朱学勤：高校除弊的背后之弊

李旧苗

据说改革是要启蒙的，知识分子们一直这么说，从五四说到今天，老百姓也就深信不疑了。但是中国改革二十多年，一个最具讽刺的现象是：启蒙者成堆的地方却是改革的死角，如果以改革进度来衡量，这些死角可能比有待启蒙的农村地区还要腐朽。
　　比如作协，为不少严肃作家所不齿；比如高校，内里积累的弊端与知识分子的集中程度成正比，大大损害启蒙者的集体形象。
　　根据某机构最近的一个统计：中国的民主意识，知识分子最差，比工人、农民还要低，这就是启蒙者所在的体制长期淤塞的恶果。
　　现在终于要改了，今天你是教授，明天就可以不是——以聘代评，一刀切在了知识分子最敏感的部位。力度不可谓不大，用意不可谓不善：彻底结束评定职称的弊端，端掉铁饭碗，能进能出，能上能下。
　　但是另有一点疑虑，则始终难以打消：聘任权操于谁手？会不会因此而导致行政权公然干预？
　　那个“职称评定”，说穿了，就是让知识分子评知识分子，里面腐败丛生，弊不止一。但从制度上说，却有一利：尚不是官员评知识分子，学术评估体系还稍有独立——一个副教授得罪了院长、书记，也看不惯本单位知识分子，只要他确有过硬的学术成果，就能突破行政权力的限制，把这些成果拿到校外社会化的职称评定委员会去评定，一旦通过，他就能争回这口气。院长、书记在其他方面还可以继续给他穿小鞋，但是对他的教授职称以及随之而来的工资待遇，却只能承认，无可奈何。
　　改革了，以聘代评了，校外社会化的职称评定委员会撤销了，他必须老老实实回到本单位的那一张桌子前面来。坐在他面前审定他学术成果的再不是本行当学术同业，而是本单位同事与官员，其中一两个很可能昨天上午就和他怄过气。这就不难想象这个心高气傲的可怜人，坐在这张熟悉的桌子前面，会是一张如何惨淡的脸。同样是这个副教授，这一次申请就可能面临不是晋升而是下岗的命运。
　　我是赞成改革的，而且赞成以聘代评。但是这一改革的前提是教授治校，学术独立，这才能保证即使在校内“聘”，也未必比校外“评”差，胜者公正，输者服气，同时避免了铁饭碗，带来了人才流动。
　　但在今天内地高教界，行政权力并没有退出学术评估体系，校长的招呼、院长的脸色，比在场的那些教授专家的意见更起作用。要改革的正是前者，而不是后者。在这种情况下，说一声以聘代评，就在全市推开，而且很快就会被其他省市仿效，其后果很可能是当改者不改，不该革者革之，行政权对学术独立进一步扩张，高校内部官本位又一轮恶性膨胀。
　　三十年来，中国的改革如果有其成功一面，我无甚高论，无非“松绑”二字。松什么绑？松行政权之绑。行政权在哪里松绑，哪里的事业就发达，就兴旺。知识分子成堆的地方并不神秘，与安徽小岗村一样，既会有伯乐相马的好村长，也会有薄妇刁民，当街恶骂。关键是行政权松绑，培育独立的学术评估制度，即使没有伯乐介入，也有制度保证千里马不会被埋没。如此积累一代两代人的时间，高校才会恢复高校的尊严，才能出大师。
　　要改革，就应该向着松绑的方向走，“党”要管“党”，“长”要管“长”，书记管党员，校长管院长；而在其他方面则大大方方，给教授们松绑，组建行政官员不在其中的聘任委员会。如果一个官员“双肩挑”，那就让他卸下一挑；学术有自信，就放弃官职；仕途有前景，则离开聘任委员会。恰如基辛格欲任哈佛教授，校方第一要求就是请他辞去白宫职务。这是学术的起码尊严，已经够可怜了，不能再摧残。
　　学术尊严不关政治方向，无权有威，却正是高校之所以为高校的命脉所在。万不能在这个关节点向着行政权扩张的方向走，让行政权吞噬所剩无几的那一点“其他方面”。后者就不是改革了，即使勉强称之为改革，那也是把“猫”说成个“咪”，如此正名，“猫腻”就来了。
　　改革应该是兴利除弊，不能除一“弊”而兴一“弊”，甚至兴出一个更大的“弊”来。

shen

China’s Research Culture
Yigong Shi and Yi Rao
GOVERNMENT RESEARCH FUNDS IN CHINA HAVE BEEN GROWING AT AN ANNUAL RATE OF MORE than 20%, exceeding even the expectations of China’s most enthusiastic scientists. In theory, this could allow China to make truly outstanding progress in science and research, complementing the nation’s economic success. In reality, however, rampant problems in research funding—some attributable to the system and others cultural—are slowing down China’s potential pace of innovation.
Although scientific merit may still be the key to the success of smaller research grants, such as those from China’s National Natural Science Foundation, it is much less relevant for the megaproject grants from various government funding agencies, which range from tens to hundreds of millions of Chinese yuan (7 yuan equals approximately 1 U.S. dollar). For the latter, the key is the application guidelines that are issued each year to specify research areas and projects. Their ostensible purpose is to outline “national needs.” But the guidelines are often so narrowly described that they leave little doubt that the “needs” are anything but national; instead, the intended recipients are obvious. Committees appointed by bureaucrats in the funding agencies determine these annual guidelines. For obvious reasons, the chairs of the committees often listen to and usually cooperate with the bureaucrats. “Expert opinions” simply refl ect a mutual understanding between a very small group of bureaucrats and their favorite scientists. This top-down approach stifl es innovation and makes clear to everyone that the connections with bureaucrats and a few powerful scientists are paramount, dictating the entire process of guideline preparation. To obtain major grants in China, it is an open secret that doing good research is not as important as schmoozing with powerful bureaucrats and their favorite experts.
This problematic funding system is frequently ridiculed by the majority of Chinese researchers. And yet it is also, paradoxically, accepted by most of them. Some believe that there is no choice but to accept these conventions. This culture even permeates the minds of those who are new returnees from abroad; they quickly adapt to the local environment and perpetuate the unhealthy culture. A signifi cant proportion of researchers in China spend too much time on building connections and not enough time attending seminars, discussing science, doing research, or training students (instead, using them as laborers in their labora tories). Most are too busy to be found in their own institutions. Some become part of the problem: They use connections to judge grant applicants and undervalue scientific merit.
There is no need to spell out the ethical code for scientifi c research and grants management, as most of the power brokers in Chinese research were educated in industrialized countries. But overhauling the system will be no easy task. Those favored by the existing system resist meaningful reform. Some who oppose the unhealthy culture choose to be silent for fear of losing future grant opportunities. Others who want change take the attitude of “wait and see,” rather than risk a losing battle. Despite the roadblocks, those shaping science policy and those working at the bench clearly recognize the problems with China’s current research culture: It wastes resources, corrupts the spirit, and stymies innovation. The time for China to build a healthy research culture is now, riding the momentum of increasing funding and a growing strong will to break away from damaging conventions. A simple but important start would be to distribute all of the new funds based on merit, without regard to connections. Over time, this new culture could and should become the major pillar of a system that nurtures, rather than squanders, the innovative potential of China.

tian295

校园改革如果最终还是操于行政之手，那改革还是算了吧！

蝈蝈

　　朱学勤这篇文章写得好，比以往的文章更有力度，虽然没有用激昂的口号。