态之中的一个整体。

§146. This therefore contains the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all the transactions, with all persons and communities without the common-wealth, and may be called federative, if any one pleases. So the thing be understood, I am indifferent as to the name.
§146. 所以，这包括了战争与和平，联盟，以及与国家之外所有的人和团体交往的权力，如果大家愿意的话，可以称之为外交权力。只要能够理解，我对称谓无所谓。

§147. These two powers, executive and federative, though they be really distinct in themselves, yet one comprehending the execution of the municipal laws of the society within itself, upon all that are parts of it; the other the management of the security and interest of the public with out, with all those that it may receive benefit or damage from, yet they are always almost united. And though this federative power in the well or ill management of it be of great moment to the common-wealth, yet it is much less capable to be directed by antecedent, standing, positive laws, than the executive; and so must necessarily be left to the prudence and wisdom of those, whose hands it is in, to be managed for the public good: for the laws that concern subjects one amongst another, being to direct their actions, may well enough precede them. But what is to be done in reference to foreigners, depending much upon their actions, and the variation of designs and interests, must be left in great part to the prudence of those, who have this power committed to them, to be managed by the best of their skill, for the advantage of the common-wealth.
§147. 执行与外交的这两种权力，虽然其本身的区别是很明显的，然而前者包含的是社会内部自治法律的执行，针对的是社会的成员；后者包含的是处理与外部相关的公众的安全和利益，在与外部的关系中它可能受益或受害，然而它们几乎总是联结在一起。并且，虽然外交权力管理的好坏对国家甚为重要，然而它远不能像执行权力那样，由既定的，恒定的和肯定性的法律来引导；所以这就有必要交给审慎和明智的人来管理公众利益：因为关系到引导臣民彼此之间行为的法律，可以预先很好的制定。但是对于外国人如何应对，既然在很大的程度上要看外部的行为，以及计划和利益也经常变动，就必须主要留给被授与了外交权力的人的审慎，为着国家的利益，由他们最好的技能来管理。

§148. Though, as I said, the executive and federative power of every community be really distinct in themselves, yet they are hardly to be separated, and placed at the same time, in the hands of distinct persons: for both of them requiring the force of the society for their exercise, it is almost impracticable to place the force of the common-wealth in distinct, and not subordinate hands; or that the executive and federative power should be placed in persons, that might act separately, whereby the force of the public would be under different commands: which would be apt some time or other to cause disorder and ruin.
§148. 虽然，如我所说，每个共同体的执行和外交权力本身确实区别明显，然而它们也很难分开，同时交给完全不同的人：因为这两种权力的行使都要求社会的力量，将国家的力量交给两个独立互不从属的机构，这几乎不可能做到；或者执行和外交权力可以交给独立行动的机构，那么公众的力量将接受两种不同的命令：这迟早将引起混乱和毁灭。

WIND

在三权的关系上,彼此之间如何平衡相互制约,美国两百多年的实践还是完善了很多细节的.比如最高法院对立法权力所制定的法律的违宪审查权.这个东西不但其它国家比较陌生,连英国议会权力都显得有点专横.

WIND

美国最高法院的违宪审查权（judicial review）,始于1803年的Marbury v. Madison案件，由此奠定了司法权力可以以议会法案或行政法规违反宪法为由宣布其无效。

WIND

Chapter XIII.
Of the Subordination of the Powers of the Common-wealth.
第十三章 论国家各项权力的从属关系

§149. THOUGH in a constituted common-wealth, standing upon its own basis, and acting according to its own nature, that is, acting for the preservation of the community, there can be but one supreme power, which is the legislative, to which all the rest are and must be subordinate, yet the legislative being only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends, there remains still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the legislative, when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them: for all power given with trust for the attaining an end, being limited by that end, whenever that end is manifestly neglected, or opposed, the trust must necessarily be forfeited, and the power devolve into the hands of those that gave it, who may place it anew where they shall think best for their safety and security. And thus the community perpetually retains a supreme power of saving themselves from the attempts and designs of any body, even of their legislators, whenever they shall be so foolish, or so wicked, as to lay and carry on designs against the liberties and properties of the subject: for no man or society of men, having a power to deliver up their preservation, or consequently the means of it, to the absolute will and arbitrary dominion of another; when ever any one shall go about to bring them into such a slavish condition, they will always have a right to preserve, what they have not a power to part with; and to rid themselves of those, who invade this fundamental, sacred, and unalterable law of self-preservation, for which they entered into society. And thus the community may be said in this respect to be always the supreme power, but not as considered under any form of government, because this power of the people can never take place till the government be dissolved.
§149. 虽然，一个建立起来的国家，它站立的基础和行动所依据的本性是为保护共同体而行动，只能有一个最高权力，这就是立法权力，其余一切权力是且必须处于从属地位，然而，既然立法权力只能是为着确定的目的而行使的一种基于信任的权力，那么一旦发现立法权力的行为与交与它的信任相背离，公民仍旧保留着撤销或变更立法权力的最高权力：因为所有的权力都是基于信任为着确定的目的授与，当然受那个目的的限制，一旦那个目的明显的被忽视，或与其背离，信任就必须收回，从而权力回归授权者的手中，然后可以重新交给他们认为能够最好的保障他们的安全的地方。这样的话，共同体就永久保留一种拯救他们自己的最高权力，免于受任何人甚至是他们的立法者的企图和预谋的伤害，无论他们什么时候由于愚蠢和邪恶而实施侵犯臣民的自由和财产的图谋：因为没有人或社会有权力将保护他们或保护他们的手段授与另一个绝对的意志和肆意的统治；一旦有人想将他们带入这样一种被奴役的境地，他们总是有权利来保护他们自己，这是一种他们自己都没有权力分离出去的权利；从而使他们自己摆脱那些侵犯这种基本的，神圣的和不可变更的自我保护的法律的人，他们进入社会就是为了保护自我。在这种意义上可以说，共同体总是拥有最高权力，但是并不是在任何政府形式之下都要这么考虑，因为只有在政府应当解体的时候，公民的这种权力才会发生。

WIND

§150. In all cases, whilst the government subsists, the legislative is the supreme power: for what can give laws to another, must needs be superior to him; and since the legislative is no otherwise legislative of the society, but by the right it has to make laws for all the parts, and for every member of the society, prescribing rules to their actions, and giving power of execution, where they are transgressed, the legislative must needs be the supreme, and all other powers, in any members or parts of the society, derived from and subordinate to it.
§150. 在一切情况下，只要政府还能维持，立法权力就是最高权力：因为能够给另一个人制定法律的，权力必须高于他；既然立法权力是唯一的社会立法权力，仅仅基于这种权利它就必须为所有的分权力，及所有的社会成员制定法律，对他们的行为制定规则，并在他们违反时授权执行，立法权力必须居于最高位置，其它任何社会成员或分权力的权力，均来源并从属于它。

WIND

§151. In some commonwealths, where the legislative is not always in being, and the executive is vested in a single person, who has also a share in the legislative; there that single person in a very tolerable sense may also be called supreme: not that he has in himself all the supreme power, which is that of law-making; but because he has in him the supreme execution, from whom all inferior magistrates derive all their several subordinate powers, or at least the greatest part of them: having also no legislative superior to him, there being no law to be made without his consent, which cannot be expected should ever subject him to the other part of the legislative, he is properly enough in this sense supreme. But yet it is to be observed, that tho' oaths of allegiance and fealty are taken to him, it is not to him as supreme legislator, but as supreme executor of the law, made by a joint power of him with others; allegiance being nothing but an obedience according to law, which when he violates, he has no right to obedience, nor can claim it otherwise than as the public person vested with the power of the law, and so is to be considered as the image, phantom, or representative of the common-wealth, acted by the will of the society, declared in its laws; and thus he has no will, no power, but that of the law. But when he quits this representation, this public will, and acts by his own private will, he degrades himself, and is but a single private person without power, and without will, that has any right to obedience; the members owing no obedience but to the public will of the society.
§151. 在某些国家中，立法权力并不一直存在，执行权力授与单独的一个人，他也分享立法权力；在那里这单独的一个人可以恰当的称之为“最高”：他并非拥有所有的制定法律的最高权力；但是因为他拥有最高的执行权力，所有下级管理者的从属权力均来源于他，或至少他们的绝大部分权力是这样：既然没有高于他的立法权力，没有他的同意便不能制定法律，就不能期望他还会服从于其它的立法分支，在这种意义上足够认为他拥有最高权力。但是，仍然应当注意到，虽然忠诚的誓言是向他作出的，却并非将他视为最高立法者，而是视为最高的法律执行者，法律是由他和其他人共同制定的；忠诚仅仅是依据法律的服从，当他违反法律的时候，便没有权利要求服从，也不能因公众授予了他执行法律的权力而要求服从，那么，他被认为是国家的形象，幻影或代表，依社会的意志——在国家的法律中宣布的——而行动；这样的话，他并没有他自己的意志和权力，而是法律的意志和权力。但是当他放弃代表和公共意志，而依他自己的私人意志行动的时候，他便降低了自己的权力，仅仅是一个单独的个人，没有国家的权力和意志，没有任何权利去要求服从；社会的成员只应服从社会的公共意志。

WIND

以上说的便是当时英格兰的情况.但是很明显,英国人同时也认识到了这个问题,所以1689年的权利法案的第一条便是:
That the pretended power of suspending the laws or the execution of laws by regal authority without consent of Parliament is illegal;
未经国会同意，以国王的职权搁置，或者执行法律的权力为非法。

这就将掌握执行权力的国王置于了立法权力的国会之下,所以<国王的演讲>中,乔治六世的父亲乔治五世说,几百年来,我们王室已经变成了"actor"，只需背念台词了。

WIND

§152. The executive power, placed any where but in a person that has also a share in the legislative, is visibly subordinate and accountable to it, and may be at pleasure changed and displaced; so that it is not the supreme executive power, that is exempt from subordination, but the supreme executive power vested in one, who having a share in the legislative, has no distinct superior legislative to be subordinate and accountable to, farther than he himself shall join and consent; so that he is no more subordinate than he himself shall think fit, which one may certainly conclude will be but very little. Of other ministerial and subordinate powers in a commonwealth, we need not speak, they being so multiplied with infinite variety, in the different customs and constitutions of distinct commonwealths, that it is impossible to give a particular account of them all. Only thus much, which is necessary to our present purpose, we may take notice of concerning them, that they have no manner of authority, any of them, beyond what is by positive grant and commission delegated to them, and are all of them accountable to some other power in the common-wealth.
§152. 执行权力，如授与同时拥有立法权力的一个人，很明显执行权力从属并向立法权力负责，依立法权力可改变和替换；所以，并不是最高执行权力可免除对立法权力的服从，而是最高执行权力被授与一个同时分享立法权力的人，便没有了一个清晰的比他自己的参与和同意更高的立法权力去服从并对之负责；这样一来，他所服从的就只有他自己认为适当的法律，这可以确定的推断所服从的法律只是其中很少的一部分。对于国家其它日常管理性的和从属性的权力，我们不需要讨论，由于各个不同的国家的不同习俗和宪制，它们具有无限的多样性，不可能一一加以说明。于我们现在讨论目的所必需的，仅仅这些就足够了，不过我们可以注意一点，它们没有任何职权——任何权力都没有——可超越由肯定性的许可和任命授与他们的权限，它们所有的权力都必须对国家中的其它某种权力负责。