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§87. Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect freedom, and an uncontrolled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of nature, equally with any other man, or number of men in the world, hath by nature a power, not only to preserve his property, that is, his life, liberty and estate, against the injuries and attempts of other men; but to judge of, and punish the breaches of that law in others, as he is persuaded the offence deserves, even with death itself, in crimes where the heinousness of the fact, in his opinion, requires it. But because no political society can be, nor subsist, without having in itself the power to preserve the property, and in order thereunto, punish the offences of all those of that society; there, and there only is political society, where every one of the members hath quitted this natural power, resigned it up into the hands of the community in all cases that exclude him not from appealing for protection to the law established by it. And thus all private judgment of every particular member being excluded, the community comes to be umpire, by settled standing rules, indifferent, and the same to all parties; and by men having authority from the community, for the execution of those rules, decides all the differences that may happen between any members of that society concerning any matter of right; and punishes those offences which any member hath committed against the society, with such penalties as the law has established: whereby it is easy to discern, who are, and who are not, in political society together. Those who are united into one body, and have a common established law and judicature to appeal to, with authority to decide controversies between them, and punish offenders, are in civil society one with another: but those who have no such common appeal, I mean on earth, are still in the state of nature, each being, where there is no other, judge for himself, and executioner; which is, as I have before shewed it, the perfect state of nature.
§87. 如已经证明的，人生来拥有完全的自由，并不受控制的享有自然法的所有权利，与世界上的其他任何人或人群相等，从而自然的拥有一种权力，不仅可以保护他的所有物，即他的生命，自由和财产，免遭他人的伤害和企图；而且可以审判和惩罚他人破坏自然法的行为，让侵犯者罪有应得，在他认为极其重大的罪行当中甚至可以将其处死。但是，因为政治社会本身如果没有权力来保护财产，以及为保护财产而惩罚那种社会的侵犯者，它就不能形成也不能维持；所以政治社会只能是这样，在这种社会关系中，每个社会成员放弃这种自然的权力，除了他不能通过诉诸共同体所建立的法律得到保护的情况外，其余的情况全部授权共同体的机构来处理。所有每个人的私人审判这样排除之后，共同体担当了裁判者，用恒定不变的规则，无差别的对待所有的成员；通过由共同体授权的人来执行那些规则，去裁定这种社会中所有与权利相关的可能发生在任何成员之间的分歧；并且依建立的法律所规定的惩罚方式惩罚那些破坏这种社会的行为：由此，就很容易辨别谁处于政治社会之中，谁处于政治社会之外了。那些结合成一个共同体，拥有共同的既成法律和司法机构可以申诉和有权裁定成员之间的争议，并惩罚侵犯者，这样的人就与他人处于公民社会之中：但是那些没有共同的申诉，我的意思是在世上没有，他们就仍处于自然状态，在每个个体那里没有别人担当他的审判者和执行者；这种状态，如我已经说明的，就是完全的自然状态。

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§88. And thus the common-wealth comes by a power to set down what punishment shall belong to the several transgressions which they think worthy of it, committed amongst the members of that society, (which is the power of making laws) as well as it has the power to punish any injury done unto any of its members, by any one that is not of it, (which is the power of war and peace) and all this for the preservation of the property of all the members of that society, as far as is possible. But though every man who has entered into civil society, and is become a member of any commonwealth, has thereby quitted his power to punish offences, against the law of nature, in prosecution of his own private judgment, yet with the judgment of offences, which he has given up to the legislative in all cases, where he can appeal to the magistrate, he has given a right to the common-wealth to employ his force, for the execution of the judgments of the common-wealth, whenever he shall be called to it; which indeed are his own judgments, they being made by himself, or his representative. And herein we have the original of the legislative and executive power of civil society, which is to judge by standing laws, how far offences are to be punished, when committed within the common-wealth; and also to determine, by occasional judgments founded on the present circumstances of the fact, how far injuries from without are to be vindicated; and in both these to employ all the force of all the members, when there shall be need.
§88. 这样一来，共同体就拥有了一种权力来确定属于那个社会的成员的若干种罪行应受的惩罚，（这就是制定法律的权力）如同它拥有惩罚任何伤害它的成员的外部侵犯的权力，（这就是战争与和平的权力）所有这些都是为了尽可能的保护这种社会所有成员的财产。但是虽然每个进入公民社会并成为了某一共同体的成员的人，因此而放弃依他自己的私人审判并惩罚违反自然法的侵犯者的权力，然而对侵犯者的审判，在他能够向管理者申诉的情况下均已交给立法机构，同时他也授与了共同体一种权利可以使用他的力量去行使共同体的审判，无论什么时候需要他；实际上这些审判都是他自己的审判，它们由他自己或者他授权的代表决定。在这里，我们可以找到公民社会的立法和执行权力的来源，依据恒定的法律去审判属于共同体内部的侵犯行为应受多大程度的惩罚；以及在偶尔出现的外部侵犯的事件中，去决定应给侵犯者多大程度的惩罚；在这两方面如有必要，共同体都可使用所有成员的所有力量。

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§89. Where-ever therefore any number of men are so united into one society, as to quit every one his executive power of the law of nature, and to resign it to the public, there and there only is a political, or civil society. And this is done, where-ever any number of men, in the state of nature, enter into society to make one people, one body politic, under one supreme government; or else when any one joins himself to, and incorporates with any government already made: for hereby he authorizes the society, or which is all one, the legislative thereof, to make laws for him, as the public good of the society shall require; to the execution whereof, his own assistance (as to his own decrees) is due. And this puts men out of a state of nature into that of a common-wealth, by setting up a judge on earth, with authority to determine all the controversies, and redress the injuries that may happen to any member of the commonwealth; which judge is the legislative, or magistrates appointed by it. And where-ever there are any number of men, however associated, that have no such decisive power to appeal to, there they are still in the state of nature.
§89.所以，无论在哪里，任何数量的人这样结合成一个社会，以便放弃每个人所拥有的自然法的执行权力，然后转让给公共机构，这才是一个政治社会或曰公民社会。政治社会的形成方式可以是，无论何处，任何数量的处于自然状态的人，进入社会形成一个整体，一个政治体，处于一个最高政府统治之下；或者，任何一个人加入任何一个已经建立的政府：由此他授权给社会或社会的立法机构，根据社会公共利益的要求为他制定法律；对这些法律的执行，他自己的协助是应当的。通过在世上设置审判者，有权力去裁定所有的争议，并矫正共同体内任何成员可能受到的伤害，这样就使人们脱离自然状态而进入了共同体的状态之中；共同体的审判者就是立法机构，或由它所指定的管理者。而无论哪里无论多少人，不管他们怎样聚合在一起，若没有这样的裁定权力可申诉，他们就仍然处于自然状态之中。

§90. Hence it is evident, that absolute monarchy, which by some men is counted the only government in the world, is indeed inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no form of civil-government at all: for the end of civil society, being to avoid, and remedy those inconveniences of the state of nature, which necessarily follow from every man's being judge in his own case, by setting up a known authority, to which every one of that society may appeal upon any injury received, or controversy that may arise, and which every one of the* society ought to obey; where-ever any persons are, who have not such an authority to appeal to, for the decision of any difference between them, there those persons are still in the state of nature; and so is every absolute prince, in respect of those who are under his dominion.
§90. 这样就很明显了，被一些人认为是世界上唯一的政府形式的绝对君主国，实际上与公民社会是不一致的，因而完全不是公民政府的形式：因为公民社会的目的，是为了避免和矫正自然状态的麻烦——每个人在他自己的事情中担当审判者所必然带来的——通过设置一种众所周知的权力，社会中的每个人都可以就他所受的伤害或他们之间可能发生的争议向它申诉，而社会中的每个人也应当服从这种权力；无论哪里，若人们没有这样的权力可申诉，来裁定他们之间所发生的分歧，那里的人们就仍然处于自然状态之中；而每个绝对君主统治下的人就是这样的自然状态。

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§91. For he being supposed to have all, both legislative and executive power in himself alone, there is no judge to be found, no appeal lies open to any one, who may fairly, and indifferently, and with authority decide, and from whose decision relief and redress may be expected of any injury or inconvenience, that may be suffered from the prince, or by his order: so that such a man, however entitled, Czar, or Grand Seignior, or how you please, is as much in the state of nature, with all under his dominion, as he is with the rest of mankind: for where-ever any two men are, who have no standing rule, and common judge to appeal to on earth, for the determination of controversies of right betwixt them, there they are still in the state of* nature, and under all the inconveniencies of it, with only this woeful difference to the subject, or rather slave of an absolute prince: that whereas, in the ordinary state of nature, he has a liberty to judge of his right, and according to the best of his power, to maintain it; now, whenever his property is invaded by the will and order of his monarch, he has not only no appeal, as those in society ought to have, but as if he were degraded from the common state of rational creatures, is denied a liberty to judge of, or to defend his right; and so is exposed to all the misery and inconveniencies, that a man can fear from one, who being in the unrestrained state of nature, is yet corrupted with flattery, and armed with power.
§91. 因为绝对君主被假定为一个人单独拥有立法和执行两种权力，这样就找不到审判者了，当有人遭受来自君主或他的命令所造成的伤害或麻烦之后，将不存在一个可能公正，中立和有权作出裁定的人可申诉，并期望这种裁定能够对伤害或麻烦给与救济和矫正：所以这样的人，无论给与什么样的称呼，Czar（中文译为沙皇。拜占廷或俄国皇帝。该词源自中世纪caesar一词，指最高统治者，尤指拜占廷皇帝。1453年拜占廷帝国亡，俄国君主成了仅存的东正教君主。俄罗斯东正教会认为俄国君主有可能成为东正教新的最高领袖。1547年，伊凡四世(雷帝)第一个加冕为沙皇。在理论上，沙皇拥有绝对权力，但实际上他和他的继承者都受到东正教会、贵族会议以及1497年、1550年和1649年公布的法典制约。1721年沙皇彼得一世废除沙皇之称，改而采用“全俄罗斯皇帝”这个头衔，但在民间，他和他的继承者继续被称为“沙皇”。//大英袖珍百科），或Grand Seignior（大领主）或任何你想用的，他都与他统治下的人及其余人类一样，仍处于自然状态：因为无论两个人在哪里，若在世上没有恒定的规则和共同的审判者可申诉，来裁定他们之间关于权利的争议，在那里他们就仍处于自然状态和自然状态所有的麻烦之中，一个绝对君主之下的臣民，或者更确切的说奴隶的悲惨之处仅在于——在通常的自然状态中，他拥有自由去审判他自己的权利，并尽其最大的力量去维护它的权利；而现在呢，当他的财产受到他君主的意志和命令的侵犯时，他不仅不能像正常社会应该有的那样申诉，而且好像被从理性动物降为无理性动物，丧失了审判或捍卫其权利的自由；这就是遭受所有苦难和麻烦的原因，一个人害怕另一个人，另一个人虽然处于不受限制的自然状态，仍然得到奉承道德败坏并掌管权力。

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§92. For he that thinks absolute power purifies men's blood, and corrects the baseness of human nature, need read but the history of this, or any other age, to be convinced of the contrary. He that would have been insolent and injurious in the woods of America, would not probably be much better in a throne; where perhaps learning and religion shall be found out to justify all that he shall do to his subjects, and the sword presently silence all those that dare question it: for what the protection of absolute monarchy is, what kind of fathers of their countries it makes princes to be and to what a degree of happiness and security it carries civil society, where this sort of government is grown to perfection, he that will look into the late relation of Ceylon, may easily see.
§92. 谁认为绝对权力可以让人们的血液得到净化，并纠正人类本性中卑鄙下贱的部分，他只要读一下当代或其它任何时代的历史，就会得到相反的结论。在美洲丛林中野蛮有害的人，大概在王座上也不会好多少；当他身居王位时，很可能会寻找学说和宗教来证明他对臣民所做的一切皆为正当，并且刀剑马上会让那些胆敢质疑他的人沉默下来：因为在这种政府完善的地方，绝对君主国保护什么，它会让君主成为怎样的一国之父，以及它带给公民社会多大程度上的幸福与安全，他只要去考察一下锡兰最近的情况，就很容易看到。

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ceylon:斯里兰卡1972年之前四百多年的英文名.

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§93. In absolute monarchies indeed, as well as other governments of the world, the subjects have an appeal to the law, and judges to decide any controversies, and restrain any violence that may happen betwixt the subjects themselves, one amongst another. This every one thinks necessary, and believes he deserves to be thought a declared enemy to society and mankind, who should go about to take it away. But whether this be from a true love of mankind and society, and such a charity as we owe all one to another, there is reason to doubt: for this is no more than what every man, who loves his own power, profit, or greatness, may and naturally must do, keep those animals from hurting, or destroying one another, who labour and drudge only for his pleasure and advantage; and so are taken care of, not out of any love the master has for them, but love of himself, and the profit they bring him: for if it be asked, what security, what fence is there, in such a state, against the violence and oppression of this absolute ruler? the very question can scarce be borne. They are ready to tell you, that it deserves death only to ask after safety. Betwixt subject and subject, they will grant, there must be measures, laws and judges, for their mutual peace and security: but as for the ruler, he ought to be absolute, and is above all such circumstances; because he has power to do more hurt and wrong, it is right when he does it. To ask how you may be guarded from harm, or injury, on that side where the strongest hand is to do it, is presently the voice of faction and rebellion: as if when men quitting the state of nature entered into society, they agreed that all of them but one, should be under the restraint of laws, but that he should still retain all the liberty of the state of nature, increased with power, and made licentious by impunity. This is to think, that men are so foolish, that they take care to avoid what mischiefs may be done them by pole-cats, or foxes; but are content, nay, think it safety, to be devoured by lions.
93.实际上，在绝对君主国中，如同世界上其它的政府一样，臣民也可向法律申诉，并有审判者去裁定任何争议，从而约束可能发生在臣民之间的任何暴行。这一点每个人都认为是必要的，并相信谁要取消它就要认为他应当被宣称为社会和人类的敌人。但是这是否出自人类和社会真正的爱护，这样的慈善是否如我们每个人彼此应有的，却有理由怀疑：因为它并没有超过任何一个热爱他自己的权力，利益或强大的人对那些为他的快乐和利益劳作和忙碌的牲畜不至于互相猎杀和伤害可能和自然会做的一切；它们之所以受到照料，并非出自主人对它们的爱护，而是源于主人对自己的爱以及它们带给他的利益：因为如果问，在那样的状态中有什么安全保障，有什么样的护栏可以避免这个绝对统治者的暴行和压迫？这样的问题将是愚蠢不堪的。他们会告诉你，只要问到安全它就该死。在臣民与臣民之间，为了他们彼此之间的和平和安全，他们会承认，需要一定的措施，法律和审判者：但是就统治者而言，他应当是绝对的，并居于所有这些条件之上；因为他有权力去犯更多的伤害和过错，他这样做是正当的。那么，当这个最强大的权力这样做的时候，你们如何保证免于被伤害的质疑，将立即成为内乱和反叛的声音：如同人们退出自然状态进入社会的时候，他们一致同意所有的人都应当受法律约束，而有一个除外，他仍然保留自然状态的所有自由，随着权力的增加，可以肆无忌惮。这不能不被认为：人们竟如此愚蠢，他们小心谨慎的避免臭貂或狐狸的侵害；却甘愿被狮子猎食，甚至还认为这样是安全的。

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§94. But whatever flatterers may talk to amuse people's understandings, it hinders not men from feeling; and when they perceive, that any man, in what station soever, is out of the bounds of the civil society which they are of, and that they have no appeal on earth against any harm, they may receive from him, they are apt to think themselves in the state of nature, in respect of him whom they find to be so; and to take care, as soon as they can, to have that safety and security in civil society, for which it was first instituted, and for which only they entered into it. And therefore, though perhaps at first, (as shall be shewed more at large hereafter in the following part of this discourse) some one good and excellent man having got a pre-eminency amongst the rest, had this deference paid to his goodness and virtue, as to a kind of natural authority, that the chief rule, with arbitration of their differences, by a tacit consent devolved into his hands, without any other caution, but the assurance they had of his uprightness and wisdom; yet when time, giving authority, and (as some men would persuade us) sacredness of customs, which the negligent, and unforeseeing innocence of the first ages began, had brought in successors of another stamp, the people finding their properties not secure under the government, as then it was, (whereas government has no other end but the preservation of * property) could never be safe nor at rest, nor think themselves in civil society, till the legislature was placed in collective bodies of men, call them senate, parliament, or what you please. By which means every single person became subject, equally with other the meanest men, to those laws, which he himself, as part of the legislative, had established; nor could any one, by his own authority，avoid the force of the law, when once made; nor by any pretence of superiority plead exemption, thereby to license his own, or the miscarriages of any of his dependents.** No man in civil society can be exempted from the laws of it: for if any man may do what he thinks fit, and there be no appeal on earth, for redress or security against any harm he shall do; I ask, whether he be not perfectly still in the state of nature, and so can be no part or member of that civil society; unless any one will say, the state of nature and civil society are one and the same thing, which I have never yet found any one so great a patron of anarchy as to affirm.
§94. 但是无论谄媚者如何消遣人们的理解力，它蒙蔽不了人们的感觉；当他们意识到有人不论处于什么位置，均不受他们所属的公民社会的约束，并且在这世上对遭受来自此人的伤害而无处申诉时，他们就会认为他们自己处于自然状态之中，并发现伤害他们的人也同样处于自然状态；并且他们会尽可能快的注意到这一点，在公民社会中建立起安全和保障，而安全和保障本来就是公民社会形成之初就应该建立的，这是他们进入公民社会唯一的目的。所以，虽然最初可能，（在接下来讨论的部分将更详细的说明）有一个道德良好才能杰出的人，在其余的人中享有卓越的声望，大家尊重他的良善和美德，将他视为一种自然的权力，从而将裁定他们之间的分歧这样一种主要统治权，以一种默许的形式转交到他的手中，他们没有考虑得更多，仅仅是信任他的诚实正直和智慧；然而随着时间的推移，由于最初时代不曾在意和毫无预见的天真无知所开始的授权，以及习俗的神圣（如有些人要说服我们的），也产生了另一种类型的继承者，这时人们发现他们处于这个政府之下的财产不再像以往那样安全，（然而除了财产的保护政府没有其它的目的）于是，他们不再放心，也不再认为他们处于公民社会之中，直到将立法权交给某个机构——元老院，国会或你想用的任何称谓。通过这种方式，每一个人，都将和其他最卑贱的人一样，成为那些法律的臣民，这些法律的制定，他自己也是作为立法机构的一部分；法律一旦制定，任何人都不能以他自己的权力而免受法律的约束；也不能以居于所有人之上为借口而提请豁免，从而允许他自己或他的下属的不正当行为。公民社会中的任何人都不能免除其法律的惩罚：因为如果任何人都可以去做他认为合适的事情，那么在这世上将无可申诉，来矫正或保证他不会造成任何伤害；我要问，是否他还完全处于自然状态，从而还不是那个公民社会的成员；除非有人说，自然状态和公民社会是一回事，然而我还没有找到如此伟大的无政府状态的辩护人这样肯定。

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Chapter VIII.
Of the Beginning of Political Societies.
第八章 论政治社会的开端

§95. MEN being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent. The only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any, that are not of it. This any number of men may do, because it injures not the freedom of the rest; they are left as they were in the liberty of the state of nature. When any number of men have so consented to make one community or government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest.
§95. 如前所述，既然人们生来全都自由，平等和独立，那么，任何人未经其同意便不能将他置于这种状态之外，从而服从于他人的政治权力。任何人据以放弃他的自然自由并受公民社会约束的唯一方式，便是为了彼此舒适，安全与和平的生活在一起，同意加入或与他人联合组成共同体，以确保对其财产的享用，并对防御共同体之外的侵犯提供更大的保障。任何数量的人群都可以这样做，因为它并不伤害其余人的自由；其余的人仍然像以前一样处于自然状态的自由之中。当任何数量的人群如此同意组成一个共同体或一个政府的时候，他们便因此结合而组成了一个政治实体，其中的多数拥有制定法律和订立国际条约的权利。

WIND

§96. For when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual, made a community, they have thereby made that community one body, with a power to act as one body, which is only by the will and determination of the majority: for that which acts any community, being only the consent of the individuals of it, and it being necessary to that which is one body to move one way; it is necessary the body should move that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent of the majority: or else it is impossible it should act or continue one body, one community, which the consent of every individual that united into it, agreed that it should; and so every one is bound by that consent to be concluded by the majority. And therefore we see, that in assemblies, impowered to act by positive laws, where no number is set by that positive law which impowers them, the act of the majority passes for the act of the whole, and of course determines, as having, by the law of nature and reason, the power of the whole.
§96. 因为，当任何数量的人，基于每个人的同意组成一个共同体的时候，他们便使得那个共同体成为了一个实体，拥有权力作为一个实体而行动，而这种行动只能依据多数的意志和裁决：因为任何共同体的行动，既然只能经由个体同意，并且必须作为一体一致行动；那么必然是由较大的力量来决定，这就是多数的同意：否则经由每个人的同意就不可能一致行动或作为一个共同体继续存在；所以每个人被这种同意约束，必须由多数来作决定。因此我们看到，在由肯定性的法律所授权行动的议会中，那种授予他们权力的肯定性法律并未规定任何人数，多数的行为被认为是整体的行为，从而理所当然的由多数来作决议，根据自然法和理性，多数拥有整体的权力。

WIND

§97. And thus every man, by consenting with others to make one body politic under one government, puts himself under an obligation, to every one of that society, to submit to the determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it; or else this original compact, whereby he with others incorporates into one society, would signify nothing, and be no compact, if he be left free, and under no other ties than he was in before in the state of nature. For what appearance would there be of any compact? What new engagement if he were no farther tied by any decrees of the society, than he himself thought fit, and did actually consent to? This would be still as great a liberty, as he himself had before his compact, or any one else in the state of nature hath, who may submit himself, and consent to any acts of it if he thinks fit.
§97. 这样一来，每个人经其与他人同意组成一个政治实体，处于一个政府的统治之下，那么对此社会的每个人而言，他便有责任服从其多数的裁决，并由多数来作决定；否则他据以与他人结合成一个社会的原初契约便毫无意义，如果他仍像以前处于自然状态一样不受别的约束，那么也就没有什么契约可言了。因为，这样还像什么存在契约的样子呢？如果除了他自己认为适当且实际上表示同意的此社会的法令之外，便不再受其它约束，那么“新约定”又是什么呢？这样的话，他仍然拥有订立契约之前的巨大自由，或像别的仍处于自然状态之中的人所拥有的自由，他可以只服从他自己或对他认为合适的行为表示同意。

WIND

§98. For if the consent of the majority shall not, in reason, be received as the act of the whole, and conclude every individual; nothing but the consent of every individual can make any thing to be the act of the whole: but such a consent is next to impossible ever to be had, if we consider the infirmities of health, and avocations of business, which in a number, though much less than that of a common-wealth, will necessarily keep many away from the public assembly. To which if we add the variety of opinions, and contrariety of interests, which unavoidably happen in all collections of men, the coming into society upon such terms would be only like Cato's coming into the theatre, only to go out again. Such a constitution as this would make the mighty Leviathan of a shorter duration, than the feeblest creatures, and not let it outlast the day it was born in: which cannot be supposed, till we can think, that rational creatures should desire and constitute societies only to be dissolved: for where the majority cannot conclude the rest, there they cannot act as one body, and consequently will be immediately dissolved again.
§98. 因为如果在理性上不将多数的同意视为整体的行为，并替每个人作决定；而只将每个人的同意作为整体的行为：但是这样的同意几乎不可能取得，如果我们考虑到健康欠佳，沉于事务的情况，在数量上虽然远远少于共同体的人数，也必然会使许多人不能参加公共集会。对此，如果我们再加上意见的分歧，利益的冲突的情况，也不可避免地会在众人之中发生，那么，基于这样的条件加入社会只会像卡托所说的“进剧院”，只会再度退出。这样的制度将会使强大的“利维坦”比最脆弱的生物还要短命，在它诞生的那一天就会死亡：不能假设，除非我们认为，理性被造物应当期待和建立的社会只是为了解体：因为其中的多数不能替其余的人作决定，由此他们便不能作为一个实体而行动，其结果必然是立即再度解体。

WIND

§99. Whosoever therefore out of a state of nature unite into a community, must be understood to give up all the power, necessary to the ends for which they unite into society, to the majority of the community, unless they expressly agreed in any number greater than the majority. And this is done by barely agreeing to unite into one political society, which is all the compact that is, or needs be, between the individuals, that enter into, or make up a commonwealth. And thus that, which begins and actually constitutes any political society, is nothing but the consent of any number of freemen capable of a majority to unite and incorporate into such a society. And this is that, and that only, which did, or could give beginning to any lawful government in the world.
§99. 所以，凡脱离自然状态而联合成为一个共同体的人，必须懂得将所有他们联合成一个社会的目的所必须的权力交给共同体的多数，除非他们明确同意交给比多数更多的任何人数。这一点只要同意联合组成一个政治社会就行了，这就是或必须是进入或创建共同体的个人之间的契约的所有含义。于是，开始并实际创建任何政治社会的契约，不过是能够形成多数的任何数量的自由人同意联合和结合成这样的社会。这就是那份契约，也只有这份契约，过去或将来才能给与世上任何一个合法政府一个开端。
§100. To this I find two objections made.
First, That there are no instances to be found in story, of a company of men independent, and equal one amongst another, that met together, and in this way began and set up a government.
Secondly, It is impossible of right, that men should do so, because all men being born under government, they are to submit to that, and are not at liberty to begin a new one.
§100. 对此，我发现存在两种反对意见。
第一，在历史上找不到这样的例子，一群彼此独立和平等的人聚集在一起，以这种方式开始建立一个政府。
第二，人们这样做在权利上是不可能的，因为所有的人既然生来处于政府之下，他们便应当服从它，没有自由建立一个新的政府。

WIND

§101. To the first there is this to answer, That it is not at all to be wondered, that history gives us but a very little account of men, that lived together in the state of nature. The inconveniences of that condition, and the love and want of society, no sooner brought any number of them together, but they presently united and incorporated, if they designed to continue together. And if we may not suppose men ever to have been in the state of nature, because we hear not much of them in such a state, we may as well suppose the armies of Shalmanesser or Xerxes were never children, because we hear little of them, till they were men, and imbodied in armies. Government is everywhere antecedent to records, and letters seldom come in amongst a people till a long continuation of civil society has, by other more necessary arts, provided for their safety, ease, and plenty: and then they begin to look after the history of their founders, and search into their original, when they have outlived the memory of it: for it is with commonwealths as with particular persons, they are commonly ignorant of their own births and infancies: and if they know any thing of their original, they are beholden for it, to the accidental records that others have kept of it. And those that we have, of the beginning of any polities in the world, excepting that of the Jews, where God himself immediately interposed, and which favours not at all paternal dominion, are all either plain instances of such a beginning as I have mentioned, or at least have manifest footsteps of it.
§101. 对于第一种反对意见，可以这样回答——对于人们共同生活在自然状态之中情形，历史仅仅给与我们非常少量的描述，这完全不用惊奇。那种条件下的麻烦和对社会的喜爱和期待，一旦将任何数量的人聚集起来，如果他们打算继续在一起便会立即联合和结合起来。如果我们因为对这样一种状态听得不多便假设人们从未处于这样一种状态之中，我们也可以同样假设Shalmanesser（亚述国王）或泽克西斯（Xerxes，c.519–465 BC，波斯国王）的军队从未有过孩童时期，因为我们对他们成人并加入军队之前的情况也听得很少。政府到处都是先于记录而存在的，文字的使用，几乎都是公民社会依靠其它更必要的技艺在为他们长期提供安全，安逸和丰富的物品之后才开始的：当他们失去这段历史的记忆的时候，他们才开始回顾他们的奠基者的历史，并追溯它们的起源：因为共同体也像个人一样，他们都是对他们自己的出生和婴儿时期无知的：如果他们对他们的起源有所了解，他们该感激那些他人碰巧保留的记录。我们拥有的关于世上任何政治实体开端的记录——除了犹太人，在那里是上帝自己直接干预的，而这根本就不会赞成父亲的统治权了——如果不是如我所提到的这种开端的浅显例子，也至少存在这种明显的痕迹。

WIND

§102. He must shew a strange inclination to deny evident matter of fact, when it agrees not with his hypothesis, who will not allow, that the beginning of Rome and Venice were by the uniting together of several men free and independent one of another, amongst whom there was no natural superiority or subjection. And if Josephus Acosta's word may be taken, he tells us, that in many parts of America there was no government at all. There are great and apparent conjectures, says he, that these men, speaking of those of Peru, for a long time had neither kings nor commonwealths, but lived in troops, as they do this day in Florida, the Cheriquanas, those of Brazil, and many other nations, which have no certain kings, but as occasion is offered, in peace or war, they choose their captains as they please, 1. i. c. 25. If it be said, that every man there was born subject to his father, or the head of his family; that the subjection due from a child to a father took not away his freedom of uniting into what political society he thought fit, has been already proved. But be that as it will, these men, it is evident, were actually free; and whatever superiority some politicians now would place in any of them, they themselves claimed it not, but by consent were all equal, till by the same consent they set rulers over themselves. So that their politic societies all began from a voluntary union, and the mutual agreement of men freely acting in the choice of their governors, and forms of government.
§102. 如果谁不承认罗马和威尼斯的开端是由若干彼此自由与独立的人联合组成，在他们中间没有自然的统治和服从关系，那么他只是表明在有事实证明与其假设相背的情况下仍顽固的否认事实。如果Josephus Acosta的话可以接受的话，他告诉我们，在美洲的很多地方完全没有政府。他说，对此可以明显的推测——这些人（指秘鲁的那些人）在很长一段时期内都没有国王也没有共同体，而是群居在一起，如同今天的佛罗里达人，巴西的那些人，以及许多其它的国家一样，他们没有确定的国王，而只是偶尔在和平或战争中，才随意挑选出他们的首领。如果说那里的人生来便从属于他的父亲或他家族的头领；这种一个孩子应当对一个父亲的服从也不能剥夺他加入一个他认为合适的政治社会的自由，这便已经证明了。只能是这样，很明显，这些人实际上都是自由的；无论今天的某些政治人士将任何统治权力给与他们当中的某些人，其实他们自己并未如此宣称，而是大家都同意彼此平等，直到彼此同意设定统治者来统治他们。所以他们的政治社会都是始于一种自愿的联合，并彼此同意自由的选择他们的统治者和政府形式。

WIND

§103. And I hope those who went away from Sparta with Palantus, mentioned by Justin, 1. iii. c. 4. will be allowed to have been freemen independent one of another, and to have set up a government over themselves, by their own consent. Thus I have given several examples, out of history, of people free and in the state of nature, that being met together incorporated and began a commonwealth. And if the want of such instances be an argument to prove that government were not, nor could be so begun, I suppose the contenders for paternal empire were better let it alone, than urge it against natural liberty: for if they can give so many instances, out of history, of governments begun upon paternal right, I think (though at best an argument from what has been, to what should of right be, has no great force) one might, without any great danger, yield them the cause. But if I might advise them in the case, they would do well not to search too much into the original of governments, as they have begun de facto[in fact], lest they should find, at the foundation of most of them, something very little favourable to the design they promote, and such a power as they contend for.
§103. 而且，我希望查士丁（Justin，古罗马历史学家）所提到的那些追随Palantus脱离斯巴达的人能够被承认为彼此独立的自由人，并且经由他们自己的同意建立了统治他们自己的政府。这样我便已经从历史中给出了几个例子，人们自由并处于自然状态，在他们聚集之后结合在一起开始组成共同体（国家）。如果可以拿缺少这样的例子来证明政府不是也不会这样开始，我认为父权帝国的辩护者还是放弃这种打算为好，而不是用它来反对自然自由：因为如果他们能够从历史中给出这么多政府基于父权利而开始的例子，我想（虽然充其量用曾经如此来证明将来应当如此，并没有太大的说服力）在这个问题上对他们让步也没有太大的危险。但是如果我可以在这一点上劝告他们的话，他们最好还是别去深究事实上他们已经开始的深究的政府的起源问题，以免他们发现，在大多数政府的基础方面，很少能够找到什么来支持他们所提倡的方案和他们为之辩护的那种权力。

WIND

§104. But to conclude, reason being plain on our side, that men are naturally free, and the examples of history shewing, that the governments of the world, that were begun in peace, had their beginning laid on that foundation, and were made by the consent of the people; there can be little room for doubt, either where the right is, or what has been the opinion, or practice of mankind, about the first erecting of governments.
§104. 而结论就是——很明白，理性在我们这边，人们生来自由，历史上的例子表明，世上的政府是和平开始的，以公民的同意作为其基础而建立；关于最初政府的建立，无论是基于何种权利，还是人类当时的意见或实践，都很少有怀疑的余地。

§105. I will not deny, that if we look back as far as history will direct us, towards the original of commonwealths, we shall generally find them under the government and administration of one man. And I am also apt to believe, that where a family was numerous enough to subsist by itself, and continued entire together, without mixing with others, as it often happens, where there is much land, and few people, the government commonly began in the father: for the father having, by the law of nature, the same power with every man else to punish, as he thought fit, any offences against that law, might thereby punish his transgressing children, even when they were men, and out of their pupilage; and they were very likely to submit to his punishment, and all join with him against the offender, in their turns, giving him thereby power to execute his sentence against any transgression, and so in effect make him the law-maker, and governor over all that remained in conjunction with his family. He was fittest to be trusted; paternal affection secured their property and interest under his care; and the custom of obeying him, in their childhood, made it easier to submit to him, rather than to any other. If therefore they must have one to rule them, as government is hardly to be avoided amongst men that live together; who so likely to be the man as he that was their common father; unless negligence, cruelty, or any other defect of mind or body made him unfit for it? But when either the father died, and left his next heir, for want of age, wisdom, courage, or any other qualities, less fit for rule; or where several families met, and consented to continue together; there, it is not to be doubted, but they used their natural freedom, to set up him, whom they judged the ablest, and most likely, to rule well over them. Conformable hereunto we find the people of America, who (living out of the reach of the conquering swords, and spreading domination of the two great empires of Peru and Mexico) enjoyed their own natural freedom, though, caeteris paribus[Ceteris paribus or caeteris paribus：with other things the same], they commonly prefer the heir of their deceased king; yet if they find him any way weak, or uncapable, they pass him by, and set up the stoutest and bravest man for their ruler.
§105. 我并不否认，如果我们沿着历史尽可能追溯共同体的起源，那么我们通常会发现它们处于一个人的统治与管理之下。我也倾向于相信，当一个家族人口众多，可以自给自足，而继续共同生活在一起而不与其它家族混居，就像地广人稀的地方所通常发生得那样，那么统治通常始于父亲：因为父亲基于自然法拥有与其他每个人同样的权力，可在他认为合适的情况下惩罚违反自然法的行为，因而也可以惩罚他违法的孩子，即使他们已经成人并脱离了监护状态；而他们也极可能服从他的惩罚，全都同他一起来反对侵犯者，从而依次授予他一种对任何违法行为执行他的判决的权力，因而实际上使他成为了那些仍然留在家族之内的人的立法者和统治者。他是最值得信赖的人；父亲的慈爱使他们的财产和利益在他的照看下得到保障；自他们孩童开始的服从父亲的习惯使他们更容易服从父亲而不是其他人。因此，如果他们必须选择一个人来统治他们，因为人们共同生活在一起很难避免统治；谁比他们共同的父亲更可能成为这样的人；除非亵职，残酷，或任何其它的精神或身体的缺陷使他不适合担当这一角色？但是当父亲死亡，留下的继承人年龄不足，缺乏智慧和勇气，或者缺少任何其它的资格，不适合统治；或者，几个家族相遇，同意继续生活在一起；在这些情况下，毫无疑问，他们只能使用他们的自然自由，选择他们认为最能干最可能好好统治他们的人担当统治者。与此相符的是，我们发现美洲的人们，他们（未被秘鲁和墨西哥两大帝国征服的人）享有他们的自然自由，虽然在其它条件相同的情况下，他们通常会选择他们逝去的国王的继承人；然而如果他们发现他软弱无能的话，他们就会放弃他并选择最坚定最勇敢的人担当他们的统治者。

WIND

§106. Thus, though looking back as far as records give us any account of peopling the world, and the history of nations, we commonly find the government to be in one hand; yet it destroys not that which I affirm, viz. that the beginning of politic society depends upon the consent of the individuals, to join into, and make one society; who, when they are thus incorporated, might set up what form of government they thought fit. But this having given occasion to men to mistake, and think, that by nature government was monarchical, and belonged to the father, it may not be amiss here to consider, why people in the beginning generally pitched upon this form, which though perhaps the father's pre-eminency might, in the first institution of some commonwealths, give a rise to, and place in the beginning, the power in one hand; yet it is plain that the reason, that continued the form of government in a single person, was not any regard, or respect to paternal authority; since all petty monarchies, that is, almost all monarchies, near their original, have been commonly, at least upon occasion, elective.
§106. 这样的话，虽然尽可能的追溯记录给我们的有关人类定居世界的描述和国家的历史，我们通常会发现统治由一人担当；然而这并不能推翻我所肯定的结论，即政治社会的开端基于个人的同意而加入并组成一个社会；当他们这样结合的时候，他们可以建立他们认为合适的政府形式。但是这也引起了人们的误解，以为政府生来就是君主制并属于父亲的，在此考虑一下如下的问题也没有什么不恰当，为什么在开始会普遍的选中这种形式，虽然可能父亲的杰出地位在某些共同体最初的创建当中开始会将权力交给一个人；然而，很明白，一个人统治的政府形式的继续存在的理由，并不是由于对父权力的敬重；因为所有的小君主国，换言之，几乎所有的君主国在他们刚形成的时候，通常——至少在某些时候——是选举制的。

§107. First then, in the beginning of things, the father's government of the childhood of those sprung from him, having accustomed them to the rule of one man, and taught them that where it was exercised with care and skill, with affection and love to those under it, it was sufficient to procure and preserve to men all the political happiness they sought for in society. It was no wonder that they should pitch upon, and naturally run into that form of government, which from their infancy they had been all accustomed to; and which, by experience, they had found both easy and safe. To which, if we add, that monarchy being simple, and most obvious to men, whom neither experience had instructed in forms of government, nor the ambition or insolence of empire had taught to beware of the encroachments of prerogative, or the inconveniences of absolute power, which monarchy in succession was apt to lay claim to, and bring upon them, it was not at all strange, that they should not much trouble themselves to think of methods of restraining any exorbitances of those to whom they had given the authority over them, and of balancing the power of government, by placing several parts of it in different hands. They had neither felt the oppression of tyrannical dominion, nor did the fashion of the age, nor their possessions, or way of living, (which afforded little matter for covetousness or ambition) give them any reason to apprehend or provide against it; and therefore it is no wonder they put themselves into such a frame of government, as was not only, as I said, most obvious and simple, but also best suited to their present state and condition; which stood more in need of defence against foreign invasions and injuries, than of multiplicity of laws. The equality of a simple poor way of living, confining their desires within the narrow bounds of each man's small property, made few controversies, and so no need of many laws to decide them, or variety of officers to superintend the process, or look after the execution of justice, where there were but few trespasses, and few offenders. Since then those, who like one another so well as to join into society, cannot but be supposed to have some acquaintance and friendship together, and some trust one in another; they could not but have greater apprehensions of others, than of one another: and therefore their first care and thought cannot but be supposed to be, how to secure themselves against foreign force. It was natural for them to put themselves under a frame of government which might best serve to that end, and chuse the wisest and bravest man to conduct them in their wars, and lead them out against their enemies, and in this chiefly be their ruler.
§107. 首先，在开始的时候，父亲对其后代孩童时期的统治，使他们习惯于一个人的统治，让他们知道在谨慎娴熟和慈爱之中对他们行使这种权力，便足以使他们所寻求的社会之中的政治幸福能够取得和维持。无须惊奇，他们会选中和自然进入这种政府形式，对此他们从婴儿时期开始便开始习惯；而且，根据经验，他们发现这既容易又安全。此外我们还可以说，君主制对人们而言是最简单和最显而易见的，不但他们的经验没有教导他们政府的种种形式，而且也没有帝国的野心和狂妄让他们意识到特殊权力的侵犯或绝对权力的骚扰——这些都是君主制在沿袭当中易于宣称并施加于其臣民身上的，因此他们没有太费心去想约束他们所授与权力的人的过度的权力行使，去想政府权力的平衡问题——通过将权力的各部分置于不同的人手中，也就不足为奇了。他们既没有感受到残暴统治的压迫，时代的风气，他们的财产或生活方式（很少成为贪婪或野心的对象）也没有给与他们理由来理解或防范暴政；所以也就难怪他们会置身于这样一种政府框架之下，因为不仅如我所说，这最显而易见和简单，而且也最适合他们当前的状态和条件；那种情况下防御外来侵犯和伤害比内部法律的多样化来得迫切。一种简单贫乏的生活方式的平等，将他们的欲望局限于每个人的少量财产的狭窄范围内，很少有什么争议，在犯罪行为和犯罪者很少的地方，也就无须许多法律来裁决他们，也无须各种各样的官员来管理和照看正义的执行。那么既然，人们是基于互爱而加入社会的，只能假设他们彼此有一些认识和友情，互相有一些信任；他们更多的是猜疑外人而不是猜疑彼此：因而他们首先担心和考虑的只能是如何保障他们自己免于外部强制。于是他们很自然的置身于这样一种可能最好的服务与那个目标的政府框架之下，在战争中挑选最具智慧和最勇敢的人来带领他们驱逐他们的敌人，主要在这方面担当他们的统治者。

WIND

§108. Thus we see, that the kings of the Indians in America, which is still a pattern of the first ages in Asia and Europe, whilst the inhabitants were too few for the country, and want of people and money gave men no temptation to enlarge their possessions of land, or contest for wider extent of ground, are little more than generals of their armies; and though they command absolutely in war, yet at home and in time of peace they exercise very little dominion, and have but a very moderate sovereignty, the resolutions of peace and war being ordinarily either in the people, or in a council. Tho' the war itself, which admits not of plurality of governors, naturally devolves the command into the king's sole authority.
§108. 这样的话我们看到，美洲印第安人的国王——它仍是亚洲和欧洲早期的样式，当时国家的人口极为稀少，人口和货币的缺乏没有给与人们诱惑来扩大他们的土地财产，或争夺更广的领土——不过是他们军队的首领；虽然在战争中享有绝对的指挥权，然而在家中与和平时期却很少行使统治权，只有非常适度的统治主权，和平与战争的决定通常不是由公民就是由议会（council）来行使。虽然，战争本身由于不允许多个统治者，自然的就会将指挥权授与国王一人。

§109. And thus in Israel itself, the chief business of their judges, and first kings, seems to have been to be captains in war, and leaders of their armies; which (besides what is signified by going out and in before the people, which was, to march forth to war, and home again in the heads of their forces) appears plainly in the story of Jephthah. The Ammonites making war upon Israel, the Gileadites in fear send to Jephthah, a bastard of their family whom they had cast off, and article with him, if he will assist them against the Ammonites, to make him their ruler; which they do in these words, And the people made him head and captain over them, Judg. xi, 11. which was, as it seems, all one as to be judge. And he judged Israel, judg. xii. 7. that is, was their captain-general six years. So when Jotham upbraids the Shechemites with the obligation they had to Gideon, who had been their judge and ruler, he tells them, he fought for you, and adventured his life far, and delivered you out of the hands of Midian, Judg. ix. 17. Nothing mentioned of him but what he did as a general: and indeed that is all is found in his history, or in any of the rest of the judges. And Abimelech particularly is called king, though at most he was but their general. And when, being weary of the ill conduct of Samuel's sons, the children of Israel desired a king, like all the nations to judge them, and to go out before them, and to fight their battles, I. Sam viii. 20. God granting their desire, says to Samuel, I will send thee a man, and thou shalt anoint him to be captain over my people Israel, that he may save my people out of the hands of the Philistines, ix. 16. As if the only business of a king had been to lead out their armies, and fight in their defence; and accordingly at his inauguration pouring a vial of oil upon him, declares to Saul, that the Lord had anointed him to be captain over His inheritance, x. 1. And therefore those, who after Saul's being solemnly chosen and saluted king by the tribes at Mispah, were unwilling to have him their king, made no other objection but this, How shall this man save us? v. 27. as if they should have said, this man is unfit to be our king, not having skill and conduct enough in war, to be able to defend us. And when God resolved to transfer the government to David, it is in these words, But now thy kingdom shall not continue: the Lord hath sought him a man after his own heart, and the Lord hath commanded him to be captain over his people, xiii. 14. As if the whole kingly authority were nothing else but to be their general: and therefore the tribes who had stuck to Saul's family, and opposed David's reign, when they came to Hebron with terms of submission to him, they tell him, amongst other arguments they had to submit to him as to their king, that he was in effect their king in Saul's time, and therefore they had no reason but to receive him as their king now. Also (say they) in time past, when Saul was king over us, thou wast he that leddest out and broughtest in Israel, and the Lord said unto thee, Thou shalt feed my people Israel, and thou shalt be a captain over Israel, II. Sam v. 2.
§109. 就以色列人来说，他们的“士师”和早期的国王的主要事务看起来便是在战争中担当首领和军队的领导者；耶弗他的故事说得很明白。亚扪人向以色列人发动战争，恐惧中的基列人便去请耶弗他——他们家族的私生子，一个他们曾经抛弃的人——回来，与他签订条约，如果他愿意帮助他们抵抗亚扪人，他们就让他做他们的统治者；对此圣经是这样说的，人们立他做他们的首领和指挥者（士师记：11：11），这看起来这就是作士师了。他做以色列人的士师（士师记：12：7），即他做了他们的首领六年。又如约坦谴责示剑人欠曾做他们的士师和统治者的基甸的人情时，他对他们说，他曾经冒死为你们参战，并救你们脱离米甸人的手（士师记：9：17）。提到基甸的时候，除了他作为一个首领之外什么也没有：实际上这也是他或其余任何一个士师的历史的全部。亚比米勒特别的被称为“国王”，虽然最多他不过是他们的首领。再如，当以色列的后代厌烦了撒母耳的儿子们的恶行时，他们期待一个国王，像所有其它的国家一样来统治他们，带领他们参加战斗（撒母耳记上：8：20）。上帝答应了他们的请求，对撒母耳说，我将派给你们一个人，你要膏他做我的子民以色列人的首领，他会救我的子民脱离非利士人之手（撒母耳记上：9：16）。似乎一个国王唯一的事情就是带领他们的军队出征，为自身的防御而战；结果在扫罗的就职仪式上，撒母耳将一小瓶油撒向他，向他宣布，耶和华已经膏他做祂的子民的首领（撒母耳记上：10：1）。所以，在米斯巴扫罗由部落正式选出并拥为国王之后，那些不愿立他为王的人也只是提出这样的反对意见，此人将如何救我们？（撒母耳记上：10：27）似乎他们的意思是说，此人不适合作我们的国王，在战争中没有足够的技能和才干以保护我们。当上帝决定将政府移交给大卫时，撒母耳是这样对扫罗说的，现在你的王国不能再继续下去了：耶和华已经寻到一个合乎他心意的人，并命他作祂的子民的首领（撒母耳记上：13：14）。似乎整个国王的权力只是做他们的将军：所以，那些过去依附于扫罗家族反对大卫的统治的部落，当他们带着服从于大卫的条件来到希伯仑时，他们告诉他，除了其它的理由，他们不得不将他作为他们的国王，实际上在扫罗的时代大卫就是他们的国王了，所以他们现在没有理由只能接受他作他们的国王。他们还说，当扫罗作我们国王的时候，是你率领以色列人征战归来，耶和华也曾对你说，你应当牧养我的子民以色列人，你应当作以色列人的首领（撒母耳记下：5：2）。

WIND

§110. Thus, whether a family by degrees grew up into a common-wealth, and the fatherly authority being continued on to the elder son, every one in his turn growing up under it, tacitly submitted to it, and the easiness and equality of it not offending any one, every one acquiesced, till time seemed to have confirmed it, and settled a right of succession by prescription: or whether several families, or the descendants of several families, whom chance, neighbourhood, or business brought together, uniting into society, the need of a general, whose conduct might defend them against their enemies in war, and the great confidence the innocence and sincerity of that poor but virtuous age, (such as are almost all those which begin governments, that ever come to last in the world) gave men one of another, made the first beginners of commonwealths generally put the rule into one man's hand, without any other express limitation or restraint, but what the nature of the thing, and the end of government required: which ever of those it was that at first put the rule into the hands of a single person, certainly it is no body was intrusted with it but for the public good and safety, and to those ends, in the infancies of commonwealths, those who had it commonly used it. And unless they had done so, young societies could not have subsisted; without such nursing fathers tender and careful of the public weal, all governments would have sunk under the weakness and infirmities of their infancy, and the prince and the people had soon perished together.
§110. 这样，不管是一个家庭逐渐形成为一个国家，父亲的权力由长子延续下去，每个在此权力下依次长大的人默认对它的服从，它的温和与平等不冒犯任何人，每个人默认下来，直到时间使之成为习惯，以法律规定的形式确立了继承权：还是，几个家族或几个家族的后代，因机缘，邻居或贸易往来聚居在一起，联合成社会，需要一位将军在战争中带领他们防御敌人，那个贫乏但道德良好时代的淳朴和真诚给与彼此巨大的信任（世界上能够存在下来的政府几乎都是这样开始的），使得那些最初的国家的创建者通常将统治权力授与一人，除了事情本身的性质和政府目的所要求的，没有其它明确的限制或约束：无论是哪种情况，当初将统治权置于一人之手，可以肯定的是，给予信任授与这种权力只是为了公共利益与安全，而且在国家的幼年时期，那些拥有这种权力的人通常行使它也是为了这些目的。除非他们这样做，年幼的社会无法生存；没有这样保姆式的对公共利益的父亲照料，一切政府都沉于他们的幼年的脆弱中，从而君主与臣民很快就一起消亡。

§111. But though the golden age (before vain ambition, and amor sceleratus habendi, evil concupiscence, had corrupted men's minds into a mistake of true power and honour) had more virtue, and consequently better governors, as well as less vicious subjects, and there was then no stretching prerogative on the one side, to oppress the people; nor consequently on the other, any dispute about privilege, to lessen or restrain the power of the magistrate, and so no contest betwixt rulers and people about governors or government: yet, when ambition and luxury in future ages* would retain and increase the power, without doing the business for which it was given; and aided by flattery, taught princes to have distinct and separate interests from their people, men found it necessary to examine more carefully the original and rights of government; and to find out ways to restrain the exorbitances, and prevent the abuses of that power, which they having intrusted in another's hands only for their own good, they found was made use of to hurt them.
§111. 但是虽然黄金时代（在虚妄的野心，邪恶的占有欲，罪恶的淫欲败坏人们的理智，误解真正的权力和荣誉之前）具有更多的美德，因而有更好的统治者和较少的邪恶的臣民，一方面没有权力的过度扩张来压迫人们；另一方面也没有任何特殊权利的争议来缩减或限制管理者的权力，因而在统治者与公民之间也就没有统治者或政府问题的冲突：但是，当之后的时代野心与奢侈欲保留并扩大权力，却不做授与权力所要求做的事情；并在奉承的怂恿下，教会了君主们拥有与其臣民截然不同的利益，于是人们发现有必要更谨慎的审查政府的来源和权利；并寻找一些办法去限制政府权力的过度使用和防止它的滥用，这种权力他们过去授与他人只是为了他们自己的利益，现在却发现被用来伤害他们了。

WIND

§112. Thus we may see how probable it is, that people that were naturally free, and by their own consent either submitted to the government of their father, or united together out of different families to make a government, should generally put the rule into one man's hands, and chuse to be under the conduct of a single person, without so much as by express conditions limiting or regulating his power, which they thought safe enough in his honesty and prudence; though they never dreamed of monarchy being lure Divino, which we never heard of among mankind, till it was revealed to us by the divinity of this last age; nor ever allowed paternal power to have a right to dominion, or to be the foundation of all government. And thus much may suffice to shew, that as far as we have any light from history, we have reason to conclude, that all peaceful beginnings of government have been laid in the consent of the people. I say peaceful, because I shall have occasion in another place to speak of conquest, which some esteem a way of beginning of governments.
§112. 由此可见，当初极为可能的情况是，生来自由的人们，基于他们自己的同意，或者服从于他们父亲的统治，或者不同家族的人联合起来设立一个政府，普遍的将统治权置于一人之手，选择由一人来指挥，没有诸多明确表达的条件来限制或调整他的权力，对此他们对他的诚实和谨慎足够信任；虽然他们做梦也没有想到君权神授一说，对此我们从未听说，直到我们这个时代的神学向我们说明；也从未承认父权力拥有一种统治的权利，或可作为所有政府的基础。这足以表明，只要我们对历史有所了解，我们就有理由断定，所有和平的政府的开端都是基于人们的同意。我之所以说“和平的”，是因为我将在其它地方论及“征服”，对此有人认为这也是政府开端的一种方式。

WIND

The other objection I find urged against the beginning of polities, in the way I have mentioned, is this, viz.
对于我所阐述的政制的开端的另一种强烈的反对意见，是这样的，即，

§113. That all men being born under government, some or other, it is impossible any of them should ever be free, and at liberty to unite together, and begin a new one, or ever be able to erect a lawful government.
If this argument be good; I ask, how came so many lawful monarchies into the world? for if any body, upon this supposition, can shew me any one man in any age of the world free to begin a lawful monarchy, I will be bound to shew him ten other free men at liberty, at the same time to unite and begin a new government under a regal, or any other form; it being demonstration, that if any one, born under the dominion of another, may be so free as to have a right to command others in a new and distinct empire, every one that is born under the dominion of another may be so free too, and may become a ruler, or subject, of a distinct separate government. And so by this their own principle, either all men, however born, are free, or else there is but one lawful prince, one lawful government in the world. And then they have nothing to do, but barely to shew us which that is; which when they have done, I doubt not but all mankind will easily agree to pay obedience to him.
§113. 所有人既已生来处于这个或那个政府之下，他们任何人便不可能自由，并自由的联合起来创建一个新的政府，或能够建立一个合法的政府。
如果这种说法不错的话；我想问，世上如何能够形成这么多合法的君主国呢？因为如果任何人基于这个假设能够向我说明这个世界任何时代的任何一个人可以自由的建立一个合法的君主国，那么我一定向他说明十个其他的自由人在君主制或任何其它的政府形式之下与此同时可以自由的联合起来创建一个新政府；毫无疑问，如果一个在他人统治下出生的人可以如此自由，以致拥有权利建立另一个新的完全不同的的帝国来命令别人，那么每个在他人统治下的出生的人都可以如此的自由，并成为另一个完全独立的政府的统治者或臣民。因此，依照他们自己的原则，要么所有人，无论出生如何，都是自由的，要么世上只有一个合法的君主，一个合法的政府。那么，他们无需做什么，只要向我们说明哪个正确就是了；在他们指出之后，也就没什么疑问了，所有人都会轻易的赞同服从于他。

李新苗

强力千斤顶~！

WIND

§114. Though it be a sufficient answer to their objection, to shew that it involves them in the same difficulties that it doth those they use it against; yet I shall endeavour to discover the weakness of this argument a little farther. All men, say they, are born under government, and therefore they cannot be at liberty to begin a new one. Every one is born a subject to his father, or his prince, and is therefore under the perpetual tie of subjection and allegiance. It is plain mankind never owned nor considered any such natural subjection that they were born in, to one or to the other that tied them, without their own consents, to a subjection to them and their heirs.
§114. 虽然，这足以回答了他们的反对意见，说明他们的反对将使他们陷入他们所反对的困境之中；然而我将努力对此说法的弱点稍作进一步的说明。他们说，所有人既已生来处于政府之下，所以他们不能自由的创建一个新的政府。每个人既然生来服从他的父亲或他的君主，所以便终身处于服从和忠诚的约束之下。很明白，人类从未承认或考虑任何这样的生来就有的未经他们自己同意的对他人和他们的继承人的自然服从。

§115. For there are no examples so frequent in history, both sacred and profane, as those of men withdrawing themselves, and their obedience, from the jurisdiction they were born under, and the family or community they were bred up in, and setting up new governments in other places; from whence sprang all that number of petty commonwealths in the beginning of ages, and which always multiplied, as long as there was room enough, till the stronger, or more fortunate, swallowed the weaker; and those great ones again breaking to pieces, dissolved into lesser dominions. All which are so many testimonies against paternal sovereignty, and plainly prove, that it was not the natural right of the father descending to his heirs, that made governments in the beginning, since it was impossible, upon that ground, there should have been so many little kingdoms; all must have been but only one universal monarchy, if men had not been at liberty to separate themselves from their families, and the government, be it what it will, that was set up in it, and go and make distinct commonwealths and other governments, as they thought fit.
§115. 因为，在宗教史和世俗史中，再也没有比这更常见的例子了，那就是人们从他们生来所受的统治下和在其中长大的家庭或共同体中抽身出来，不再服从，而在别处建立新的政府；由此产生了世界初期众多的小国家，而且只要有足够的空间，这种小国家就总是增加，直到更强更富的国家吞灭了弱国；而那些大国又再度四分五裂，分为较小的国家。这一切都是父亲统治权力的反证，并很明白的证明，并非父亲的自然权利转继给他的继承人，从而形成初期的政府，因为在这样的基础上，不可能有如此众多的小王国；如果人们没有自由从他们的家族或政府中分离出来，去建立他们认为合适的独立的国家和政府，那么全世界就只有一个君主国了。

WIND

§116. This has been the practice of the world from its first beginning to this day; nor is it now any more hindrance to the freedom of mankind, that they are born under constituted and ancient polities, that have established laws, and set forms of government, than if they were born in the woods, amongst the unconfined inhabitants, that run loose in them: for those, who would persuade us, that by being born under any government, we are naturally subjects to it, and have no more any title or pretence to the freedom of the state of nature, have no other reason (bating that of paternal power, which we have already answered) to produce for it, but only, because our fathers or progenitors passed away their natural liberty, and thereby bound up themselves and their posterity to a perpetual subjection to the government, which they themselves submitted to. It is true, that whatever engagements or promises any one has made for himself, he is under the obligation of them, but cannot, by any compact whatsoever, bind his children or posterity: for his son, when a man, being altogether as free as the father, any act of the father can no more give away the liberty of the son, than it can of any body else: he may indeed annex such conditions to the land, he enjoyed as a subject of any common-wealth, as may oblige his son to be of that community, if he will enjoy those possessions which were his father's; because that estate being his father's property, he may dispose, or settle it, as he pleases.
§116. 这就是世界从始至今的实践；对于人类的自由而言，他们现在生来便处于已经建立的古老的政制之下，有着既定的法律和政府形式，与他们若生在丛林之中，同无拘无束的居民共居相比较，前者并没有更多的阻碍：因为，那些要我们相信既已生来处于任何政府之下，我们便自然的服从于它，且没有更多的资格享有自然状态的自由的人，对此没有给出别的理由（除了父权力，对此我们已经给出回答），仅仅因为，我们的父亲或祖先放弃了他们的自然自由，从而使他们自己和他们的后代终身服从于他们自己所服从的政府。确实，任何人无论为自己做出什么约定或承诺，他便有履行的责任，但是不能以无论什么契约来约束他的孩子或后代：因为他的儿子，当成人的时候，也同的父亲一样自由，父亲的任何行为都不能丧失儿子的自由，正如父亲的行为不能丧失他人的自由一样：实际上，他可以对他作为任何国家的臣民所享有的土地附加这样的条件，如果儿子将享有他父亲这样的财产，可以迫使他的儿子成为那个国家的臣民；因为那片土地既是他父亲的财产，他便可以随意处置或安排它。

§117. And this has generally given the occasion to mistake in this matter; because commonwealths not permitting any part of their dominions to be dismembered, nor to be enjoyed by any but those of their community, the son cannot ordinarily enjoy the possessions of his father, but under the same terms his father did, by becoming a member of the society; whereby he puts himself presently under the government he finds there established, as much as any other subject of that common-wealth. And thus the consent of freemen, born under government, which only makes them members of it, being given separately in their turns, as each comes to be of age, and not in a multitude together; people take no notice of it, and thinking it not done at all, or not necessary, conclude they are naturally subjects as they are men.
§117. 这一点普遍的引起了对这个问题的误解；因为国家不允许它的任何领土遭到分割，也不允许为共同体之外的人任何人所享有，儿子通常只有通过成为该社会的成员，处于与他父亲相同的条件之下，才能享有他父亲的财产；由此此时他才将自己置身于那个已经建立的政府之下，那个国家的任何其他的臣民也差不多。这样的话，生来处于政府之下的自由人，只有他们的同意才使他们成为国家的成员，而这种同意是他们每个人在成年的时候依次分别做出的，而不是成群一起做出的；人们并未注意到这种同意，认为完全没有或没有必要做出同意，而断言他们一旦成年便自然就是某国的臣民。

WIND

§118. But, it is plain, governments themselves understand it otherwise; they claim no power over the son, because of that they had over the father; nor look on children as being their subjects, by their fathers being so. If a subject of England have a child, by an English woman in France, whose subject is he? Not the king of England's; for he must have leave to be admitted to the privileges of it: nor the king of France's; for how then has his father a liberty to bring him away, and breed him as he pleases? and whoever was judged as a traitor or deserter, if he left, or warred against a country, for being barely born in it of parents that were aliens there? It is plain then, by the practice of governments themselves, as well as by the law of right reason, that a child is born a subject of no country or government. He is under his father's tuition and authority, till he comes to age of discretion; and then he is a freeman, at liberty what government he will put himself under, what body politic he will unite himself to: for if an Englishman's son, born in France, be at liberty, and may do so, it is evident there is no tie upon him by his father's being a subject of this kingdom; nor is he bound up by any compact of his ancestors. And why then hath not his son, by the same reason, the same liberty, though he be born any where else? Since the power that a father hath naturally over his children, is the same, where-ever they be born, and the ties of natural obligations, are not bounded by the positive limits of kingdoms and commonwealths.
§118. 但是，很明白，政府本身对这个问题的理解是不同的；它们并不因它们对父亲的权力而声称对儿子也拥有这样的权力；也不因父亲是它们的臣民而将儿子也视为它们的臣民。如果一个英格兰的男人与一个英格兰的女人在法国生了一个孩子，那么这个孩子是谁的臣民？他不是英格兰国王的；因为他必须得到承认方可获得作为英格兰臣民的特殊权利：他也不是法国的国王的；因为若是，他的父亲如何又能随其意愿自由的带走和抚养他？如果他离开或与这个国家交战，能够仅仅因为他的父母作为外国人在这个国家生他而被判为叛国者吗？所以很明白，基于政府本身的实际行为以及正当理性的法则，一个孩子生来并不是任何国家或政府的臣民。他处于父亲的教导和权力之下，直到达到具备判断力的年龄；之后他便是一个自由人，可以自由选择置身于任何一个政府之下，或加入任何一个政治实体之中：因为如果一个英格兰人的儿子，在法国出生，是自由的，那么很明显，他并不因他的父亲是英格兰王国的臣民而受约束；也不受他祖先的任何契约限制。那么他的儿子尽管出生在任何其他地方，为何不能基于同样的理由享有同样的自由呢？既然一个父亲对孩子自然拥有的权力，无论孩子在什么地方出生都是一样的，那么，自然责任的约束就不受王国和国家的限制。

§119. Every man being, as has been shewed, naturally free, and nothing being able to put him into subjection to any earthly power, but only his own consent; it is to be considered, what shall be understood to be a sufficient declaration of a man's consent, to make him subject to the laws of any government. There is a common distinction of an express and a tacit consent, which will concern our present case. No body doubts but an express consent, of any man entering into any society, makes him a perfect member of that society, a subject of that government. The difficulty is, what ought to be looked upon as a tacit consent, and how far it binds, i.e. how far any one shall be looked on to have consented, and thereby submitted to any government, where he has made no expressions of it at all. And to this I say, that every man, that hath any possessions, or enjoyment, of any part of the dominions of any government, doth thereby give his tacit consent, and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government, during such enjoyment, as any one under it; whether this his possession be of land, to him and his heirs for ever, or a lodging only for a week; or whether it be barely travelling freely on the highway; and in effect, it reaches as far as the very being of any one within the territories of that government.
§119. 前面已经说明，每个人既然生来自由，除了他自己的同意之外，没有什么能够将他置身于对世俗权力的服从之中；于是产生了这样的问题，究竟什么可以被理解为一个人同意服从于任何政府的法律的足够宣示。通常有区别明显的明确同意（express consent）和默认同意（tacit consent）之分，这是与我们目前的论述有关的。没有人怀疑只有加入任何社会的任何人的明确同意才使他完全成为那个社会的成员和那个政府的臣民。问题在于，应该将什么视为默认同意，以及它约束的程度有多大，换言之，在一个人根本没有做出任何表示的场合，在多大的程度上应当将他视为已经同意，从而服从于任何政府。对此我可以这样说，每个人若拥有或享用任何政府的任何领土，就因此而给与了他默认的同意，相应的在他享用期间应当如此政府之下的任何人一样服从它的法律；无论这财产是他及其继承人永远拥有的土地，或是暂住一周的住处；或者仅仅是自由行走的公有道路；实际上，只要身在那个政府的领土之内，就构成了某种默认同意。

WIND

§120. To understand this the better, it is fit to consider, that every man, when he at first incorporates himself into any commonwealth, he, by his uniting himself thereunto, annexed also, and submits to the community, those possessions, which he has, or shall acquire, that do not already belong to any other government: for it would be a direct contradiction, for any one to enter into society with others for the securing and regulating of property; and yet to suppose his land, whose property is to be regulated by the laws of the society, should be exempt from the jurisdiction of that government, to which he himself, the proprietor of the land, is a subject. By the same act therefore, whereby any one unites his person, which was before free, to any common-wealth, by the same he unites his possessions, which were before free, to it also; and they become, both of them, person and possession, subject to the government and dominion of that common-wealth, as long as it hath a being. Whoever therefore, from thenceforth, by inheritance, purchase, permission, or otherways, enjoys any part of the land, so annexed to, and under the government of that common-wealth, must take it with the condition it is under; that is, of submitting to the government of the common-wealth, under whose jurisdiction it is, as far forth as any subject of it.
§120. 为了更好的理解这一点，可以这样考虑，每个人当他最初加入任何国家的时候，他，通过他的加入，也把他所拥有的或将要获得的且不属于任何其它政府的财产附加了进来，并服从于共同体的管理：因为这是一对直接矛盾——任何人既然是为了保障和调整财产才与他人一同加入社会；然而却假定他本应由社会的法律调整的土地又可以免除政府的管理，而他本人，即土地所有人是此政府的臣民。所以，通过这一行为，任何人因此而将他之前自由的人身并入任何国家，这同一种行为也将他自由的财产并入了进来；只要这种情况继续，他的人身和财产便都服从于这个政府和这个国家的统治。所以，自此以后，无论是谁，通过继承，购买，许可或其它方式，享用这样附加进来的处于那个国家的政府之下的土地的任何部分，也必须将土地所附加的条件一同接受下来；即，服从此国家的政府，处于它的管辖之下，如同它的其他臣民一样。

WIND

§121. But since the government has a direct jurisdiction only over the land, and reaches the possessor of it, (before he has actually incorporated himself in the society) only as he dwells upon, and enjoys that; the obligation any one is under, by virtue of such enjoyment, to submit to the government, begins and ends with the enjoyment; so that whenever the owner, who has given nothing but such a tacit consent to the government, will, by donation, sale, or otherwise, quit the said possession, he is at liberty to go and incorporate himself into any other common-wealth; or to agree with others to begin a new one, in vacuis locis[empty places], in any part of the world, they can find free and unpossessed: whereas he, that has once, by actual agreement, and any express declaration, given his consent to be of any commonwealth, is perpetually and indispensably obliged to be, and remain unalterably a subject to it, and can never be again in the liberty of the state of nature; unless, by any calamity, the government he was under comes to be dissolved; or else by some public act cuts him off from being any longer a member of it.
§121. 但是，既然政府只是对土地拥有直接的管辖权，仅仅在他居留并享用它们的时候才延及土地的占有者，（在他实际加入此社会之前）；任何人因为享用才有责任服从政府，也就随同享用而开始和终止；所以无论何时，仅仅通过给与政府默认同意的财产所有人，便可以通过捐赠，出卖或其它方式放弃前述的财产，从而可以自由的加入任何其它的国家；或与他人一致同意在他们所能找到的未被占有的世界任何地方的空地上建立一个新的国家：但是，一旦他通过实际的同意和任何明确的宣示给与了任何政府同意，就必须终身有责任不可改变的做它的臣民，而不能再度退回到自然状态；除非，因为任何灾难，他所服从的政府开始解体；或通过某些公共行为使他不再成为此社会的成员。

§122. But submitting to the laws of any country, living quietly, and enjoying privileges and protection under them, makes not a man a member of that society: this is only a local protection and homage due to and from all those, who, not being in a state of war, come within the territories belonging to any government, to all parts whereof the force of its laws extends. But this no more makes a man a member of that society, a perpetual subject of that common-wealth, than it would make a man a subject to another, in whose family he found it convenient to abide for some time; though, whilst he continued in it, he were obliged to comply with the laws, and submit to the government he found there. And thus we see, that foreigners, by living all their lives under another government, and enjoying the privileges and protection of it, though they are bound, even in conscience, to submit to its administration, as far forth as any denison; yet do not thereby come to be subjects or members of that commonwealth. Nothing can make any man so, but his actually entering into it by positive engagement, and express promise and compact. This is that, which I think, concerning the beginning of political societies, and that consent which makes any one a member of any common-wealth.
§122. 但是，服从任何国家的法律，并在法律之下平静的生活，享受特殊权利和保护，并不使一个人成为此社会的成员：这仅仅是一个不处于战争状态的人们，来到任何政府的领地之内，在其法律效力所延及的范围之内，所应得的地方保护和应有的忠诚。但是这并不使一个人成为那个社会的成员，那个国家的终身臣民，正如一个人觉得适于在他人家里寄居一段时间，并不使他成为他人的臣民一样；虽然，在他继续拘留的时候，他有责任遵守那里的法律并服从那里的政府。这样的话，我们看到，那些在别的政府下终身生活并享受它的特殊权利和保护的外国人，虽然他们必须甚至在内心服从于那个政府的管理；然而并不因此而成为那个国家的臣民或成员。除了通过肯定性的约定和明确的承诺及契约实际加入一个国家，没有别的方式可以使任何人成为国家的成员。这就是我所认为的关于政治社会的开端，以及使任何人成为任何国家的成员的那种同意（即明确同意）。

WIND

Chapter IX.
Of the Ends of Political Society and Government.
第九章 论政治社会和政府的目的

§123. IF man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; if he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to no body, why will he part with his freedom? why will he give up this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and control of any other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasion of others: for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very unsecure. This makes him willing to quit a condition, which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers: and it is not without reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name, property.
§123. 如前所述，如果自然状态中的人如此的自由；如果他是他自己的人身和财产的绝对主人，与最强大的人一样，无须服从于其他任何人，那么，为什么他要与他的自由分离？为什么他要放弃这个帝国，并服从于任何其它的权力的统治和管理呢？对此显然可以这样回答，虽然在自然状态中他拥有这样一种权利，然而享用这种权利并不确定，常常受到他人的侵犯：既然所有人都是像他一样的国王，每个人都与他平等，而大部分人并不是平等和正义的遵守者，因而他在这种状态中对财产的享用就非常不安全，非常没有保障。这使得他愿意脱离这种境况，这种境况虽然自由却充满了恐惧和连续不断的危险：所以并非毫无道理，他寻求并愿意与已经联合起来的或有意联合的其他人组成社会，以相互保护他们的生命，自由和财产——这些我都统称为“财产”（property）。

§124. The great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property. To which in the state of nature there are many things wanting.
First, There wants an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the common measure to decide all controversies between them: for though the law of nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures; yet men being biassed by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to their particular cases.
§124. 所以，人们联合组成国家并置身于政府之下的重要和主要的目的便是他们财产的保护。对此自然状态存在诸多的欠缺。
首先，缺少建立的，确定的，众所周知的法律，为共同的同意所接受和承认而成为对错的辨别标准，和裁断他们之间所有争议的共同尺度：因为虽然自然法对所有理性被造物来说简单明了；然而人们因他们的私利而有偏向，同时因为缺少对自然法的研究而无知，不容易承认它作为一种在他们各自的情况中可以应用的对他们有约束力的法律。

§125. Secondly, In the state of nature there wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the established law: for every one in that state being both judge and executioner of the law of nature, men being partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much heat, in their own cases; as well as negligence, and unconcernedness, to make them too remiss in other men's.
§125. 第二，在自然状态中，缺少一位众所周知的中立的审判者，有权依据建立的法律裁决所有的分歧：因为自然状态中的每个人都是自然法的审判者和执行者，而人们又倾向于偏袒自己，冲动和报复心理很容易走得太远，在他们自己的事情中太过热情；同时，疏忽，漠不关心又使他们对他人的事情过于冷漠。

§126. Thirdly, In the state of nature there often wants power to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution. They who by any injustice offended, will seldom fail, where they are able, by force to make good their injustice; such resistance many times makes the punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive, to those who attempt it.
§126. 第三，在自然状态中常常缺少权力来支持正确的判决，并给与它应有的执行。那些受到不公正侵犯的人，总是耿耿于怀，只要他们能够，就会用强力来补偿他们所受的不公正对待；这样的反抗许多时候使得惩罚变得危险，而且常常对企图惩罚的人是破坏性的。

WIND

§127. Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of the state of nature, being but in an ill condition, while they remain in it, are quickly driven into society. Hence it comes to pass, that we seldom find any number of men live any time together in this state. The inconveniencies that they are therein exposed to, by the irregular and uncertain exercise of the power every man has of punishing the transgressions of others, make them take sanctuary under the established laws of government, and therein seek the preservation of their property. It is this makes them so willingly give up every one his single power of punishing, to be exercised by such alone, as shall be appointed to it amongst them; and by such rules as the community, or those authorized by them to that purpose, shall agree on. And in this we have the original right and rise of both the legislative and executive power, as well as of the governments and societies themselves.
§127. 这样一来，人类尽管在自然状态中拥有所有的特殊权利，但是当他们继续留在这种状态中，却只是呆在糟糕的境况中，因而很快被驱使进入社会。所以就发生了这样的情况——我们很少发现任何数量的人群一起生活在这种状态之中。在这种状态中，由于每个人拥有的惩罚他人犯罪行为的权力的行使不稳定又没有规则，他们在其中所遭受到的麻烦便会使他们避难于政府所建立的法律之下，并在这里寻求对他们财产的保护；正是这种原因才使得他们愿意放弃每个人单独拥有的惩罚权力，并交由在他们中间指定的权力机构单独来行使；而行使权力所依据的共同体的规则，或者为此目的而由共同体所授权的人，应当经过同意。在此我们得到立法和执行权力的权利来源，政府和社会本身也来源于此。