WIND

§183. Let the conqueror have as much justice on his side, as could be supposed, he has no right to seize more than the vanquished could forfeit: his life is at the victor's mercy; and his service and goods he may appropriate, to make himself reparation; but he cannot take the goods of his wife and children; they too had a title to the goods he enjoyed, and their shares in the estate he possessed: for example, I in the state of nature (and all commonwealths are in the state of nature one with another) have injured another man, and refusing to give satisfaction, it comes to a state of war, wherein my defending by force what I had gotten unjustly, makes me the aggressor. I am conquered: my life, it is true, as forfeit, is at mercy, but not my wife's and children's. They made not the war, nor assisted in it. I could not forfeit their lives; they were not mine to forfeit. My wife had a share in my estate; that neither could I forfeit. And my children also, being born of me, had a right to be maintained out of my labour or substance. Here then is the case: the conqueror has a title to reparation for damages received, and the children have a title to their father's estate for their subsistence: for as to the wife's share, whether her own labour, or compact, gave her a title to it, it is plain, her husband could not forfeit what was her's. What must be done in the case? I answer, the fundamental law of nature being, that all, as much as may be, should be preserved, it follows, that if there be not enough fully to satisfy both, viz, for the conqueror's losses, and children's maintenance, he that hath, and to spare, must remit something of his full satisfaction, and give way to the pressing and preferable title of those who are in danger to perish without it.
§183. 假如征服者这一方拥有所能想象的最大的正义，他仍然没有权利获得超过被征服者所能丧失的财产：他的生命任由胜者处置；他的服务和财产胜者可以占有以作赔偿；但是胜者不能拿走他的妻子和孩子的财产；他们对他享有的财产也有一种权利，也有一份：举例来说，我在自然状态中（所有的国家都彼此处于自然状态中）伤害了另一个人，并拒绝给与赔偿，便形成了战争状态，在这种状态中我用强制力保护我的不正当获得，便使我成了入侵者。我被征服了：我的生命，既然已经丧失生命权，便任由征服者处置，但是我的妻子和孩子的生命却不是这样。他们并没有发动战争，也没有协助战争。我不能剥夺他们的生命；他们不是我能剥夺的。我的妻子分享我的一部分财产；我也不能剥夺。我的孩子也是这样，既然由我所生，便拥有权利由我的劳动和财产予以供养。那么情况就是这样：征服者对他所遭受的损失拥有获得赔偿的资格，而孩子们为了他们的生存对他们父亲的财产也有一种资格：而对于妻子的那一份，不管是她自己的劳动或契约给与其拥有的资格，很明白，她的丈夫不能予以剥夺。那么这种情况应当怎么办？我的回答是，基于基本的自然法是尽可能的保护所有的人，结论就是，如果没有足够的财产来满足双方，即征服者的损失和孩子们的抚养，那么富足有余的人必须降低他完全满足的要求，让位于那些受到死亡威胁的较迫切的权利。

WIND

所有的国家都彼此处于自然状态中
=========================
联合国的建立就是为了结束这种状态。当然联合国的宪法即它的建立原则是另一个大问题。

WIND

§184. But supposing the charge and damages of the war are to be made up to the conqueror, to the utmost farthing; and that the children of the vanquished, spoiled of all their father's goods, are to be left to starve and perish; yet the satisfying of what shall, on this score, be due to the conqueror, will scarce give him a title to any country he shall conquer: for the damages of war can scarce amount to the value of any considerable tract of land, in any part of the world, where all the land is possessed, and none lies waste. And if I have not taken away the conqueror's land, which, being vanquished, it is impossible I should; scarce any other spoil I have done him can amount to the value of mine, supposing it equally cultivated, and of an extent any way coming near what I had overrun of his. The destruction of a year's product or two (for it seldom reaches four or five) is the utmost spoil that usually can be done: for as to money, and such riches and treasure taken away, these are none of nature's goods, they have but a fantastical imaginary value: nature has put no such upon them: they are of no more account by her standard, than the wampompeke of the Americans to an European prince, or the silver money of Europe would have been formerly to an American. And five years product is not worth the perpetual inheritance of land, where all is possessed, and none remains waste, to be taken up by him that is disseized: which will be easily granted, if one do but take away the imaginary value of money, the disproportion being more than between five and five hundred; though, at the same time, half a year's product is more worth than the inheritance, where there being more land than the inhabitants possess and make use of, any one has liberty to make use of the waste: but there conquerors take little care to possess themselves of the lands of the vanquished. No damage therefore, that men in the state of nature (as all princes and governments are in reference to one another) suffer from one another, can give a conqueror power to dispossess the posterity of the vanquished, and turn them out of that inheritance, which ought to be the possession of them and their descendants to all generations. The conqueror indeed will be apt to think himself master: and it is the very condition of the subdued not to be able to dispute their right. But if that be all, it gives no other title than what bare force gives to the stronger over the weaker: and, by this reason, he that is strongest will have a right to whatever he pleases to seize on.
§184. 但是假定被征服者必须罄其所有来赔偿征服者战争的花费和损失；被征服者的孩子们，在他们的父亲的财产全被毁掉之后，面临饥饿和死亡；然而在这种情况中，征服者所应得的满足，也很少给与他对所征服的任何国家领土一种权利：因为战争的损失很少能够和世界上任何大片的土地的价值相提并论，如果那里的土地全被占有没有荒地的话。如果我没有夺走征服者的土地——既然被征服，我便不可能这样做；我对他造成的其它损失很少能够抵得上我的土地的价值，假定被同等程度的耕种，大小略等于我曾经侵占过的他的土地。一两年土地产出的破坏（因为很少达到四五年）是通常所能造成的最大损失了：至于夺去的货币及诸如此类的财富和珠宝，并非自然财产，它们具有的不过是幻想的想象的价值：自然并未赋与它们这种价值：根据自然的标准，它们的价值意义并不超过美洲印第安人的货币对于欧洲一个君主，或欧洲的银币以前对于一个美洲人的意义。在土地全被占有没有荒地的情况下，五年的土地产出并不能和被他所强占的永久土地继承权相比：一个人只要抛开货币的想象价值，便不难承认，这种不对等超过5比500；虽然，另一方面，在土地超过居民所能占有和使用，任何人都可自由的使用荒地的情况下，半年的土地产出便能超过土地的价值：但是在这种情况下，征服者反而不太关心占有被征服者的土地了。所以，在自然状态中（所有的君主和政府都彼此处于这种状态中），人们彼此之间的损害，并不能给与征服者驱逐被征服者的后代的权力，从而使他们丧失这些财产——这些财产应当属于他们及他们的后代，一代代继承下去。实际上，征服者倾向于认为他们应当作为主人：而被征服者的状况也无法为他们的权利争辩。但是如果这就是一切，那么这给与的资格也仅仅是赤裸裸的强制力给与强者对弱者的权利：基于这样的理由，谁最强大，谁便拥有权利可以夺取他想要的一切。

李新苗

辛苦了，慰问一下~！

WIND

辛苦了，慰问一下~！
李新苗 发表于 2011-8-5 14:57

谢谢新苗mm！

WIND

§185. Over those then that joined with him in the war, and over those of the subdued country that opposed him not, and the posterity even of those that did, the conqueror, even in a just war, hath, by his conquest, no right of dominion: they are free from any subjection to him, and if their former government be dissolved, they are at liberty to begin and erect another to themselves.
§185. 对于那些与他一同战斗的人，对于那些被征服的国家中并未反对他的人，甚至是反对他的人的后代，征服者，即使是在正当的战争中，通过他的征服也没有统治的权利：他们并不臣服于他，如果他们之前的政府解体了，他们可以自由的开始建立一个新的政府来统治自己。

WIND

§186. The conqueror, it is true, usually, by the force he has over them, compels them, with a sword at their breasts, to stoop to his conditions, and submit to such a government as he pleases to afford them; but the enquiry is, what right he has to do so? If it be said, they submit by their own consent, then this allows their own consent to be necessary to give the conqueror a title to rule over them. It remains only to be considered, whether promises extorted by force, without right, can be thought consent, and how far they bind. To which I shall say, they bind not at all; because whatsoever another gets from me by force, I still retain the right of, and he is obliged presently to restore. He that forces my horse from me, ought presently to restore him, and I have still a right to retake him. By the same reason, he that forced a promise from me, ought presently to restore it, i.e. quit me of the obligation of it; or I may resume it myself, i.e. chuse whether I will perform it: for the law of nature laying an obligation on me only by the rules it prescribes, cannot oblige me by the violation of its rules: such is the extorting any thing from me by force. Nor does it at all alter the case to say, I gave my promise, no more than it excuses the force, and passes the right, when I put my hand in my pocket, and deliver my purse myself to a thief, who demands it with a pistol at my breast.
§186. 确实，征服者通常用刀剑逼近被征服者的胸口，用强制力迫使他们屈服于他的条件，服从于按他的意愿所建立的政府；但是问题是，他有什么权利这样做？如果说，他们服从是经由他们自己同意的，那么这便承认他们自己的同意是给与征服者统治他们的资格的必要条件。那么剩下的就只有一个问题了，通过强制力所获的承诺，并不基于权利，能否被视为同意，以及它们具有多大的约束力。对此我要说，它们完全没有约束力；因为无论他人通过强制力从我这里获得什么，我仍然保留它的权利，并且他有责任立即归还。强抢我的马匹的人，应当立即归还，并且我仍然拥有夺回的权利。基于同样的理由，强制获得我的承诺，应当立即归还，即解除我履行承诺的责任；或者，我可以自行收回，即选择是否履行：因为自然法只能基于它所规定的规则来确定我所负有的责任，而不能通过违反它的规则来要求我：这样的承诺便是使用强制力从我这里获得的东西。这相当于说，当盗贼用枪指着我的胸口，索取我的钱包，我伸进我的口袋，取出来递给他，自然法因此可以宽恕这种强制力，并转让这种权利。

§187. From all which it follows, that the government of a conqueror, imposed by force on the subdued, against whom he had no right of war, or who joined not in the war against him, where he had right, has no obligation upon them.
§187. 由以上可以得出，征服者所建立的政府，通过强制力加于被征服者，由于他对被征服者并没有战争的权利，或者他虽有权利但他们并未参与战争对抗他，那么这样的政府对被征服者没有约束力。

WIND

§188. But let us suppose, that all the men of that community, being all members of the same body politic, may be taken to have joined in that unjust war wherein they are subdued, and so their lives are at the mercy of the conqueror.
§188. 但是让我们假定，那个共同体的所有人，全是同一个政治实体的成员，可能都参加了那场非正义的战争并被征服，于是他们的生命由征服者来处置。

WIND

§189. I say, this concerns not their children who are in their minority: for since a father hath not, in himself, a power over the life or liberty of his child, no act of his can possibly forfeit it. So that the children, whatever may have happened to the fathers, are freemen, and the absolute power of the conqueror reaches no farther than the persons of the men that were subdued by him, and dies with them: and should he govern them as slaves, subjected to his absolute arbitrary power, he has no such right of dominion over their children. He can have no power over them but by their own consent, whatever he may drive them to say or do; and he has no lawfull authority, whilst force, and not choice, compels them to submission.
§189. 我说，这与他们的未成年的孩子没有关系：因为既然父亲对他孩子的生命和自由没有权力，那么他的任何行为都不可能剥夺孩子的自由。所以，无论父亲发生什么事情，孩子都是自由的人，征服者的绝对权力不能超越那些被他所征服的人，并随着他们的死亡而终止：即使他统治他们像奴隶一样，使他们服从于他的绝对的肆意的权力，他对他们的孩子仍然没有统治权利。除了经由他们自己的同意，他对他们没有权力，无论他迫使他们说什么或做什么；只要他迫使他们服从时伴随着强制力，而不是自愿选择，他便没有合法的权力。

WIND

§190. Every man is born with a double right: first, a right of freedom to his person, which no other man has a power over, but the free disposal of it lies in himself. Secondly, a right, before any other man, to inherit with his brethren his father's goods.
§190. 每个人生来就有两种权利：第一，人身自由的权利，对此他人没有权力，而只能由他自己自由处置。第二，在任何他人面前，与他的兄弟共同继承他父亲的财产。

§191. By the first of these, a man is naturally free from subjection to any government, tho' he be born in a place under its jurisdiction; but if he disclaim the lawful government of the country he was born in, he must also quit the right that belonged to him by the laws of it, and the possessions there descending to him from his ancestors, if it were a government made by their consent.
§191. 基于第一种权利，一个人自然的免于服从任何政府，虽然他的出生地在某个政府的管辖之下；但是如果他放弃他所出生的国家的合法政府，那么他也必须放弃依据其法律而属于他的权利，以及他的祖先留给他的财产，如果这是一个基于他们同意而建立的政府的话。

WIND

§192. By the second, the inhabitants of any country, who are descended, and derive a title to their estates from those who are subdued, and had a government forced upon them against their free consents, retain a right to the possession of their ancestors, though they consent not freely to the government, whose hard conditions were by force imposed on the possessors of that country: for the first conqueror never having had a title to the land of that country, the people who are the descendants of, or claim under those who were forced to submit to the yoke of a government by constraint, have always a right to shake it off, and free themselves from the usurpation or tyranny which the sword hath brought in upon them, till their rulers put them under such a frame of government as they willingly and of choice consent to. Who doubts but the Grecian Christians, descendants of the ancient possessors of that country, may justly cast off the Turkish yoke, which they have so long groaned under, whenever they have an opportunity to do it? For no government can have a right to obedience from a people who have not freely consented to it; which they can never be supposed to do, till either they are put in a full state of liberty to chuse their government and governors, or at least till they have such standing laws, to which they have by themselves or their representatives given their free consent, and also till they are allowed their due property, which is so to be proprietors of what they have, that no body can take away any part of it without their own consent, without which, men under any government are not in the state of freemen, but are direct slaves under the force of war.
§192. 基于第二种权利，任何国家的居民，作为被征服者的后代并从他们那里获得财产继承权，有一个违背他们的自由同意而强加给他们的政府，仍然对他们祖先的财产保留权利，虽然他们不自由的同意政府，而政府的苛刻条件是强加在那个国家的所有者身上的：因为最初征服者对那个国家的土地并没有占有的资格，所以通过强迫而被迫服从于一个政府的枷锁的人的后代总是拥有权利摆脱它，从而从刀剑强加给他们的篡夺或暴政下获得自由，直到他们的统治者将他们置于他们自愿选择同意的政府框架之下。谁会怀疑古希腊的基督徒，作为那个国家过去的所有者的后代，只要有机会就可以正当的扔掉土耳其的枷锁——他们在此之下长久的呻吟？因为没有一个政府有权利得到那些没有自由的同意它的人们的服从；不能假定他们做出了这种自由的同意，直到将他们置于一种完全的自由状态之中去选择他们的政府和统治者，或者至少直到他们拥有他们自己或他们的代表给与自由同意的恒定的法律，并且直到他们的正当财产得到承认，从而成为他们所有物的所有者，未经他们自己的同意任何人都不能夺走任何部分，没有这些条件，人们处于任何政府之下都不是自由人的状态，而只是战争强制力下的直接的奴隶。

WIND

§193. But granting that the conqueror in a just war has a right to the estates, as well as power over the persons, of the conquered; which, it is plain, he hath not: nothing of absolute power will follow from hence, in the continuance of the government; because the descendants of these being all freemen, if he grants them estates and possessions to inhabit his country, (without which it would be worth nothing) whatsoever he grants them, they have, so far as it is granted, property in. The nature whereof is, that without a man's own consent it cannot be taken from him,
§193. 但是，承认征服者在正当的战争中对被征服者的人身拥有权力的同时，对他们的财产也拥有权利；很明白，他没有这种权利：在继续统治期间，任何绝对权力都不能由此得出；因为这些后代都是自由的人，如果他给与他们财产以定居于他的国家，（没有这一条征服也没有什么意义了）无论他给与什么，只要给与了，便对他给与的东西拥有了财产权。财产权的性质就是，未经他自己的同意，不能拿走。

WIND

§194. Their persons are free by a native right, and their properties, be they more or less, are their own, and at their own dispose, and not at his; or else it is no property. Supposing the conqueror gives to one man a thousand acres, to him and his heirs for ever; to another he lets a thousand acres for his life, under the rent of 50l. or 500l. per annum. Has not the one of these a right to his thousand acres for ever, and the other, during his life, paying the said rent? And hath not the tenant for life a property in all that he gets over and above his rent, by his labour and industry during the said term, supposing it be double the rent? Can any one say, the king, or conqueror, after his grant, may by his power of conqueror take away all, or part of the land from the heirs of one, or from the other during his life, he paying the rent? Or can he take away from either the goods or money they have got upon the said land, at his pleasure? If he can, then all free and voluntary contracts cease, and are void in the world; there needs nothing to dissolve them at any time, but power enough: and all the grants and promises of men in power are but mockery and collusion: for can there be any thing more ridiculous than to say, I give you and your's this for ever, and that in the surest and most solemn way of conveyance can be devised; and yet it is to be understood, that I have right, if I please, to take it away from you again tomorrow?
§194. 他们的人身基于生来就有的权利是自由的，他们的财产，无论多少，都是他们自己的，由他们自己处置，而不是由征服者来处置；否则就不是财产了。假设征服者给与一个人1000英亩土地，由他和他的继承人永远享有；给与另一个人1000英亩终身所有，年租金50或500镑。难道前者不是对他的1000英亩土地永久享有权利，而后者在他支付既定的租金之后终身对土地享有权利？难道终身的承租人对通过他的劳作在一定的时期内所获得的超过租金的部分——假设是租金的两倍——没有财产权吗？难道任何人能够说，国王或征服者，在他给与之后，可以通过他的征服者的权力夺走前者的继承人的全部或部分土地，或在后者的有生之年在他支付租金之后可以夺走他的全部或部分的土地？或者他能够随意夺走他们在这些土地上的所得吗？如果他可以，那么世界上所有的自由自愿性的契约都终止和无效了；任何时候只要足够强大无需别的什么就可解除契约：所有掌权的人的给与和承诺都不过是愚弄和串谋：因为我说，我将这个给与你和你的后代世代享有，并以所能想出的最可信和最郑重的财产转移的方式；然而却要被理解为，如果我高兴，明天我仍有权利从你那里取回，难道还有比这个更荒唐的事情吗？

WIND

§195. I will not dispute now whether princes are exempt from the laws of their country; but this I am sure, they owe subjection to the laws of God and nature. No body, no power, can exempt them from the obligations of that eternal law. Those are so great, and so strong, in the case of promises, that omnipotency itself can be tied by them. Grants, promises, and oaths, are bonds that hold the Almighty: whatever some flatterers say to princes of the world, who all together, with all their people joined to them, are, in comparison of the great God, but as a drop of the bucket, or a dust on the balance, inconsiderable, nothing!
§195. 我现在不想争论君主们是否免受他们国家的法律的约束；但是有一点我确信，即他们应当服从上帝和自然的法律。没有人，没有什么权力能够免于服从这种永恒的法律。就承诺来说，它们的约束力是如此的强大，以致全能的上帝本身都被它们约束。给与，承诺，以及誓言，是约束全能者的契约：无论奉承者对世上的君主们说过什么，所有的君主，以及所有臣属于他们的人，与上帝比起来，不过是桶里的一滴水，或天平上的一粒尘，微不足道，算不了什么！

WIND

§196. The short of the case in conquest is this: the conqueror, if he have a just cause, has a despotical right over the persons of all, that actually aided, and concurred in the war against him, and a right to make up his damage and cost out of their labour and estates, so he injure not the right of any other. Over the rest of the people, if there were any that consented not to the war, and over the children of the captives themselves, or the possessions of either, he has no power; and so can have, by virtue of conquest, no lawful title himself to dominion over them, or derive it to his posterity; but is an aggressor, if he attempts upon their properties, and thereby puts himself in a state of war against them; and has no better a right of principality, he, nor any of his successors, than Hingar, or Hubba, the Danes, had here in England, or Spartacus, had he conquered Italy, would have had; which is to have their yoke cast off, as soon as God shall give those under their subjection courage and opportunity to do it. Thus, notwithstanding whatever title the kings of Assyria had over Judah, by the sword, God assisted Hezekiah to throw off the dominion of that conquering empire. And the lord was with Hezekiah; and he prospered whithersoever he went forth: and he rebelled against the king of Assyria, and served him not, 2 Kings xviii. 7. Whence it is plain, that shaking off a power, which force, and not right, hath set over any one, though it hath the name of rebellion, yet is no offence before God, but is that which he allows and countenances, though even promises and covenants, when obtained by force, have intervened: for it is very probable, to any one that reads the story of Ahaz and Hezekiah attentively, that the Assyrians subdued Ahaz, and deposed him, and made Hezekiah king in his father's lifetime; and that Hezekiah by agreement had done him homage, and paid him tribute all this time.
§196. 征服的情况，简言之就是这样：如果征服者拥有正当的理由，那么对在战争中实际帮助和支持过他的敌人的所有人拥有一种独断的权力，有权利从他们的劳动和财产中获得补偿以弥补他的损失和花费，这样他便没有伤害到任何其他人的权利。对其余的人——如果他们并不赞同战争，或者对俘虏们的孩子，或者对任何一个的财产，他没有权力；从而不能基于征服而对他们拥有合法的统治权，或将这种统治权传给他的后代；如果他对他们的财产有所图谋，他便成了入侵者，从而使自己置身于对他们的战争状态之中；他或他的继承者并不比丹麦人Hingar或Hubba对英国兰，或斯巴达克思（奴隶，角斗士，反叛罗马的领导者）——如果他征服意大利的话——拥有更多的君主权利；一旦上帝给与他们所臣服的人勇气和机会，他们便可以扔掉他们的枷锁。这样的话，不管亚述的国王凭借刀剑对犹大国享有何种资格，上帝帮助希西家摆脱了那个征服帝国的统治。耶和华与希西家同在；无论他到哪里去，都能兴旺：他反叛亚述国王，不再侍奉他（列王纪下：18：7）。由此可见，摆脱一种基于强制而不是权利而加于任何人身上的权力，尽管背有反叛之名，然而在上帝面前并不是什么罪行，而是祂允许和赞同的，即使靠强制力所获得的承诺和契约在干扰：任何人只要仔细读过亚哈斯和希西家的故事，就可能知道，亚述人征服亚哈斯，废黜了他，并在他还在世的时候立希西家为国王；而依据协议希西家一直忠于亚述国王并向他进贡。

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Chapter XVII.
Of Usurpation.
第十七章 论篡夺

§197. AS conquest may be called a foreign usurpation, so usurpation is a kind of domestic conquest, with this difference, that an usurper can never have right on his side, it being no usurpation, but where one is got into the possession of what another has right to. This, so far as it is usurpation, is a change only of persons, but not of the forms and rules of the government: for if the usurper extend his power beyond what of right belonged to the lawful princes, or governors of the commonwealth, it is tyranny added to usurpation.
§197. 因为征服可以称为国外的篡夺，所以篡夺就是一种国内的征服，与前者不同的是，篡夺者在他这一方从来没有权利，因为只有在一个人占有另一个人才有权利占有的东西的情况下，才称之为“篡夺”。只要是篡夺，便只是人身的改变，而不是政府的形式和规则的改变：因为如果篡夺者扩大他的权力超越了属于合法君主或国家统治者的权利范围，那就是篡夺加暴政。

§198. In all lawful governments, the designation of the persons, who are to bear rule, is as natural and necessary a part as the form of the government itself, and is that which had its establishment originally from the people; the anarchy being much alike, to have no form of government at all, or to agree that it shall be monarchical, but to appoint no way to design the person that shall have the power, and be the monarch. Hence all commonwealths, with the form of government established, have rules also of appointing those who are to have any share in the public authority, and settled methods of conveying the right to them. Whoever gets into the exercise of any part of the power, by other ways than what the laws of the community have prescribed, hath no right to be obeyed, though the form of the commonwealth be still preserved; since he is not the person the laws have appointed, and consequently not the person the people have consented to. Nor can such an usurper, or any deriving from him, ever have a title, till the people are both at liberty to consent, and have actually consented to allow, and confirm in him the power he hath till then usurped.
§198. 在所有合法的政府中，指定由哪些人来担当统治，如同政府形式本身一样自然并作为必要条件，而且也是公民最初所确定的；完全没有政府形式，或者虽然赞同君主制，但并不指定谁来掌握这种权力以担当君主的方式，其实同样都是无政府形式。因此，所有的国家，在建立政府形式的同时，都建立指定由谁来分享公共权力的规则，以及授权给他们的确定方法。无论是谁来行使任何分支的权力，若通过共同体的法律已经规定的方式之外的方式，便没有权利要求服从，虽然国家的形式仍然得以保持；既然他不是法律所指定的人，理所当然就不是公民所同意的人。这样的篡夺者，或任何由他授权的人，从来没有资格，直到公民能够自由的表示同意，并且实际已经予以承认和批准他之前所篡夺的权力为止。

WIND

Chapter XVIII.
Of Tyranny.
第十八章 论暴政（或译为“论压迫性的政府”）

§199. AS usurpation is the exercise of power, which another hath a right to; so tyranny is the exercise of power beyond right, which no body can have a right to. And this is making use of the power any one has in his hands, not for the good of those who are under it, but for his own private separate advantage. When the governor, however intitled, makes not the law, but his will, the rule; and his commands and actions are not directed to the preservation of the properties of his people, but the satisfaction of his own ambition, revenge, covetousness, or any other irregular passion.
§199. 如果说篡夺是行使他人才有权利行使的权力；那么暴政就是行使任何人都没有权利行使的权力。任何人使用他所掌握的权力，不是为了他所统治下的那些人的利益，而只是为了他自己的私人的与大家不一样的利益。当统治者，不管以怎样的名义，不是使法律而是他的意志成为规则；他的命令和行为不是为了保护他的臣民的财产，而是为了满足他自己的野心，报复之心和贪婪之心，或任何其它乱七八糟的冲动。这就是暴政。

WIND

§200. If one can doubt this to be truth, or reason, because it comes from the obscure hand of a subject, I hope the authority of a king will make it pass with him. King James the first, in his speech to the parliament, 1603, tells them thus, I will ever prefer the weal of the public, and of the whole commonwealth, in making of good laws and constitutions, to any particular and private ends of mine; thinking ever the wealth and weal of the commonwealth to be my greatest weal and worldly felicity; a point wherein a lawful king doth directly differ from a tyrant: for I do acknowledge, that the special and greatest point of difference that is between a rightful king and an usurping tyrant, is this, that whereas the proud and ambitious tyrant doth think his kingdom and people are only ordained for satisfaction of his desires and unreasonable appetites, the righteous and just king doth by the contrary acknowledge himself to be ordained for the procuring of the wealth and property of his people.
§200. 如果有人因为这些话出自一个微不足道的臣民之手，便怀疑其正确性或理性，那么我希望王权能够使他接受这一点。詹姆士一世国王，在1603年对国会的演讲中，这样告诉他们，我将永远以公共和整个国家的利益为重来制定良好的法律和宪法，而不是任何我个人的私人的目的；永远将考虑国家的利益作为我此生最大的幸福；这就是一个合法的国王与一个压迫性君主（暴君）完全不同的地方：因为我确信，一个正当的国王与一个篡位的暴君最大的区别就在于，一个傲慢和怀有野心的暴君认为他的王国和臣民注定是为了满足他的愿望和不合理的贪欲，而正直和正义的国王却与此相反，确信他自己注定是为了谋求他的臣民的利益和财产。

WIND

And again, in his speech to the parliament, 1609, he hath these words, The king binds himself by a double oath, to the observation of the fundamental laws of his kingdom; tacitly, as by being a king, and so bound to protect as well the people, as the laws of his kingdom; and expressly, by his oath at his coronation, so as every just king, in a settled kingdom, is bound to observe that paction made to his people, by his laws, in framing his government agreeable thereunto. According to that paction which God made with Noah after the deluge, hereafter, seed-time and harvest, and cold and heat, and summer and winter, and day and night, shall not cease while the earth remaineth. And therefore a king governing in a settled kingdom, leaves to be a king, and degenerates into a tyrant, as soon as he leaves off to rule according to his laws. And a little after, Therefore all kings that are not tyrants, or perjured, will be glad to bound themselves within the limits of their laws; and they that persuade them the contrary, are vipers, and pests both against them and the commonwealth. Thus that learned king, who well understood the notion of things, makes the difference betwixt a king and a tyrant to consist only in this, that one makes the laws the bounds of his power, and the good of the public, the end of his government; the other makes all give way to his own will and appetite.
在1609年对国会的演讲中又有这些话，国王通过两份誓言来约束自己以遵守他的王国的基本法律；一份是默认的，作为一个国王，就必须保护他的王国的法律和臣民；另一份是加冕仪式上通过他的誓言明确表示的，像每个正当的国王一样，在一个稳定的王国，必须遵守他与臣民之间订立的契约，通过他的法律，将他的政府架构得与此相符。根据洪水之后上帝与诺亚所订立的契约，从此以后，地还在的时候，播种和收获，寒冷和炎热，夏天和冬天，白昼和黑夜，便不再停息了。所以，在一个稳定的王国内统治的国王，只要他抛弃他的法律，便不再是一个国王而堕落为暴君。稍后他接着说，所有不是暴君或作伪誓的国王，都乐于将他们自己约束在他们的法律范围内；凡是劝说他们与此背道而驰的人，都是既背叛国王又背叛国家的毒蛇和害虫。可见，那位明白事理的博学的国王，认为国王和暴君的区别仅仅在于，前者将法律作为他的权力的边界，将公共利益作为他的政府的目的；而后者让一切都为他自己的意志和贪婪让路。

WIND

§201. It is a mistake, to think this fault is proper only to monarchies; other forms of government are liable to it, as well as that: for wherever the power, that is put in any hands for the government of the people, and the preservation of their properties, is applied to other ends, and made use of to impoverish, harass, or subdue them to the arbitrary and irregular commands of those that have it; there it presently becomes tyranny, whether those that thus use it are one or many. Thus we read of the thirty tyrants at Athens, as well as one at Syracuse; and the intolerable dominion of the Decemviri[ten men] at Rome was nothing better.
§201. 如果认为压迫性只是君主制所特有的，那是错误的；其它政府形式也同君主制一样易有这种缺点：因为无论在哪里，为了统治臣民并保护他们的财产而授与某些人的权力，一旦应用于其它的目的，以及被用来使臣民陷入贫困，骚扰他们，或迫使他们服从于那些掌权的人的肆意和乱七八糟的命令；它便立即变为暴政，无论使用这种权力的人是一个还是多个。这样来看的话，我们读到雅典历史上有30个暴君，Syracuse（现为西西里岛东部的港口城市）也有一个；在罗马难以忍受的“十人执政”统治下（在罗马共和国时期），也好不到哪里去。

WIND

§202. Wherever law ends, tyranny begins, if the law be transgressed to another's harm; and whosoever in authority exceeds the power given him by the law, and makes use of the force he has under his command, to compass that upon the subject, which the law allows not, ceases in that to be a magistrate; and, acting without authority, may be opposed, as any other man, who by force invades the right of another. This is acknowledged in subordinate magistrates. He that hath authority to seize my person in the street, may be opposed as a thief and a robber, if he endeavours to break into my house to execute a writ, notwithstanding that I know he has such a warrant, and such a legal authority, as will impower him to arrest me abroad. And why this should not hold in the highest, as well as in the most inferior magistrate, I would gladly be informed. Is it reasonable, that the eldest brother, because he has the greatest part of his father's estate, should thereby have a right to take away any of his younger brothers portions? or that a rich man, who possessed a whole country, should from thence have a right to seize, when he pleased, the cottage and garden of his poor neighbour? The being rightfully possessed of great power and riches, exceedingly beyond the greatest part of the sons of Adam, is so far from being an excuse, much less a reason, for rapine and oppression, which the endamaging another without authority is, that it is a great aggravation of it: for the exceeding the bounds of authority is no more a right in a great than in a petty officer, no more justifiable in a king than a constable; but is so much the worse in him, in that he has more trust put in him, has already a much greater share than the rest of his brethren, and is supposed, from the advantages of his education, employment, and counsellors, to be more knowing in the measures of right and wrong.
§202. 法律死亡的地方，暴政便开始了，如果法律被违反伤害到他人的话；无论是谁掌握权力，若超越了法律所授与他的权力界限，使用他所能支配的强制力，强迫臣民服从法律所不允许的权力，他就不再是一个管理者；并且，未经授权的统治行为，可以像对待那些用强制力侵犯他人的权利的人一样予以反对。就那些下级管理者来说，这是大家所公认的。一个有权在街上抓捕我的人，如果企图闯入我的屋子来执行法令，尽管我知道他有这样的授权令，也有合法的权力可以在外面逮捕我，我仍然可以将他视为盗贼和抢劫者予以反抗。那么，这些原则对于最高管理者为什么就不能像那些最下级的管理者一样有效了呢？我倒乐意有人向我说明。长兄因为可以继承他的父亲的绝大部分财产，于是有权利夺走其他弟弟所应得的那一份，这合理吗？又或者，拥有整个乡下的富人，于是就有权利可随意夺走他的贫穷的邻人的小屋和小院？合法的拥有巨大的权力和财富，远远地超过绝大部分亚当的子孙们，不但不能为强夺和压迫开脱，更不能作为其理由了，未经授权而损害他人的利益，使强夺和压迫的性质更加严重：因为超越职权的范围，国王并不比小官员拥有更多的权利，国王也不比基层警察拥有更多的正当性；反而越是接受了更多的信任的人更加糟糕，因为他既已比他的弟兄享受了更多的条件，理应由于他的教育，职业和各种顾问，更加明了对和错的辨别。

WIND

§203. May the commands then of a prince be opposed? may he be resisted as often as any one shall find himself aggrieved, and but imagine he has not right done him? This will unhinge and overturn all polities, and, instead of government and order, leave nothing but anarchy and confusion.
§203. 那么，君主的命令可以反对吗？是否任何人觉得自己的权利遭到侵犯，便仅凭想象他没有权利这样对他，就可以常常反抗他呢？这将会扰乱和推翻所有的政制，代替管理和秩序的便只有无政府和混乱了。

§204. To this I answer, that force is to be opposed to nothing, but to unjust and unlawful force; whoever makes any opposition in any other case, draws on himself a just condemnation both from God and man; and so no such danger or confusion will follow, as is often suggested: for,
§204. 对此我的回答是，强制力只能反对不正当和非法的强制力；凡在其它的情况下进行反抗的人，带给自己的将是上帝和人类正当的谴责；所以这样的危险和混乱并不会像人们常常所暗示的那样随之发生：因为，

WIND

§205. First, As, in some countries, the person of the prince by the law is sacred; and so, whatever he commands or does, his person is still free from all question or violence, not liable to force, or any judicial censure or condemnation. But yet opposition may be made to the illegal acts of any inferior officer, or other commissioned by him; unless he will, by actually putting himself into a state of war with his people, dissolve the government, and leave them to that defence which belongs to every one in the state of nature: for of such things who can tell what the end will be? And a neighbour kingdom has shewed the world an odd example. In all other cases the sacredness of the person exempts him from all inconveniencies, whereby he is secure, whilst the government stands, from all violence and harm whatsoever; than which there cannot be a wiser constitution: for the harm he can do in his own person not being likely to happen often, nor to extend itself far; nor being able by his single strength to subvert the laws, nor oppress the body of the people, should any prince have so much weakness, and ill nature as to be willing to do it, the inconveniency of some particular mischiefs, that may happen sometimes, when a heady prince comes to the throne, are well recompensed by the peace of the public, and security of the government, in the person of the chief magistrate, thus set out of the reach of danger: it being safer for the body, that some few private men should be sometimes in danger to suffer, than that the head of the republic should be easily, and upon slight occasions, exposed.
§205. 首先，比如在某些国家，君主的人身由法律规定是不可侵犯的；所以，无论他命令或做什么，他的人身仍然是免受质疑或暴行的，也不受强制力或任何司法指控或定罪。但是，反对仍然可以针对他的任何下级官员或其他他所授权的人的非法行为；除非他想实际通过将自己置于与他的臣民的战争状态之中来解体政府，从而使他们获得战争状态中每个人所拥有的自我防御权利：因为这样的事情谁能够知道结局会怎么样？邻国已经给世界提供了一个奇怪的先例。在其它一切情况下，人身的不可侵犯使他免于所有的麻烦，只要政府还在，他便可以因此而免于所有的暴行和伤害；没有比这更明智的制度了：因为他本人所能造成的伤害并不可能经常发生，影响也不会太远；即使任何君主有如此多的缺陷和恶劣的本性想去破坏法律或压迫全体臣民，以他单独的力量也不可能，一位影响强势的君主继位，即使偶尔因某些特别的错误制造麻烦，也可在最高管理者置身于危险之外，通过公共和平和政府的安全得到很好的补偿：对于整个国家来说，某些个人有时遭遇危险，总比共和国的元首轻易的暴露于危险之中要安全。

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§206. Secondly, But this privilege, belonging only to the king's person, hinders not, but they may be questioned, opposed, and resisted, who use unjust force, though they pretend a commission from him, which the law authorizes not; as is plain in the case of him that has the king's writ to arrest a man, which is a full commission from the king; and yet he that has it cannot break open a man's house to do it, nor execute this command of the king upon certain days, nor in certain places, though this commission have no such exception in it; but they are the limitations of the law, which if any one transgress, the king's commission excuses him not: for the king's authority being given him only by the law, he cannot impower any one to act against the law, or justify him, by his commission, in so doing; the commission, or command of any magistrate, where he has no authority, being as void and insignificant, as that of any private man; the difference between the one and the other, being that the magistrate has some authority so far, and to such ends, and the private man has none at all: for it is not the commission, but the authority, that gives the right of acting; and against the laws there can be no authority. But, notwithstanding such resistance, the king's person and authority are still both secured, and so no danger to governor or government.
§206. 第二，但是这种特殊权利，仅仅属于国王的人身，并不妨碍那些未经法律授权而使用不正当强制力的人——虽然他们有得到他授权的借口——可能受到质疑，反对或抵抗；举一个简单的例子，一个人持国王的命令去逮捕一个人，这是完全由国王授权的；然而此人并不能闯入一个人的屋子去逮捕他，也不能在某些特定的日子或特定的地点执行国王的命令，虽然这份授权书并没有做出这种例外的规定；但是它们是法律的限制，如果任何人违反，国王的授权也不能宽恕他：因为国王的职权仅为法律所授与，他不能授权任何人去做违法的事，也不能因为是由他所授权所为便使一个人的行为正当化；任何官员的授权或命令，若超越职权的范围，便如同任何私人的授权或命令一样，是无效和没有意义的；前者和后者的区别在于，官员拥有为一定的目的而规定的职权，私人则没有：因为不是授权而是职权才给与官员行动的权利；违背法律则没有职权。但是，尽管有这样的抵抗，国王的人身和职权都仍然是得到保障的，这样统治者或政府就不会有危险。

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这里所讲的情况也是当时英格兰的情况。布莱克斯通从法律的视角也讲得很明白，如果国王的下级官员做出违法的事，比如未经正当的法律程序而使任何臣民丧失法律的保护，那么他必会依法受到审判，如果被法庭定罪，国王也不能赦免他。

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§207. Thirdly, Supposing a government wherein the person of the chief magistrate is not thus sacred; yet this doctrine of the lawfulness of resisting all unlawful exercises of his power, will not upon every slight occasion indanger him, or imbroil the government: for where the injured party may be relieved, and his damages repaired by appeal to the law, there can be no pretence for force, which is only to be used where a man is intercepted from appealing to the law: for nothing is to be accounted hostile force, but where it leaves not the remedy of such an appeal; and it is such force alone, that puts him that uses it into a state of war, and makes it lawful to resist him. A man with a sword in his hand demands my purse in the high-way, when perhaps I have not twelve pence in my pocket: this man I may lawfully kill. To another I deliver 100l. to hold only whilst I alight, which he refuses to restore me, when I am got up again, but draws his sword to defend the possession of it by force, if I endeavour to retake it. The mischief this man does me is a hundred, or possibly a thousand times more than the other perhaps intended me (whom I killed before he really did me any); and yet I might lawfully kill the one, and cannot so much as hurt the other lawfully. The reason whereof is plain; because the one using force, which threatened my life, I could not have time to appeal to the law to secure it: and when it was gone, it was too late to appeal. The law could not restore life to my dead carcass: the loss was irreparable; which to prevent, the law of nature gave me a right to destroy him, who had put himself into a state of war with me, and threatened my destruction. But in the other case, my life not being in danger, I may have the benefit of appealing to the law, and have reparation for my 100l. that way.
§207. 第三，假设一个政府中的元首的人身并不是那样不可侵犯；然而这种抵抗一切他的权力的非法行使具备合法性的学说，并不会在每个无关紧要的场合都置他于危险之中或使政府陷于混乱：因为在受害者可以通过向法律申诉得到救济并补偿其损失的情况下，强制力便没有借口了，强制力只有在诉诸法律受阻的情况下才能使用：因为只有在诉诸法律矫正不可能的情况下，才使强制力变为敌对的强制力；也只有这种敌对的强制力才使使用它的人置身于战争状态，从而使得抵抗他变得合法。一个人在公路上手持刀剑索求我的钱包，而当时我可能口袋里连十二便士也没有：而我可以合法的杀死他。另一个人，我在下车的时候将100英镑交给他保管，后来我上车的时候他拒绝归还给我，如果我努力去夺回的话，他就抽出他的刀剑以强力保护对它的占有。这个人对我造成的损害是前者企图造成的损害（我在他实际损害我之前便把他杀了）的100倍甚至1000倍；然而我可以合法的杀死前者，却不可以合法的伤害后者。这其中的理由很明白；因为前者使用强制力威胁到我的生命，而我没有时间诉诸法律来加以保护：而一旦丧失生命，诉诸法律便太迟了。法律不能起死回生：这种损失是无法弥补的；为了阻止这种情况，自然法给与我权利去毁灭他，如果他将自己置身于对我的战争状态之中，威胁到我的生命的话。但是在后一种情况中，我的生命并未受到威胁，我可以诉诸法律并获得100英镑的补偿。

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§208. Fourthly, But if the unlawful acts done by the magistrate be maintained by the power he has got, and the remedy which is due by law, be by the same power obstructed; yet the right of resisting, even in such manifest acts of tyranny, will not suddenly, or on slight occasions, disturb the government: for if it reach no farther than some private men's cases, though they have a right to defend themselves, and to recover by force what by unlawful force is taken from them; yet the right to do so will not easily engage them in a contest, wherein they are sure to perish; it being as impossible for one, or a few oppressed men to disturb the government, where the body of the people do not think themselves concerned in it, as for a raving mad-man, or heady malcontent to overturn a well settled state; the people being as little apt to follow the one, as the other.
§208. 第四，但是如果管理者所做的非法行为通过他所获得权力加以维持，应当由法律所作的矫正因为这种权力受到阻碍；然而即使是在这样明显的暴政行为中抵抗的权利也不会突然或轻易的扰乱政府：因为如果不超越私人事件的范围，即使他们拥有自我防御的权利，以强制力恢复被非法强制力所夺走的东西；然而这样做的权利并不会轻易的引起他们陷于冒死的争斗之中；在全体公民并不认为他们与此有关的情况下，某个或几个被压迫的人是不可能扰乱政府的，如同一个疯狂的人或一个鲁莽的不满者不可能掀翻一个良好建立的国家；因为人们很少跟随前者，像后者一样。

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§209. But if either these illegal acts have extended to the majority of the people; or if the mischief and oppression has lighted only on some few, but in such cases, as the precedent, and consequences seem to threaten all; and they are persuaded in their consciences, that their laws, and with them their estates, liberties, and lives are in danger, and perhaps their religion too; how they will be hindered from resisting illegal force, used against them, I cannot tell. This is an inconvenience, I confess, that attends all governments whatsoever, when the governors have brought it to this pass, to be generally suspected of their people; the most dangerous state which they can possibly put themselves in, wherein they are the less to be pitied, because it is so easy to be avoided; it being as impossible for a governor, if he really means the good of his people, and the preservation of them, and their laws together, not to make them see and feel it, as it is for the father of a family, not to let his children see he loves, and takes care of them.
§209. 但是如果这些非法的权力行使的任何一种情况波及到了多数的公民；或者，如果这种损害和压迫仅仅涉及某些人，但是在这样的情况中，先例表明，结果似乎会威胁到所有人；于是促使他们在内心相信，他们的法律，以及与之相连的他们的财产，自由和生命受到了威胁，甚至可能涉及到了他们的宗教；那么，如何去阻止他们去抵抗侵犯他们的非法的强制力，我就不知道了。我承认，无论什么政府，当统治者们将它带到这样一种被它的臣民普遍怀疑的关头，确实是一种困境；这是他们将自己所能推到的最危险的状态了，他们置身其中也没有什么可怜悯的，因为这本来是那么容易避免的；如果一个统治者真正是为了他的臣民的利益，为了保护他们和他们的法律，是不可能不让他们看到和感觉到这一点的，如同一个家庭的父亲，不可能不让他的孩子们看到他的慈爱和关照。

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§210. But if all the world shall observe pretences of one kind, and actions of another; arts used to elude the law, and the trust of prerogative (which is an arbitrary power in some things left in the prince's hand to do good, not harm to the people) employed contrary to the end for which it was given: if the people shall find the ministers and subordinate magistrates chosen suitable to such ends, and favoured, or laid by, proportionably as they promote or oppose them: if they see several experiments made of arbitrary power, and that religion underhand favoured, (tho' publicly proclaimed against) which is readiest to introduce it; and the operators in it supported, as much as may be; and when that cannot be done, yet approved still, and liked the better: if a long train of actions shew the councils all tending that way; how can a man any more hinder himself from being persuaded in his own mind, which way things are going? Or from casting about how to save himself, than he could from believing the captain of the ship he was in, was carrying him, and the rest of the company, to Algiers, when he found him always steering that course, though cross winds, leaks in his ship, and want of men and provisions did often force him to turn his course another way for some time, which he steadily returned to again, as soon as the wind, weather, and other circumstances would let him?
§210. 但是如果全世界都表面是一套，做的是另一套；权术被用来规避法律，特殊权力（这是留给君主的一种随意权力，是为了有益于而不是有害于公民）的委托被用于与原来的规定相反的目的：如果臣民发现大臣和下级官员的挑选是为了这样的目的，并按照他们是促成还是反对它们，相应的对他们进行提升或贬黜：如果公民看到随意权力的数次试探，宗教予以暗中支持，（虽然公开声称反对）急不可耐的准备采取那种方式；其中的人员跃跃欲试；当这些无法获得成功时，仍然得到认可，甚至更甚：如果一连串的行为表明权力机构全都趋向那条路；如何能够让他不再相信会走到那条路上去呢？或者在驶往阿尔及尔（北非港口，与西班牙隔海相望）的过程中，他发现他总是偏离航线，如何让他不是想方设法的自救，而是深信船长将带他和同船的其他人驶往那个地方？虽然有时穿越风浪，船漏水，人员和物资缺少会迫使他改变航线，但是一旦风浪，天气和其它条件允许，他一定会坚定的返回航线的。

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Chapter XIX.
Of the Dissolution of Government.
第十九章 论政府的解体

§211. HE that will with any clearness speak of the dissolution of government, ought in the first place to distinguish between the dissolution of the society and the dissolution of the government. That which makes the community, and brings men out of the loose state of nature, into one politic society, is the agreement which every one has with the rest to incorporate, and act as one body, and so be one distinct commonwealth. The usual, and almost only way whereby this union is dissolved, is the inroad of foreign force making a conquest upon them: for in that case, (not being able to maintain and support themselves, as one intire and independent body) the union belonging to that body which consisted therein, must necessarily cease, and so every one return to the state he was in before, with a liberty to shift for himself, and provide for his own safety, as he thinks fit, in some other society. Whenever the society is dissolved, it is certain the government of that society cannot remain. Thus conquerors swords often cut up governments by the roots, and mangle societies to pieces, separating the subdued or scattered multitude from the protection of, and dependence on, that society which ought to have preserved them from violence. The world is too well instructed in, and too forward to allow of, this way of dissolving of governments, to need any more to be said of it; and there wants not much argument to prove, that where the society is dissolved, the government cannot remain; that being as impossible, as for the frame of an house to subsist when the materials of it are scattered and dissipated by a whirl-wind, or jumbled into a confused heap by an earthquake.
§211. 谁要清晰的论述政府的解体问题，他应当首先区分社会的解体和政府的解体。组成共同体，将人们带离松散的自然状态并形成一个政治社会的是每个人与其余的人所达成协议，以结合在一起作为一个整体行动，从而成为一个独立的国家。这种联合的解体，通常和几乎唯一的方式是国外强制力的侵入并征服他们：因为在那种情况下，（他们不能再作为一个完整和独立的整体维持下去）属于这样一个整体的联合便必然终止，于是每个人都回归之前的自然状态，可以自由的为自己改变到其它的社会中去，为他自己的安全以他认为合适的方式。无论何时，社会一旦解体，那个社会原来的政府必定不能继续存在。征服者的刀剑常常将原来的政府连根拔起，将社会打成碎片，将被征服或被分散的众人脱离原来那个应当保护他们免于暴行的社会的保护和依赖。这个世界已经对这种政府解体了解得太多，并有很深的体会，不能予以容忍，也无需再做更多的说明；对于社会一旦解体，政府便不能继续存在的结论，也无需更多的证明；正如当飓风刮散了房屋的材料，或地震将房屋震为废墟，房屋的框架就不再存在一样。