WIND

§212. Besides this over-turning from without, governments are dissolved from within,
§212. 除了这种外部的倾覆之外，政府也可以从内部予以解体，

WIND

First, When the legislative is altered. Civil society being a state of peace, amongst those who are of it, from whom the state of war is excluded by the umpirage, which they have provided in their legislative, for the ending all differences that may arise amongst any of them, it is in their legislative, that the members of a commonwealth are united, and combined together into one coherent living body. This is the soul that gives form, life, and unity, to the common-wealth: from hence the several members have their mutual influence, sympathy, and connexion: and therefore, when the legislative is broken, or dissolved, dissolution and death follows: for the essence and union of the society consisting in having one will, the legislative, when once established by the majority, has the declaring, and as it were keeping of that will. The constitution of the legislative is the first and fundamental act of society, whereby provision is made for the continuation of their union, under the direction of persons, and bonds of laws, made by persons authorized thereunto, by the consent and appointment of the people, without which no one man, or number of men, amongst them, can have authority of making laws that shall be binding to the rest. When any one, or more, shall take upon them to make laws, whom the people have not appointed so to do, they make laws without authority, which the people are not therefore bound to obey; by which means they come again to be out of subjection, and may constitute to themselves a new legislative, as they think best, being in full liberty to resist the force of those, who without authority would impose any thing upon them. Every one is at the disposure of his own will, when those who had, by the delegation of the society, the declaring of the public will, are excluded from it, and others usurp the place, who have no such authority or delegation.
首先，当立法权力改变的时候。公民社会作为一种和平状态，存在于社会成员彼此之间，因为仲裁排除了战争的可能性，而仲裁是为了终结人们之间可能产生的分歧，通过立法权力提供的，正是他们的立法权力，才将一个国家的成员联合起来组成一个合乎逻辑的生命体。这是给与国家形式，生命和统一的灵魂：由此分散的成员才相互发生影响，彼此同情和产生关系：所以，当立法权力遭到破坏或解体，随之就是政府的解体和死亡：因为社会的本质和联合在于拥有一种意志，立法权力一旦通过多数予以建立，便宣布了这种意志，并且是这种意志的保有者。立法权力的架构法是社会首要和基本的法案，根据这个法案规定在他们的联合持续的过程中，大家处于哪些人的指示和哪些法律的约束之下，法律由那些授权立法的人制定，经过公民的同意和指定，没有这种同意他们中间的任何个人或群体都没有权力制定法律来约束其余的人。当任何个人或更多的人想对众人制定法律，如果公民并未指定他们去这样做，他们就是未经授权制定法律，对此公民无需服从；众人于是再次脱离服从状态，可以以他们认为最好的方式为他们自己建立一种新的立法权力，因为对于那些未经授权欲强加任何东西的人，人们有完全的自由去抵抗他们的强制力。当那些由社会授权宣布公共意志的人遭到排除，而其他未经授权的人篡夺了这个位置的时候，每个人都可以依他自己的意志行事。

WIND

§213. This being usually brought about by such in the commonwealth who misuse the power they have; it is hard to consider it aright, and know at whose door to lay it, without knowing the form of government in which it happens. Let us suppose then the legislative placed in the concurrence of three distinct persons.
1. A single hereditary person, having the constant, supreme, executive power, and with it the power of convoking and dissolving the other two within certain periods of time.
2. An assembly of hereditary nobility.
3. An assembly of representatives chosen, pro tempore, by the people. Such a form of government supposed, it is evident,
§213. 这种情况通常是由国家中那些滥用他们所掌握的权力的人造成的；如果不知道发生这种情况的政府形式，就很难恰当的加以考虑，并知道权力到底由谁掌握。那么，让我们假设立法权力同时交给三个不同的法人。
1．一个由继承产生的法人，拥有始终如一的，最高的执行权力，同时拥有在一定的时期内召集和解散其他两个法人的权力。
2．一个由继承的贵族组成的议会。
3．一个由公民选举产生的暂时性的代表组成的议会。假设政府形式是这样，那么很明显，

WIND

§214. First, That when such a single person, or prince, sets up his own arbitrary will in place of the laws, which are the will of the society, declared by the legislative, then the legislative is changed: for that being in effect the legislative, whose rules and laws are put in execution, and required to be obeyed; when other laws are set up, and other rules pretended, and inforced, than what the legislative, constituted by the society, have enacted, it is plain that the legislative is changed. Whoever introduces new laws, not being thereunto authorized by the fundamental appointment of the society, or subverts the old, disowns and overturns the power by which they were made, and so sets up a new legislative.
§214. 第一，当这样一个单独的法人或君主，在法律中建立起他自己的肆意意志，立法权力便改变了，而法律本来是由立法权力所宣布的社会的意志：因为作为事实上的立法权力，它的规则和法律便要付诸执行并要求服从；当法律不再是由社会建立的立法权力所制定的法律，而是建立了其它的法律和规则，伪装成法律并强制实施，很明白，立法权力的性质便改变了。无论是谁引入新的法律或废除旧的法律，若不是基于社会基本的约定而得到的授权，便是对据以制定法律的权力的否定和推翻，并建立起一种新的立法权力。

WIND

§215. Secondly, When the prince hinders the legislative from assembling in its due time, or from acting freely, pursuant to those ends for which it was constituted, the legislative is altered: for it is not a certain number of men, no, nor their meeting, unless they have also freedom of debating, and leisure of perfecting, what is for the good of the society, wherein the legislative consists: when these are taken away or altered, so as to deprive the society of the due exercise of their power, the legislative is truly altered; for it is not names that constitute governments, but the use and exercise of those powers that were intended to accompany them; so that he, who takes away the freedom, or hinders the acting of the legislative in its due seasons, in effect takes away the legislative, and puts an end to the government.
§215. 第二，当君主阻碍立法权力在恰当的时间集会，或自由的行使职能以追求当初建立它的目的，立法权力的性质便改变了：因为立法权力并不仅仅在于一定的人数或者集会，除非他们也能够拥有辩论的自由，以及充足的时间，这是为了社会的利益：如果这些被取消或改变，以便剥夺社会对其权力的正当行使，立法权力的性质就真的改变了；因为建立政府的并不是“政府”这个名义，而是那些与此意图相联的诸项权力的使用和行使；所以，谁若剥夺立法权力的自由，或者阻碍立法权力在恰当的时期行使其职能，实际上就是取消立法权力并终结政府。

WIND

§216. Thirdly, When, by the arbitrary power of the prince, the electors, or ways of election, are altered, without the consent, and contrary to the common interest of the people, there also the legislative is altered: for, if others than those whom the society hath authorized thereunto, or chuse, in another way than what the society hath prescribed, those chosen are not the legislative appointed by the people.
§216. 第三，当君主使用独断权力，未经同意，并违背公民的共同利益，改变议员或选举的方式，立法权力的性质也被改变了：因为，如果这些议员未经社会为此而授权，或者不是以社会所规定的方式选举，那些被选的人就不是公民所指定的立法权力。

WIND

§217. Fourthly, The delivery also of the people into the subjection of a foreign power, either by the prince, or by the legislative, is certainly a change of the legislative, and so a dissolution of the government: for the end why people entered into society being to be preserved one intire, free, independent society, to be governed by its own laws; this is lost, whenever they are given up into the power of another.
§217. 第四，如果君主或立法权力将一个国家的人交付给一种外国权力来统治，毫无疑问这是立法权力的改变，从而也是政府的解体：因为人们进入一个社会的目的是为了保持一个完整的，自由的，独立的社会，并由他自己的法律来统治；无论何时，若他们交给其它的权力，这一点就丧失了。

WIND

§218. Why, in such a constitution as this, the dissolution of the government in these cases is to be imputed to the prince, is evident; because he, having the force, treasure and offices of the state to employ, and often persuading himself, or being flattered by others, that as supreme magistrate he is incapable of control; he alone is in a condition to make great advances toward such changes, under pretence of lawful authority, and has it in his hands to terrify or suppress opposers, as factious, seditious, and enemies to the government: whereas no other part of the legislative, or people, is capable by themselves to attempt any alteration of the legislative, without open and visible rebellion, apt enough to be taken notice of, which, when it prevails, produces effects very little different from foreign conquest. Besides, the prince in such a form of government, having the power of dissolving the other parts of the legislative, and thereby rendering them private persons, they can never in opposition to him, or without his concurrence, alter the legislative by a law, his consent being necessary to give any of their decrees that sanction. But yet so far as the other parts of the legislative any way contribute to any attempt upon the government, and do either promote, or not, what lies in them, hinder such designs, they are guilty, and partake in this, which is certainly the greatest crime men can be guilty of one towards another.
§218. 为什么在这样的宪制中，政府在这些情况中的解体应当归咎于君主，是很显然的；因为他既已掌握了国家的强制力，贵金属和公职的使用，却常常自以为是或者由于他人的奉承，认为作为最高的管理者就不能加以约束了；只有他才具备条件在合法权力的借口下进行这样重大的改变，并且使用这种权力将反对者视为内乱，叛乱和政府的敌人予以恐吓或压制：而立法权力的其它部分或公民若无足够引起注意的公开和可见的反叛无法仅凭自身就企图对立法权力进行任何的改变，一旦反叛获得成功，产生的影响与国外的征服没有多大的区别。此外，这种政府形式中的君主，既然拥有解散立法权力其它部分的权力，便使他们变成了私人性质，他们无法反对他或没有他的赞同而通过法律改变立法权力，因为他的同意是作为批准他们的法令的一个必要条件。但是另一方面，只要立法权力的其它部分以任何方式对政府有任何的企图，参与或者不尽其所能的阻止这样的图谋，他们就是有罪的，而参与其中，毫无疑问是人们彼此之间所能犯下的最大的罪行。

WIND

我发现在洛克的思考中，“究竟在什么情况下政府应当解体”这样的问题都是不恰当的，而我在翻译这一章之前，却是这样猜测。他的逻辑是：建立一个恰当的政府的理由是显而易见的；政府的解体只是指出这样一种事实，那就是政府的目的和建立原则偏离原来的预设，当然有所偏离总是不可避免的，然而显而易见的偏离是不可容许的。从而在政府事实上已经解体的前提下，最后提出应对的方法。

WIND

§219. There is one way more whereby such a government may be dissolved, and that is: When he who has the supreme executive power, neglects and abandons that charge, so that the laws already made can no longer be put in execution. This is demonstratively to reduce all to anarchy, and so effectually to dissolve the government: for laws not being made for themselves, but to be, by their execution, the bonds of the society, to keep every part of the body politic in its due place and function; when that totally ceases, the government visibly ceases, and the people become a confused multitude, without order or connexion. Where there is no longer the administration of justice, for the securing of men's rights, nor any remaining power within the community to direct the force, or provide for the necessities of the public, there certainly is no government left. Where the laws cannot be executed, it is all one as if there were no laws; and a government without laws is, I suppose, a mystery in politics, unconceivable to human capacity, and inconsistent with human society.
§219. 另外还有一种途径使得这样的政府得以解体，这就是：当拥有最高执行权力的人，忽略或放弃这种职责，于是已经制定的法律便不再付诸实施。这显然是将大家陷入无政府状态之中，因而是实际上解体政府：因为法律的制定并不是为了他们自己，而是通过他们的执行变成社会的约束，以使政治共同体的每个部分保持它的恰当位置和功能；当这一切完全停止，明显的政府就终止了，公民变成了没有秩序或联系的混乱的众人。在不再有正义的管理来保障人们的权利的地方，或者共同体内不再有权力来引导强制力或提供公共必需品，毫无疑问是没有政府的。法律若不能执行，那就等于没有法律；而一个没有法律的政府，我认为，在政治中上是不可思议的，非人类所能想象，与人类社会是冲突的。

WIND

§220. In these and the like cases, when the government is dissolved, the people are at liberty to provide for themselves, by erecting a new legislative, differing from the other, by the change of persons, or form, or both, as they shall find it most for their safety and good: for the society can never, by the fault of another, lose the native and original right it has to preserve itself, which can only be done by a settled legislative, and a fair and impartial execution of the laws made by it. But the state of mankind is not so miserable that they are not capable of using this remedy, till it be too late to look for any. To tell people they may provide for themselves, by erecting a new legislative, when by oppression, artifice, or being delivered over to a foreign power, their old one is gone, is only to tell them, they may expect relief when it is too late, and the evil is past cure. This is in effect no more than to bid them first be slaves, and then to take care of their liberty; and when their chains are on, tell them, they may act like freemen. This, if barely so, is rather mockery than relief; and men can never be secure from tyranny, if there be no means to escape it till they are perfectly under it: and therefore it is, that they have not only a right to get out of it, but to prevent it.
§220. 在这些及类似的情况下，当政府解体的时候，公民都可以自由的为他们自己，通过建立一个与前者不同的新的立法权力，在人员或形式或者这两者都以他们所能找到的最有益于他们的安全和利益的方式予以改变：因为社会不能因为别的错误而丧失自我保护的生来就有的和初始的权利，这种权利只能通过确定的立法权力，以及由它所制定的法律的公正的执行才能得以保障。但是，人类的状态并不是如此的悲惨，以致不到时机过了之后不能采取这种矫正方法。当因压迫，权术或交给国外权力统治之后，旧的立法权力已经死亡，才告诉人们他们可以为他们自己建立一种新的立法权力，这只是告诉他们，当罪恶已经无可救治的时候，他们可以期待救济。实际上，这无异于提议他们先做奴隶，然后再关注他们的自由；当他们的锁链套上去的时候，告诉他们，他们可以像自由人一样行动。如果只是这样，这不是救济而是愚弄；如果人们在完全置身于暴政之前没有逃离的方法，他们便无法免于暴政的统治：所以，人们不仅有摆脱暴政的权利，而且也有阻止暴政的权利。

WIND

§221. There is therefore, secondly, another way whereby governments are dissolved, and that is, when the legislative, or the prince, either of them, act contrary to their trust. First, the legislative acts against the trust reposed in them, when they endeavour to invade the property of the subject, and to make themselves, or any part of the community, masters, or arbitrary disposers of the lives, liberties, or fortunes of the people.
§221. 所以，第二，政府因此而解体的另一种方式是，当立法权力或君主，任何一方行事违背交托给他们的信任的时候。首先，当立法权力竭力侵犯臣民的财产，使他们自己或共同体中任何的部分成为公民的生命，自由或财产的主人或肆意的处置者的时候，这便违背了交托给他们的信任。

WIND

§222. The reason why men enter into society, is the preservation of their property; and the end why they chuse and authorize a legislative, is, that there may be laws made, and rules set, as guards and fences to the properties of all the members of the society, to limit the power, and moderate the dominion, of every part and member of the society: for since it can never be supposed to be the will of the society, that the legislative should have a power to destroy that which every one designs to secure, by entering into society, and for which the people submitted themselves to legislators of their own making; whenever the legislators endeavour to take away, and destroy the property of the people, or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of war with the people, who are thereupon absolved from any farther obedience, and are left to the common refuge, which God hath provided for all men, against force and violence. Whensoever therefore the legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule of society; and either by ambition, fear, folly or corruption, endeavour to grasp themselves, or put into the hands of any other, an absolute power over the lives, liberties, and estates of the people; by this breach of trust they forfeit the power the people had put into their hands for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the people, who have a right to resume their original liberty, and, by the establishment of a new legislative, (such as they shall think fit) provide for their own safety and security, which is the end for which they are in society.
§222. 人们进入社会的理由是他们的财产的保护；他们选择并授权一个立法权力的目的是可以制定法律，建立规则，作为保护社会所有成员财产的看守和篱笆，对社会每个部分和成员的权力和支配权进行限制和节制：因为绝不能假设社会的意志是，立法权力应当拥有权力毁灭每个人通过进入社会所意图得到保障的东西，并且为此人们服从于他们自己所设立的立法者；无论何时，只要立法者竭力去夺走和毁灭公民的财产，或者陷他们于肆意权力的奴役之中，这些立法者便置身于对公民的战争之中，他们对立法权力的服从便因此而解除，并被抛进了共同的避难所，这是上帝为所有人反抗强制力和暴行所提供的。所以无论何时，只要立法权力违反了社会的基本规则；以及因为野心，恐惧，愚蠢或败坏而竭力将对公民的生命，自由和财产的绝对权力攫为己有或置于任何其他人的手中；通过这种背信，他们便丧失了公民为着完全相反的目的所授与他们的权力，这一权力回到公民的手中，他们有权利重新获得他们原来的自由，并且，通过建立一种新的立法权力，（他们认为合适的）为他们自己的安全和保障提供条件，这是他们进入社会的目的。

WIND

What I have said here, concerning the legislative in general, holds true also concerning the supreme executor, who having a double trust put in him, both to have a part in the legislative, and the supreme execution of the law, acts against both, when he goes about to set up his own arbitrary will as the law of the society. He acts also contrary to his trust, when he either employs the force, treasure, and offices of the society, to corrupt the representatives, and gain them to his purposes; or openly preengages the electors, and prescribes to their choice, such, whom he has, by solicitations, threats, promises, or otherwise, won to his designs; and employs them to bring in such, who have promised before-hand what to vote, and what to enact. Thus to regulate candidates and electors, and new-model the ways of election, what is it but to cut up the government by the roots, and poison the very fountain of public security? For the people having reserved to themselves the choice of their representatives, as the fence to their properties, could do it for no other end, but that they might always be freely chosen, and so chosen, freely act, and advise, as the necessity of the common-wealth, and the public good should, upon examination, and mature debate, be judged to require. This, those who give their votes before they hear the debate, and have weighed the reasons on all sides, are not capable of doing. To prepare such an assembly as this, and endeavour to set up the declared abettors of his own will, for the true representatives of the people, and the law-makers of the society, is certainly as great a breach of trust, and as perfect a declaration of a design to subvert the government, as is possible to be met with. To which, if one shall add rewards and punishments visibly employed to the same end, and all the arts of perverted law made use of, to take off and destroy all that stand in the way of such a design, and will not comply and consent to betray the liberties of their country, it will be past doubt what is doing. What power they ought to have in the society, who thus employ it contrary to the trust went along with it in its first institution, is easy to determine; and one cannot but see, that he, who has once attempted any such thing as this, cannot any longer be trusted.
我这里所说的与一般立法权力相关的内容，对于最高执行者也是适用的，人们交给了他两份信任，既作为立法权力的一部分，又担当法律的最高执行权，当他忙于建立自己的肆意意志作为社会的法律时，他便违背了这两种信任。当他使用社会的强制力，财富或者公职去败坏代表，使他们服务于他的目的；或者公开的预定选举人，规定他们的选择——他通过恳请，威胁，承诺或其它方式所获得满足他的意图的那些东西；以及使用他们将那些事先承诺投什么票和制定什么法律的人选进来，这也违背了对他的信任。这样调整候选人和选举人，另造选举的方式，除了是将政府连根拔起，并毒害公共保障的泉源，还会是什么？因为既然公民保留给他们自己选举其代表的权利，作为对其财产的保护，没有别的目的，仅仅是一直可以自由的选举代表，这样选出之后，在仔细调查和互相辩论的基础上，依断定的国家的需要和公共利益的要求，自由的制定法律和给与建议。对此，那些在倾听辩论，权衡各方的理由之前便予以投票的人，是做不到这一点的。预备这样的议会，并竭力建立起他自己意志的同谋，以取代真正的公民代表和社会的法律制定者，当然的，这是和可能遇到的完全宣告颠覆政府的意图一样重大的背信。对此，如果再加上为这一目的而使用显见的奖赏和惩罚，以及制定变态的法律的种种诡计，以扫除和毁灭实现这一意图的过程中的所有阻碍与不愿跟从和同意背叛他们国家的自由的人，这到底在干什么，便毋庸置疑了。在社会中他们应当拥有什么样的权力，如此使用这种权力的人与社会建立之初所赋予的信任相背离，是很容易判断的；他不能不知道，有人一旦对这样的事情有所企图，便不能再给与信任。

WIND

§223. To this perhaps it will be said, that the people being ignorant, and always discontented, to lay the foundation of government in the unsteady opinion and uncertain humour of the people, is to expose it to certain ruin; and no government will be able long to subsist, if the people may set up a new legislative, whenever they take offence at the old one. To this I answer, quite the contrary. People are not so easily got out of their old forms, as some are apt to suggest. They are hardly to be prevailed with to amend the acknowledged faults in the frame they have been accustomed to. And if there be any original defects, or adventitious ones introduced by time, or corruption; it is not an easy thing to get them changed, even when all the world sees there is an opportunity for it. This slowness and aversion in the people to quit their old constitutions, has, in the many revolutions which have been seen in this kingdom, in this and former ages, still kept us to, or, after some interval of fruitless attempts, still brought us back again to our old legislative of king, lords and commons: and whatever provocations have made the crown be taken from some of our princes heads, they never carried the people so far as to place it in another line.
§223. 对此也许有人会说，既然人们无知，并总是心怀不满，那么将政府的基础建于人们不稳定的舆论和不确定的情绪之上，必定会处于破坏的危险之中；无论何时，只要人们不满旧的立法权力便可以建立一个新的，那么没有政府能够长久的存在下去。对此我的回答是，完全相反。人们并不像某些人所暗示的那样容易走出他们旧的政府形式。他们很难被说服去修正他们所习惯的政府架构中的公认的缺陷。并且，如果最初的政府架构中存在任何的缺陷，或者随着时间的流逝产生某些缺陷或败坏；改变这些并不容易，即使全世界都看到了改变的机会。人们放弃旧的宪制的迟钝和反感的倾向，在我们这个王国现在和过去的许多次革命中，仍然保留，或者，经过几番没有结果的企图之后，仍然将我们带回到我们旧的由国王，贵族和大众所组成的立法权力：不管什么样的愤怒使我们的一些君主的王冠丧失，它们却并没有将他们带到改变宪制本身的地步。

WIND

§224. But it will be said, this hypothesis lays a ferment for frequent rebellion. To which I answer,
§224. 但是，仍然有人会说，这种假设奠定了激发经常性反叛的根源。对此我的回答是，

WIND

First, No more than any other hypothesis: for when the people are made miserable, and find themselves exposed to the ill usage of arbitrary power, cry up their governors, as much as you will, for sons of Jupiter; let them be sacred and divine, descended, or authorized from heaven; give them out for whom or what you please, the same will happen. The people generally ill treated, and contrary to right, will be ready upon any occasion to ease themselves of a burden that sits heavy upon them. They will wish, and seek for the opportunity, which in the change, weakness and accidents of human affairs, seldom delays long to offer itself. He must have lived but a little while in the world, who has not seen examples of this in his time; and he must have read very little, who cannot produce examples of it in all sorts of governments in the world.
第一，这不会超过任何其它的假设：因为当人们陷于悲惨境地，发现他们自己处于肆意权力的滥用之中，终然你将他们的统治者吹捧为朱庇特（Jupiter，古罗马神话中的主神）的儿子；将他们奉为神性，受权于天国；无论你把他们说成是什么，同样的事情仍然会发生。人们普遍的遭到虐待，权利遭到侵犯，他们一有机会就会摆脱加于他们身上的压迫。他们期待并寻求机会，这种机会在人类事务的变迁，脆弱和意外中，很少迟迟不会出现。谁如果未曾知晓他那个时代这样的例子，那么一定是他在这个世界生活的时间太短；谁如果不能从世界所有类型的政府中举出这样的例子，那么一定是他读得很少。

§225. Secondly, I answer, such revolutions happen not upon every little mismanagement in public affairs. Great mistakes in the ruling part, many wrong and inconvenient laws, and all the slips of human frailty, will be born by the people without mutiny or murmur. But if a long train of abuses, prevarications and artifices, all tending the same way, make the design visible to the people, and they cannot but feel what they lie under, and see whither they are going; it is not to be wondered, that they should then rouse themselves, and endeavour to put the rule into such hands which may secure to them the ends for which government was at first erected; and without which, ancient names, and specious forms, are so far from being better, that they are much worse, than the state of nature, or pure anarchy; the inconveniencies being all as great and as near, but the remedy farther off and more difficult.
§225. 第二，我的回答是，这样的革命并不会基于公共事务中每个小小的错误管理而发生。即使重大的统治过失，许多错误和不当的法律，以及人类缺陷的暴露，人们都会加以容忍，不会反叛和抱怨。但是，如果一长串的权力滥用，谎言和权术，全都趋向于同一条道路，使得其意图为人们所见，那么他们就不能不对自身的处境有所察觉，不能不看到他们往何处去；毫无疑问，他们应当唤醒自己，竭力将统治权力交给那些能够保障最初建立政府的目的的人；没有这些，那么古老的名义和华丽的形式都不会比自然状态或纯粹的无政府状态好，而是要糟糕得多；所有的麻烦都那么严重那么切近，而矫正的方法却更加遥远更加困难。

WIND

§226. Thirdly, I answer, that this doctrine of a power in the people of providing for their safety a-new, by a new legislative, when their legislators have acted contrary to their trust, by invading their property, is the best fence against rebellion, and the probablest means to hinder it: for rebellion being an opposition, not to persons, but authority, which is founded only in the constitutions and laws of the government; those, whoever they be, who by force break through, and by force justify their violation of them, are truly and properly rebels: for when men, by entering into society and civil-government, have excluded force, and introduced laws for the preservation of property, peace, and unity amongst themselves, those who set up force again in opposition to the laws, do rebellare[revolt], that is, bring back again the state of war, and are properly rebels: which they who are in power, (by the pretence they have to authority, the temptation of force they have in their hands, and the flattery of those about them) being likeliest to do; the properest way to prevent the evil, is to shew them the danger and injustice of it, who are under the greatest temptation to run into it.
§226. 第三，我的回答是，当公民的立法者们由于侵犯他们的财产而违背对他们的信任的时候，他们便拥有建立新的立法权力以重新获得安全的权力，这种学说是对抗反叛最好的保护和阻止反叛最有效的手段：因为反叛不是对抗个人而是对抗权力，而只有政府的宪制（可以解释为规定政府形式的法律）和法律才是以权力为基础的；无论是谁，若通过强制力破坏法律，以及通过强制力为他们的侵犯进行辩护，才真正可以恰当的称之为“反叛”：因为当人们通过进入社会和组成公民政府，便已经排除了强制力，并引入法律来保护财产，和平，以及将他们联合在一起，那些再次兴起强制力以反对法律的人，无疑就是反叛，换言之，再次带回到战争状态，是真正的反叛者：这样的反叛，那些掌握权力的人，（由于他们拥有权力的借口，手中握有强制力的诱惑，他们周围的人的奉承）才最有可能去做；阻止这种罪恶的最恰当的方式是，向那些处于这种最大的诱惑之下的人说明这种罪恶的危险和非正义。

WIND

§227. In both the fore-mentioned cases, when either the legislative is changed, or the legislators act contrary to the end for which they were constituted; those who are guilty are guilty of rebellion: for if any one by force takes away the established legislative of any society, and the laws by them made, pursuant to their trust, he thereby takes away the umpirage, which every one had consented to, for a peaceable decision of all their controversies, and a bar to the state of war amongst them. They, who remove, or change the legislative, take away this decisive power, which no body can have, but by the appointment and consent of the people; and so destroying the authority which the people did, and no body else can set up, and introducing a power which the people hath not authorized, they actually introduce a state of war, which is that of force without authority: and thus, by removing the legislative established by the society, (in whose decisions the people acquiesced and united, as to that of their own will) they untie the knot, and expose the people a-new to the state of war. And if those, who by force take away the legislative, are rebels, the legislators themselves, as has been shewn, can be no less esteemed so, when they, who were set up for the protection, and preservation of the people, their liberties and properties, shall by force invade and endeavour to take them away; and so they putting themselves into a state of war with those who made them the protectors and guardians of their peace, are properly, and with the greatest aggravation, rebellantes, rebels.
§227. 在前面提到的两种情况中（§212，§221），当立法权力的性质改变，或者立法者们行事违背设立他们的目的；那些有罪的人便是犯了反叛（叛乱）的罪：因为如果任何人以强制力取消任何社会所建立的立法权力和立法权力按照他们所接受的信任所制定的法律，他便取消了“仲裁”，而仲裁是每个人都同意的，为了和平的裁定所有他们之间的争议，在他们之间所建立的阻止战争状态的一道隔栏。那些移除或者改变立法权力的人，取消了这种裁定权力，这是任何人都不能拥有只能通过公民的指定和同意；于是便毁灭了公民所授与的而其他任何人都不能建立的权力，并引入了一种未经公民授权的权力，实际上他们这是引入了战争状态，即未经授权而使用强制力的状态：这样一来，通过移除社会所建立的立法权力，（人们默认并通过立法权力的裁定联合在一起，如同他们自己所做的裁定）他们把这个“结”解开，于是再度置人们于战争状态之中。并且，如果那些以强制力取消立法权力的人是叛乱者，那么立法者们自己——设立他们是为了保护公民的自由和财产，如已经说明的，当他们以强制力侵犯并竭力夺走这一切的时候，也应当被视为叛乱者；他们如此置身于对那些将他们视为其和平的保护者和监护人的人们的战争状态之中，是真正的最严重的叛乱者。

WIND

§228. But if they, who say it lays a foundation for rebellion, mean that it may occasion civil wars, or intestine broils, to tell the people they are absolved from obedience when illegal attempts are made upon their liberties or properties, and may oppose the unlawful violence of those who were their magistrates, when they invade their properties contrary to the trust put in them; and that therefore this doctrine is not to be allowed, being so destructive to the peace of the world: they may as well say, upon the same ground, that honest men may not oppose robbers or pirates, because this may occasion disorder or bloodshed. If any mischief come in such cases, it is not to be charged upon him who defends his own right, but on him that invades his neighbours. If the innocent honest man must quietly quit all he has, for peace sake, to him who will lay violent hands upon it, I desire it may be considered, what a kind of peace there will be in the world, which consists only in violence and rapine; and which is to be maintained only for the benefit of robbers and oppressors. Who would not think it an admirable peace betwixt the mighty and the mean, when the lamb, without resistance, yielded his throat to be torn by the imperious wolf? Polyphemus's den gives us a perfect pattern of such a peace, and such a government, wherein Ulysses and his companions had nothing to do, but quietly to suffer themselves to be devoured. And no doubt Ulysses, who was a prudent man, preached up passive obedience, and exhorted them to a quiet submission, by representing to them of what concernment peace was to mankind, and by shewing the inconveniences might happen, if they should offer to resist Polyphemus, who had now the power over them.
§228. 但是如果那些认为我的说法奠定了反叛基础的人的意思是说，如果告诉人们当非法的企图威胁他们的自由或财产的时候，他们可以免除服从的责任，当他们的管理者违背交托给他们的信任而侵犯他们的财产的时候，他们可以抵抗这种非法的强制力，这可能引起公民之间的战争或国内骚乱；所以这种学说不应当允许，因为对世界的和平具有破坏性：那么他们也可以基于同样的理由说，正直的人不应当抵抗抢劫者或海盗，因为这会引起混乱或流血。如果在这样的情况中产生任何的损害，那么不应当指控捍卫自身权利的人，而应当指控侵犯其邻人的人。如果为了和平的缘故，无辜的正直的人必须平静放弃他的所有，让给那些欲施加暴行的人，那么我想请考虑一下，世间到底是怎样一种和平，它包括的不过是暴行强夺罢了；而维持这种和平不过是为了抢劫者和压迫者的利益。当羔羊未加抵抗的将自己交由专横的狼来撕裂他的咽喉，谁不会认为这是强者和卑微者之间值得钦佩的和平呢？Polyphemus（希腊神话中的独眼巨人）的山洞给与了我们一个有关这种和平和这种政府的完美典型，Ulysses（即Odysseus）和他的同伴除了平静的接受被吞噬的命运，什么也不做。毫无疑问，Ulysses是一个谨慎的人，通过向他们说明和平对人类的重要性，如果他们现在就对控制他们的Polyphemus表现出抵抗，会发生怎样的麻烦，从而宣扬消极的服从，劝说他们平静的接受。

§229. The end of government is the good of mankind; and which is best for mankind, that the people should be always exposed to the boundless will of tyranny, or that the rulers should be sometimes liable to be opposed, when they grow exorbitant in the use of their power, and employ it for the destruction, and not the preservation of the properties of their people?
§229. 政府的目的是人类的利益；人们应当总是置身于暴政没有边界的意志之下，或者当统治者过度使用他们所掌握的权力，用它来破坏而不是保护他们的臣民的财产的时候，应当受到抵抗，试问对人类而言哪种方式更好呢？

WIND

§230. Nor let any one say, that mischief can arise from hence, as often as it shall please a busy head, or turbulent spirit, to desire the alteration of the government. It is true, such men may stir, whenever they please; but it will be only to their own just ruin and perdition: for till the mischief be grown general, and the ill designs of the rulers become visible, or their attempts sensible to the greater part, the people, who are more disposed to suffer than right themselves by resistance, are not apt to stir. The examples of particular injustice, or oppression of here and there an unfortunate man, moves them not. But if they universally have a persuasion, grounded upon manifest evidence, that designs are carrying on against their liberties, and the general course and tendency of things cannot but give them strong suspicions of the evil intention of their governors, who is to be blamed for it? Who can help it, if they, who might avoid it, bring themselves into this suspicion? Are the people to be blamed, if they have the sense of rational creatures, and can think of things no otherwise than as they find and feel them? And is it not rather their fault, who put things into such a posture, that they would not have them thought to be as they are? I grant, that the pride, ambition, and turbulency of private men have sometimes caused great disorders in commonwealths, and factions have been fatal to states and kingdoms. But whether the mischief hath oftener begun in the people’s wantonness, and a desire to cast off the lawful authority of their rulers, or in the rulers insolence, and endeavours to get and exercise an arbitrary power over their people; whether oppression, or disobedience, gave the first rise to the disorder, I leave it to impartial history to determine. This I am sure, whoever, either ruler or subject, by force goes about to invade the rights of either prince or people, and lays the foundation for overturning the constitution and frame of any just government, is highly guilty of the greatest crime, I think, a man is capable of, being to answer for all those mischiefs of blood, rapine, and desolation, which the breaking to pieces of governments bring on a country. And he who does it, is justly to be esteemed the common enemy and pest of mankind, and is to be treated accordingly.
§230. 任何人也不能说，因为我的说法迎合了一个意图改变政府的多事或骚乱的人，于是危害便会经常发生。确实，这样的人可以随时引起骚乱；但是这只是他们自己的毁灭：因为在损害变得普遍，统治者的恶意意图显露出来，或者他们的企图为多数人所察觉之前，宁愿忍受而不是通过抵抗自行纠正的人们，并不倾向于骚乱。个别的非正义的事例，或者这里或那里一个倒霉的人所受的压迫，是不会激动他们的。但是如果基于明显的证据，他们普遍的相信，那种意图正在侵蚀他们的自由，并且事物一般的进程和倾向不能不给予他们对他们统治者的邪恶意图的强烈怀疑，谁应该为此受到谴责呢？如果本可以避免这种事情的他们将他们自己带到这样受质疑的地步，谁又能阻止这种事情？如果人们具有理性被造物的感觉，看待事物只凭他们对事物的感觉和发现，他们应当因此而受到谴责吗？这难道不是那些将事态推到这一步的人的过错吗，尽管他们认为事情本来也不是这样的？我承认，个人的傲慢，野心和狂暴有时会引起国家巨大的混乱，内乱有时会成为国家的灾难。但是祸患更多的始于人们的放肆，并意图抛弃他们统治者的合法权力，还是在于统治者的傲慢，并竭力攫取和行使对其臣民的肆意权力；是压迫还是不服从最先产生混乱，我留给公正的历史去裁断。我相信这一点，无论是统治者还是臣民，通过强制力到处侵犯君主或臣民的权利，奠定推翻任何正当政府的宪制和框架的基础，我认为，这是一个人所能犯下的最严重的罪行，应当为政府瓦解所带给一个国家的流血，强夺和破败的损失负责。谁做了这件事，都应当被视为人类共同的敌人和害虫，并受到相应的对待。

§231. That subjects or foreigners, attempting by force on the properties of any people, may be resisted with force, is agreed on all hands. But that magistrates, doing the same thing, may be resisted, hath of late been denied: as if those who had the greatest privileges and advantages by the law, had thereby a power to break those laws, by which alone they were set in a better place than their brethren: whereas their offence is thereby the greater, both as being ungrateful for the greater share they have by the law, and breaking also that trust, which is put into their hands by their brethren.
§231. 臣民或者外国人，以强制力欲对任何公民的财产有所企图时，便可以以强制力进行抵抗，这是所有人都赞同的。但是当管理者做了同样的事情，也可以进行抵抗的时候，近来却被人否定：似乎那些基于法律享有最大的特殊权力和优势的人，也因此拥有破坏那些法律的权力，其实只是基于这样的法律他们才处于较他们的同胞更好的地位：相反，他们的侵犯更为严重，因为他们不但不感激基于法律而享有的更多的权力，而且违背同胞交与他们手中的信任。

WIND

§232. Whosoever uses force without right, as every one does in society, who does it without law, puts himself into a state of war with those against whom he so uses it; and in that state all former ties are cancelled, all other rights cease, and every one has a right to defend himself, and to resist the aggressor. This is so evident, that Barclay himself, that great assertor of the power and sacredness of kings, is forced to confess, that it is lawful for the people, in some cases, to resist their king; and that too in a chapter, wherein he pretends to shew, that the divine law shuts up the people from all manner of rebellion. Whereby it is evident, even by his own doctrine, that, since they may in some cases resist, all resisting of princes is not rebellion. His words are these:
Quod siquis dicat, Ergone populus tyrannicae crudelitati & furori jugulum semper praebebit? Ergone multitude civitates suas fame, ferro, & flamma vastari, seque, conjuges, & liberos fortunae ludibrio & tyranni libidini exponi, inque omnia vitae pericula omnesque miserias & molestias a rege deduci patientur? Num illis quod omni animantium generi est a natura tributum, denegari debet, ut sc. vim vi repellant, seseq; ab injuria, tueantur? Huic breviter responsum sit, Populo universo negari defensionem, quae juris naturalis est, neque ultionem quae praeter naturam est adversus regem concedi debere. Quapropter si rex non in singulares tantum personas aliquot privatum odium exerceat, sed corpus etiam reipublicae, cujus ipse caput est, i.e. totum populum, vel insignem aliquam ejus partem immani & intoleranda saevitia seu tyrannide divexet; populo, quidem hoc casu resistendi ac tuendi se ab injuria potestas competit, sed tuendi se tantum, non enim in principem invadendi: & restituendae injuriae illatae, non recedendi a debita reverentia propter acceptam injuriam. Praesentem denique impetum propulsandi non vim praeteritam ulciscenti jus habet. Horum enim alterum a natura est, ut vitam scilicet corpusque tueamur. Alterum vero contra naturam, ut inferior de superiori supplicium sumat. Quod itaque populus malum, antequam factum sit, impedire potest, ne fiat, id postquam factum est, in regem authorem sceleris vindicare non potest: populus igitur hoc amplius quam privatus quispiam habet: quod huic, vel ipsis adversariis judicibus, excepto Buchanano, nullum nisi in patientia remedium superest. Cum ille si intolerabilis tyrannus est (modicum enim ferre omnino debet) resistere cum reverentia possit, Barclay contra Monarchom. l. iii. c. 8.
In English thus:
§232. 无论是谁，若不是基于权利而使用强制力，正如社会中的人毫无法律限制的行事，便将他自己置身于对他所施加强制的人的战争状态之中；在这种状态中，所有之前的约束都解除了，所有其它的权利都终止了，每个人只有一种权利，那就是自我防御并抵抗入侵者。这是如此的明显，以致巴克利(William Barclay, 1546–1608, 苏格兰法学家)本人，那位国王权力和神圣性的杰出的辩护者，也不得不承认，在某些情况下，人们抵抗他们的国王是合法的；而这就在他自称可以说明“神法”禁止人们采取一切形式的反叛的那一章中。因此很明显，即使是根据他自己的说法，既然他们在某些情况下可以抵抗，那么并非所有的抵抗都是反叛了。他的原话是这样的：
[原文]
翻译成英语如下：

驾一叶之扁舟

期待WIND 的全部译文。

WIND

§233. But if any one should ask, must the people then always lay themselves open to the cruelty and rage of tyranny? Must they see their cities pillaged, and laid in ashes, their wives and children exposed to the tyrant's lust and fury, and themselves and families reduced by their king to ruin, and all the miseries of want and oppression, and yet sit still? Must men alone be debarred the common privilege of opposing force with force, which nature allows so freely to all other creatures for their preservation from injury? I answer: Self-defence is a part of the law of nature; nor can it be denied by the community, even against the king himself: but to revenge themselves upon him, must by no means be allowed them; it being not agreeable to that law. Wherefore if the king shall shew an hatred, not only to some particular persons, but sets himself against the body of the common-wealth, whereof he is the head, and shall, with intolerable ill usage, cruelly tyrannize over the whole, or a considerable part of the people, in this case the people have a right to resist and defend themselves from injury: but it must be with this caution, that they only defend themselves, but do not attack their prince: they may repair the damages received, but must not for any provocation exceed the bounds of due reverence and respect. They may repulse the present attempt, but must not revenge past violences: for it is natural for us to defend life and limb, but that an inferior should punish a superior, is against nature. The mischief which is designed upon them, the people may prevent before it be done; but when it is done, they must not revenge it on the king, though author of the villainy. This therefore is the privilege of the people in general, above what any private person hath; that particular men are allowed by our adversaries themselves (Buchanan only excepted) to have no other remedy but patience; but the body of the people may with respect resist intolerable tyranny; for when it is but moderate, they ought to endure it.
§233. 但是如果有人问，那么，人们必须一直置身于暴政的残酷和狂怒之下吗？当他们看到他们的城市被掠夺，化为灰烬，他们的妻子和孩子置身于暴君的淫欲和狂怒之下，他们自己和家庭被他们的国王毁灭，以及所有贫乏和压迫的苦难，必须仍然坐视不管？自然允许所有其它的生物为了保护它们不受侵害，可以以强制力对抗强制力，唯独人必须被禁止使用这种共同的特殊权利吗？我的回答是：自卫是自然法的一部分；不能为共同体所否定，即使是反对国王本人：但是针对他的报复，必须加以禁止；因为这是与自然法相冲突的。因此，如果国王不仅对某些个人表现出恶意，而且与其身为元首的整个国家作对，以不能忍受的权力的滥用，残酷的压迫全体或相当一部分臣民，在这种情况下人们便有权利抵抗和保护自身不受伤害：但是必须注意，他们只能保护自己，不能攻击他们的君主：他们可以补偿他们所受的损害，但是不能因为任何愤怒而超越应有的恭敬的边界。他们可以挫败当前的企图，但不应当对过去的暴行进行报复：因为保护我们自己的生命和肢体，这是很自然的，但是下级惩罚上级，则违背了自然。意图加于人们的伤害，他们可以在其实现之前予以阻止；但是在实施之后，他们不应当对国王进行报复，即便他是恶行的主谋。所以，这（抵抗暴政）是超越任何个人所拥有的特殊权利，为全体公民所拥有；连我们的论敌（只有布坎南除外。布坎南（George Buchanan，1506 – 1582，苏格兰历史学家和人本主义学者））也承认个人除了忍耐没有别的纠正办法；但是全体公民则可以“尊敬的抵抗”不能忍受的暴政；因为当暴政尚有节制，他们便应当忍受它。

§234. Thus far that great advocate of monarchical power allows of resistance.
§234. 这就是那位重要的君主权力的主张者对抵抗所能容忍的程度。

WIND

期待WIND 的全部译文。
驾一叶之扁舟 发表于 2011-8-20 09:11

谢谢驾舟兄。这个月底应该能够完成。

WIND

§235. It is true, he has annexed two limitations to it, to no purpose:
First, He says, it must be with reverence.
Secondly, It must be without retribution, or punishment; and the reason he gives is, because an inferior cannot punish a superior.
§235. 确实，巴克利为抵抗毫无目的的附加了两项限制：
第一，他说，抵抗必须恭敬。
第二，抵抗必须不附加惩罚（这是报复的主要内容）；他给出的理由是，因为下级不能惩罚上级。

WIND

First, How to resist force without striking again, or how to strike with reverence, will need some skill to make intelligible. He that shall oppose an assault only with a shield to receive the blows, or in any more respectful posture, without a sword in his hand, to abate the confidence and force of the assailant, will quickly be at an end of his resistance, and will find such a defence serve only to draw on himself the worse usage. This is as ridiculous a way of resisting, as Juvenal thought it of fighting; ubi tu pulsas, ego vapulo tantum[where you strike I only am beaten]. And the success of the combat will be unavoidably the same he there describes it:
—— Libertas pauperis haec est:
Pulsatus rogat, & pugnis concisus, adorat,
Ut liceat paucis cum dentibus inde reverti.
[All the liberty which a poor man has is: to ask, if beaten, and to supplicate earnestly, if bruised unmercifully with fist-scuffs, that he may return home without having all his teeth beaten out.]
This will always be the event of such an imaginary resistance, where men may not strike again. He therefore who may resist, must be allowed to strike. And then let our author, or any body else, join a knock on the head, or a cut on the face, with as much reverence and respect as he thinks fit. He that can reconcile blows and reverence, may, for aught I know, desire for his pains, a civil, respectful cudgeling where-ever he can meet with it.
第一，如何抵抗强制力而不还手，或者如何恭敬的还手，需要一些技巧才能解释清楚。如果一个人抵抗攻击只用盾牌挡剑，或者采取更尊敬的姿态，手不持剑，以击退攻击者的信心和力量，抵抗很快就会结束，并会发现这样的防御只会使自己陷入更糟的境地。这是一种荒谬的抵抗方式，正如朱维诺（Juvenal，c.60–c.140，古罗马诗人，讽刺作家）所设想的战斗方式；“你打我，我让你打”。这样战斗的结果将不可避免的如他所述：
“一个可怜的人所拥有的自由就是：被打了，他请求，被无情的拳打脚踢伤害了，他哀求，以便可以保留几颗牙齿回家。”
人们抵抗而不可以还手，便是这样一种想象的抵抗。所以，可以抵抗的人，必须允许其还手。让我们的作者（指巴克利）或任何其他人，将当头一击或迎面一刀与他所能想象的恭敬连在一起吧。谁能协调挨打和恭敬，就我所知，也许可以被痛打之后，再期待礼貌而尊敬的一棒。

WIND

Secondly, as to his second, an inferior cannot punish a superior; that is true, generally speaking, whilst he is his superior. But to resist force with force, being the state of war that levels the parties, cancels all former relation of reverence, respect, and superiority: and then the odds that remains, is, that he, who opposes the unjust aggressor, has this superiority over him, that he has a right, when he prevails, to punish the offender, both for the breach of the peace, and all the evils that followed upon it. Barclay therefore, in another place, more coherently to himself, denies it to be lawful to resist a king in any case, but he there assigns two cases, whereby a king may un-king himself. His words are:
Quid ergo, nulline casus incidere possunt quibus populo sese erigere atque in regem impotentius dominantem arma capere & invadere jure suo suaque authoritate liceat? Nulli certe quamdiu rex manet. Semper enim ex divinis id obstat, Regem honorificato; & qui potestati resistit, Dei ordinationi resisit: non alias igitur in eum populo potestas est quam si id committat propter quod ipso jure rex esse desinat. Tunc enim se ipse principatu exuit atque in privatis constituit liber: hoc modo populus & superior efficitur, reverso ad eum sc. jure illo quod ante regem inauguratum in interregno habuit. At sunt paucorum generum commissa ejusmodi quae hunc effectum pariunt. At ego cum plurima animo perlustrem, duo tantum invenio, duos, inquam, casus quibus rex ipso facto ex rege non regem se facit & omni honore & dignitate regali atque in subditos potestate destituit; quorum etiam meminit Winzerus. Horum unus est, Si regnum disperdat, quemadmodum de Nerone fertur, quod is nempe senatum populumque Romanum, atque adeo urbem ipsam ferro flammaque vastare, ac novas sibi sedes quaerere decrevisset. Et de Caligula, quod palam denunciarit se neque civem neque principem senatui amplius fore, inque animo habuerit interempto utriusque ordinis electissimo quoque Alexandriam commigrare, ac ut populum uno ictu interimeret, unam ei cervicem optavit. Talia cum rex aliquis meditator & molitur serio, omnem regnandi curam & animum ilico abjicit, ac proinde imperium in subditos amittit, ut dominus servi pro derelicto habiti dominium.
§236. Alter casus est, Si rex in alicujus clientelam se contulit, ac regnum quod liberum a majoribus & populo traditum accepit, alienae ditioni mancipavit. Nam tunc quamvis forte non ea mente id agit populo plane ut incommodet: tamen quia quod praecipuum est regiae dignitatis amifit, ut summus scilicet in regno secundum Deum sit, & solo Deo inferior, atque populum etiam totum ignorantem vel invitum, cujus libertatem sartam & tectam conservare debuit, in alterius gentis ditionem & potestatem dedidit; hac velut quadam regni ab alienatione effecit, ut nec quod ipse in regno imperium habuit retineat, nec in eum cui collatum voluit, juris quicquam transferat; atque ita eo facto liberum jam & suae potestatis populum relinquit, cujus rei exemplum unum annales Scotici suppeditant. Barclay contra Monarchom. l. iii. c. 16.
Which in English runs thus:
第二，至于他的第二点，下级不能惩罚上级；一般来说，当他还是他的上级的时候，确实如此。但是对于以强制力抵抗强制力，作为一种双方平等的战争状态，便取消了所有之前的恭敬和上下级的关系：于是剩下的可能性就是，反抗非正义的入侵者一方，对入侵者具有如下的优势，当他获胜的时候，拥有权利因为侵犯者破坏和平和一切和平破坏之后的罪恶而惩罚之。所以，巴克利在另外的地方，说得更清楚一些，他否定在任何情况下抵抗国王是合法的，但是他指出两种情况，国王可以因此而丧失王权。他的话如下：
[原文]
翻译成英语就是：

WIND

§237. What then, can there no case happen wherein the people may of right, and by their own authority, help themselves, take arms, and set upon their king, imperiously domineering over them? None at all, whilst he remains a king. Honour the king, and he that resists the power, resists the ordinance of God; are divine oracles that will never permit it. The people therefore can never come by a power over him, unless he does something that makes him cease to be a king: for then he divests himself of his crown and dignity, and returns to the state of a private man, and the people become free and superior, the power which they had in the interregnum, before they crowned him king, devolving to them again. But there are but few miscarriages which bring the matter to this state. After considering it well on all sides, I can find but two. Two cases there are, I say, whereby a king, ipso facto[by the fact itself], becomes no king, and loses all power and regal authority over his people; which are also taken notice of by Winzerus.
The first is, If he endeavour to overturn the government, that is, if he have a purpose and design to ruin the kingdom and commonwealth, as it is recorded of Nero, that he resolved to cut off the senate and people of Rome, lay the city waste with fire and sword, and then remove to some other place. And of Caligula, that he openly declared, that he would be no longer a head to the people or senate, and that he had it in his thoughts to cut off the worthiest men of both ranks, and then retire to Alexandria: and he wisht that the people had but one neck, that he might dispatch them all at a blow. Such designs as these, when any king harbours in his thoughts, and seriously promotes, he immediately gives up all care and thought of the common-wealth; and consequently forfeits the power of governing his subjects, as a master does the dominion over his slaves whom he hath abandoned.
§237. 那么，能不能发生这样的事情，人们可以根据他们自己的权利和权力进行自救，拿起武器，攻击专横的压迫他们的国王呢？当他还是国王的时候，绝不能这样。尊重国王，抵抗权力就是抵抗上帝的法律；这是从未允许那样做的神的诫律。所以，人们绝不能得到针对国王的权力，除非他做了什么事，使得他不再成为一个国王：因为此后他便丧失了自己的王冠和高贵，回归个人的状态，人们因而变得自由和更有优势，他们在奉他为国王之前王位空缺期所拥有的权力，再度回归到他们手中。但是只有极少数的误政行为才会把事情弄到这种地步。在仔细全面考虑之后，我发现只有两种。我说，有两种情况使一个国王事实上不再是国王，从而丧失对其臣民的所有权力和王权；Winzerus也注意到了这一点。
第一种情况是，如果他竭力推翻政府，换言之，如果他意图毁灭国家，比如历史上记录的尼禄（Nero，ad 37–68，罗马皇帝），他决意根除元老院与罗马公民，用火与剑使城市变为废墟，然后迁往别处。又如历史上记录的卡利古拉（Caligula，ad 12–41，罗马皇帝），他公开的宣称，他不再是罗马公民或元老院的元首，他已打算根除这两个阶层中那些最有价值最值得敬重的人，然后退到亚历山大（埃及北部港口城市）去：他希望罗马公民只有一条脖子，好让他一刀就迅速解决了他们。当任何国王怀有这样的意图并真的促其实现，他便立即放弃了所有对国家的关心；理所当然也就丧失了统治其臣民的权力，如同一个主人抛弃了他的奴隶，他对他们的权力也就丧失了。

WIND

§238. The other case is, when a king makes himself the dependent of another, and subjects his kingdom which his ancestors left him, and the people put free into his hands, to the dominion of another: for however perhaps it may not be his intention to prejudice the people; yet because he has hereby lost the principal part of regal dignity, viz. to be next and immediately under God, supreme in his kingdom; and also because he betrayed or forced his people, whose liberty he ought to have carefully preserved, into the power and dominion of a foreign nation. By this, as it were, alienation of his kingdom, he himself loses the power he had in it before, without transferring any the least right to those on whom he would have bestowed it; and so by this act sets the people free, and leaves them at their own disposal. One example of this is to be found in the Scotch Annals.
§238. 另一种情况是，当一个国王自己依附于另一个国王，将他的先辈留给他的，以及人们自由交给他的王国服从于另一个王国的统治：因为，即使可能他无意伤害他的臣民；然而因为他因此而丧失了国王的尊严的主要内容，即在他的王国内仅次于上帝的最高的地位；并且他背叛或者强迫他的臣民——他本来应当细心的保护他们的自由——置身于外国的权力和统治之下。可以这么说，因为这种卖国，他便丧失了他之前所拥有的权力，丝毫也没有将任何权利转让给他已经转让的人；并且因为这种行为使人们获得了自由，让他们可以自行其事。苏格兰的历史上也可以找到这样一个例子。